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Historians often emphasize the physical features of battle—terrain, weaponry, 
troop formations, earthworks, etc.—in assessments of Civil War combat. Most scholars 
agree that these external combat conditions strongly influenced battle performance. Other 
historians accentuate the ways in which the mental stresses of soldiering affected combat 
performance. These scholars tend to agree that fighting effectiveness was influenced by 
such non-physical combat conditions as unit cohesion, leadership, morale, and emotional 
stress. Few authors argue that combat’s mental influences were more significant in 
determining success or failure than the physical features of the battlefield. Statistical 
analysis of the 465 tactical engagements fought by twenty-seven Federal regiments in the 
First Division of the Army of the Potomac’s Second Corps throughout the American 
Civil War suggests that the mental aspects of battle affected fighting efficiency at least as 
much—and probably more than—combat’s physical characteristics. In other words, the 
soldiers’ attitudes, opinions, and emotions had a somewhat stronger impact on combat 
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“It is well that war is so terrible—we should grow too fond of it!” 
General Robert E. Lee at Fredericksburg, December 13, 18621 
 
“Your men have done all that men could do; the fault is entirely my own.” 
General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, July 3, 18632 
 
“I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered.” 
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant at Cold Harbor, June 3, 18643 
 
 
No epoch in the history of the United States was more sanguine than that of the 
American Civil War. The nation was torn, families were broken, and brothers were pitted 
against one another in mortal combat. The fratricide continued for four years before 
Federal military success ended it. By that time, the whirlwind of war had taken more than 
620,000 lives.4 In the 140 years that have elapsed since the war began, the quotations of 
Lee and Grant (above) have come to epitomize the tragic cost of Civil War combat. So 
great is the intellectual influence of these words that our understanding of Civil War 
combat is still shaped by them.5 
                                                          
1 Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1934-35), 2:462. 
2 Ibid., 3:130. 
3 Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant (New York: Century Company, 1897), 179. 
4 The total number of soldiers who died during the Civil War is difficult to state with precision. 
The 620,000 men referred to here may be found in a widely used synthesis, James M. McPherson, Battle 
Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 854. 
5 The most recent, and arguably the most complete, military history of the Civil War both literally 
and figuratively embodies the quotations of Generals Lee and Grant. See Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil 




The traditional approach to understanding Civil War combat was founded upon 
the opinions of soldiers like Lee and Grant and has developed into an imposing 
intellectual edifice that embodies most Civil War scholarship. The essence of this 
consensus view can be captured in a single sentence: Civil War combat proved futile and 
bloody because of the tactical advantage that entrenched defenders, armed with rifled 
muskets and supported by artillery, enjoyed over exposed attackers advancing in linear 
formation. Of course, this simplification overlooks nuances such as troop strengths, 
soldier quality, combat experience, etc. However, because most analyses of such nuances 
accept, rather than reject, the core assumptions of the traditional view, they offer little 
challenge to it.6 
In light of the enduring strength of this interpretation, it would be an act of hubris 
to claim that my insight into the nature of the war is brighter, clearer, and more precise 
than those of the brave soldiers and talented scholars who have written about the Civil 
War. My goals are more modest. Through an analysis of Civil War combat, I hope to 
identify and explain those aspects of battle that most influenced combat performance. To 
do this I conducted a quantitative study of regimental combat tactics throughout the war. 
The focal point of this study is the infantry regiment. Both the Federal and 
Confederate armies employed them as their most basic combat unit. Although regiments 
usually entered battle as part of a brigade, they frequently fought independently if the 
tactical situation warranted it. Perhaps no better example of regimental independent 
                                                          
6 The recent work of a leading Civil War scholar provides an excellent example of the 
subordination of combat nuances to the core assumptions of the traditional view. See James M. 




action can be found than the moment at Gettysburg in which Major General Winfield 
Scott Hancock ordered the 260 men of the 1st Minnesota to attack an advancing 
Confederate brigade of over 1,600 soldiers. The Minnesotans battled to their deaths and 
gave Hancock the precious minutes he needed to organize his forces.7 Even when 
brigaded regiments fought side by side, their tactical experiences varied with the 
changing nature of the terrain or the uneven quality of enemy troops. Therefore, my goal 
is to interpret combat from the perspective of the regiment.8 
Because of the greater availability of Federal versus Confederate regimental 
information, this study focuses on the Federal combat experience. Specifically, twenty-
seven Federal regiments are used as the foundation for this study. The twenty-seven 
regiments are those units that engaged in any number of battles as part of the Army of the 
Potomac’s First Division, Second Corps, between May 1864 and April 1865.9 The First 
Division was chosen as the initial subject for this study because of its reputation. It began 
the Overland Campaign in May 1864 as one of the most respected fighting forces in the 
Army of the Potomac. After some 100 days, however, it was reduced to a mere shadow 
                                                          
7 For a modern history of the 1st Minnesota, especially its fateful exploits during the Battle of 
Gettysburg, see Richard Moe, The Last Full Measure: The Life and Death of the First Minnesota 
Volunteers (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993), 258-97. 
8 The infantry regiment served as the fundamental combat unit within the Federal armies, perhaps 
more so than in the Confederate armies. One author argues that the Confederates tended to employ 
brigades of three to six regiments as a single combat unit. In other words, the Confederates tended to use 
brigades as regiments and regiments as battalions. Nevertheless, Confederate regiments maintained their 
individual identities and deployed in combat as separate units within a brigade. See Hugh C. Rogers, The 
Confederates and Federals at War (New York: Hipponcrene Books, 1973), 29-31; and Everette B. Long, 
The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 716-18. 
9 Throughout this study all references regarding combat units are to volunteer infantry regiments 
unless otherwise stated. The twenty-seven regiments included in this study are the 7th New York Veterans, 
39th New York, 52nd New York, 57th New York, 61st New York, 63rd New York, 64th New York, 66th New 
York, 69th New York, 88th New York, 111th New York, 125th New York, 126th New York, 53rd 
Pennsylvania, 81st Pennsylvania, 116th Pennsylvania, 140th Pennsylvania, 145th Pennsylvania, 148th 
Pennsylvania, 183rd Pennsylvania, 2nd Delaware, 28th Massachusetts, 26th Michigan, 5th New Hampshire, 
2nd New York Heavy Artillery, 4th New York Heavy Artillery, and 7th New York Heavy Artillery. 
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of its former self. The dangers and strains of combat had depleted its ranks and eroded its 
effectiveness. It was the rapid destruction of the First Division that initially captured my 
attention.10 
Although membership in the First Division during the last year of the war was the 
criterion used for selecting the regiments, the scope of the study was broadened to 
include the entire war. Combat data were collected on each regiment’s significant 
engagements throughout the war because combat experience affected combat 
performance.11 By May 1864 many of the soldiers in the First Division were seasoned 
veterans. Their combat experiences could not be overlooked. Therefore, what began as a 
history of the First Division during the Overland Campaign became a longitudinal study 
of Civil War combat based on the fortunes of the twenty-seven regiments that constituted 
the Army of the Potomac’s First Division, Second Corps, between May 1864 and April 
1865. 
This analysis of the combat effectiveness of the twenty-seven regiments is 
statistical in nature. Those aspects of combat that lend themselves to statistical 
categorization (e.g., terrain, formation, action, etc.) as well as those variables more 
quantitative in nature (e.g., strength, casualties, etc.) occupy center stage. I have also 
                                                          
10 For accounts of the rise and fall of the First Division, indeed the entire Second Corps, in 1864, 
see Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1994), 38; David M. Jordan, Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier’s Life (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 107-09, 159-64; Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Army Corps in 
the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1887), 598-99; and, John J. Hennessy, “I 
Dread the Spring: The Army of the Potomac Prepares for the Overland Campaign,” in The Wilderness 
Campaign, ed. Gary Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 86-89. 
11 A “significant engagement” is defined as a battle that is either included in Frederick Phisterer’s 
“Chronological Record of Engagements, Battles, Etc., in the United States, 1861 to 1865” or a clash 
determined by me to have had a profound impact on the Federal regiment, either in the number of 
casualties sustained or in the perceptions of the offices and men. See Frederick Phisterer, Statistical Record 
of the Armies of the United States (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 81-244. 
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categorized and quantified numerous non-combat aspects of regimental life that 
presumably influenced combat performance (e.g., recruitment, desertion, command 
change, time-in-service, etc.). These discrete pieces of information add texture, depth, 
and meaning to the overall picture of combat. 
I will first offer a survey of Civil War combat analyses, beginning with the 
soldiers who fought the war and ending with the scholars who study it today. Second, I 
will discuss the data scrutinized in this work, detail their strengths and weaknesses, and 
summarize the analytical methodologies applied to them. Third, I will present a 
preliminary analysis of the data as a way to introduce their content and demonstrate their 
accuracy while simultaneously corroborating most scholarly tactical studies. Fourth, I 
will challenge the reliability of several atypical analyses of Civil War combat. Fifth, I 
will offer a statistical model that identifies those variables that most influenced combat, 
and rank them in order of their importance. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of 




SOLDIERS, SCHOLARS, AND CIVIL WAR COMBAT 
In 1998 two prominent Civil War historians lamented the absence of a systematic 
analysis of Civil War combat. In Writing the Civil War, both James M. McPherson and 
William J. Cooper agreed that single-battle narratives and accounts of soldiers’ 
motivations and experiences were too fragmented and disjointed to provide more than 
tactical vignettes of Civil War combat. The authors concluded that students of the war 
needed a longitudinal study of combat tactics that considered both the physical realities 
of the battlefield and the mental stresses that racked the minds of men under fire. Long 
before McPherson and Cooper challenged their colleagues to examine wartime tactics, 
however, both soldiers and scholars struggled to understand the tactical aspects of Civil 
War combat.1 
From the moment that Americans were first touched by the fire of Civil War 
combat, they began grappling with understanding the experience. The struggle continues 
today. Despite the multitude of voices that have since joined the dialogue begun by the 
soldiers, most Civil War combat analyses fit into one of two categories. The first 
interpretation began during the Civil War and dominated subsequent analyses until 
World War II. These works emphasize the physical conditions and circumstances 
                                                          
1 James M. McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr., ed., Writing the Civil War: The Quest to 
Understand (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 5. 
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surrounding men on the battlefield. In modern medical parlance, they may be described 
as taking an “environmental approach” to understanding combat. The second 
interpretation began with the close of World War II and has dominated the analysis of 
Civil War combat for the past twenty-five years. These studies emphasize the 
motivations, emotions, and reactions of soldiers on the battlefield. In modern medical 
terminology, they may be described as taking a “behavioral approach” to understanding 
combat. 
The environmental method attempts to understand combat by analyzing the 
external, physical aspects of battle. In other words, writers concentrate on the nuts-and-
bolts of the battlefield: casualties, duration, strength, tactics, terrain, weapons, weather, 
etc. The behavioral method, on the other hand, takes a personal approach to 
understanding combat. Scholars endeavor to understand combat from the soldier’s 
perspective. They emphasize the internal, mental forces affecting an infantryman as he 
struggles across the battlefield: cohesion, courage, discipline, fear, honor, leadership, 
morale, etc. Both groups of scholars exhibit varying degrees of deference toward the 
theories of the other. Most recognize that single-variable causal relationships rarely 
explain the complexities of human behavior. Still, their acknowledgments sometimes 
appear perfunctory and more a matter of protocol than sincere belief in the other’s 
argument.2 
                                                          
2 For examples of the environmental approach, see Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The 
Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987); Perry D. Jamieson, 
Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama 
Press, 1994); and Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics 
and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982). For examples of the 
behavioral method, see James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil 
 
 3 
Civil War combatants were the first to analyze their martial experiences. These 
soldiers’ conceptual framework of the war was partly a product of the intellectual milieu 
in which they lived. Their understanding of warfare was indirectly influenced by post-
Napoleonic military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini.3 Jomini’s strategic theory advocated 
direct, concentrated approaches along interior lines. Similarly, his tactical doctrine 
advocated mass frontal assaults against vulnerable points in the enemy’s line. Although 
Jomini acknowledged that maneuver was preferable to direct confrontation, he 
recognized that the difficulties associated with maneuver could be overcome only 
through the military genius of a commander like Napoleon, and even Napoleon had 
difficulty doing it. In the absence of Napoleonic genius, Jomini concluded, an army’s 
best chance for success was through concentrated, direct approaches and assaults. In 
other words, Jomini overlooked the experiences of the common soldier and instead 
emphasized strategic movements and tactical articulations. Because of its influence, the 
Jominian conceptual framework shaped the soldiers’ efforts to understand their 
experiences.4 
                                                                                                                                                                             
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Earl J. Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring 
the Ordeal of Combat (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1997). 
3 Though few Civil War soldiers studied Jomini’s writings, most were exposed to his tactical 
views. The Army’s professional officers were educated in Jominian theory by Dennis Hart Mahan, a 
professor of military and civil engineering at the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1832 
to 1870. Prior to being appointed to the faculty at West Point, Mahan spent four years in France studying 
French military theory and practice. Through Mahan’s lectures, textbooks, and post-graduate courses, 
professional officers became familiar with Jomini’s theories. The Army’s enlisted soldiers received their 
Jominian education through their officers as they trained and fought during the Civil War. See Edward 
Hagerman, “From Jomini to Dennis Hart Mahan: The Evolution of Trench Warfare and the American Civil 
War,” Civil War History 13 (September 1967): 197-220. 
4 See Antoine Henri Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1863), 185-220. Jomini’s writings between 1804 and 1839 
dominated American military thought until German victories in the Franco-Prussian War carried Karl von 
Clausewitz’s theories forward. For an introduction to Jomini, Clausewitz, and the scholarly dialogue 
surrounding the impact of their theories, see Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and 
William N. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 39-52; and 
 
 4 
Throughout the war the soldiers’ analyses of their combat experiences focused on 
the physical, external aspects of the battlefield. Casualty figures served as the soldiers’ 
most fundamental and universal measurement of a regiment’s combat effectiveness. If a 
regiment suffered heavy casualties, the numbers generally pointed to one of two possible 
conclusions: either the unit fought well and enjoyed tactical success, or it fought poorly 
and was routed. Using casualty figures as the foundation for their combat analyses, Civil 
War soldiers added countless combinations of environmental variables in an effort to 
construct an intellectual understanding of their experiences. For example, various types 
of weapons, ranging from smoothbore muskets to rifled muskets to artillery batteries, 
were often considered influential in separating victor from vanquished. Similarly, the 
tactical positions held by the belligerents at the beginning of the engagement, their 
combat formations, the intervening terrain, and the duration of the fight were all included 
by the troops at one time or another in their calculus of success. The closest that Civil 
War soldiers would come to a consensus regarding the variables that most influenced 
combat outcome was their emphasis on the physical environment of the battlefield.5 
By 1864 Civil War contemporaries began publishing formal analyses of the 
environmental aspects of Civil War combat. For example, one author argued that terrain 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 3-27. 
5 It was not possible for Civil War soldiers to differentiate and weigh the influence of various 
physical variables on combat outcome because each soldier’s analysis was limited to his own combat 
experiences. For a small sample of the soldiers’ analyses of the environmental aspects of combat, see U. S. 
War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901, ser. 1, vol. 
LI, pt. 1, pp. 20-23, 233-36; ibid., vol. XI, pt. 1, pp. 798-801, 863-66, 1062-63; ibid., pt. 2, pp. 213-14, 
614-17, 622-30; ibid., vol. XII, pt. 2, pp. 424-25; ibid., vol. XIV, pp. 58-64; ibid., vol. XXV, pt. 1, pp. 368-
69; ibid., vol. XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 664-68; ibid., vol. XXIX, pt. 1, pp. 730-32; ibid., vol. XXXVI, pt. 1, pp. 
437-40, 455-58; ibid., vol. XXI, pp. 236-38, 277-80, 368-70 (hereafter referred to as OR); and Charles G. 
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was the key to tactical success. The ground dictated positions, formations, articulations, 
and communications. In other words, “. . . every battle is determined and controlled 
largely by the character of the ground on which it is fought.” Another author, after 
witnessing the impact of artillery fire on infantry, ironclads, and fortifications, 
endeavored to bolster the soldiers’ general understanding of the “long arm” of the army 
by providing a simple history of artillery guns and the revolutionary ways in which they 
were used in the current conflict. Typical for the era, these writers emphasized various 
physical characteristics of the battlefield when discussing combat. Though their works 
seem simplistic by today’s standards, these authors deserve credit for taking the first 
steps in the historical analysis of Civil War combat.6 
Although most Civil War veterans discussed the environmental aspects of 
combat, a small number explored its behavioral aspects. This minority included two 
groups, infantrymen and their medical officers. Infantrymen served in the ranks and 
frequently spoke of several behavioral aspects of combat. Specifically, they most 
frequently discussed leadership, morale, and cohesion. These soldiers believed that 
regimental leadership, as demonstrated through the commander’s personal courage and 
effective handling of his men, directly affected the success of the regiment. Similarly, 
some believed that the zeal and confidence of the men determined their fate in battle. 
Finally, others recognized the positive effects of the strong bonds that developed among 
them as they ate, slept, trained, and fought together. For example, when writing to his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Halpine, The Life and Adventures, Songs, Services, and Speeches of Private Miles O’Reilly (New York: 
Carleton, 1864), 12. 
6 Quotation found in C. W. Tolles, “Army Movements,” The United States Service Magazine 3 
(June 1865): 541. Also see Anonymous, “A Few Facts About Artillery,” The United States Service 
 
 6 
wife in September 1861 regarding his regiment, the 14th Indiana, Lieutenant David Beem 
declared, “I shall stand by them [the men in his regiment] as long as I can, and be as 
faithful to them as possible.” Beem added, “I would rather be with them than anyone 
else.” Placing his regiment above everything else, Lieutenant Beem and his like-minded 
compatriots considered leadership, morale, and cohesion important components of an 
effective combat regiment.7 
The other Civil War veterans who analyzed the behavioral aspects of combat 
were medical officers. These doctors were primarily concerned with “malingering” (i.e., 
homesickness and the resulting exaggeration of real illnesses by the men in hopes of 
being discharged from the army) because of the drain of manpower it created. As early as 
1863 army surgeons had devised a treatment plan for such patients. They ordered that the 
“malingerer” be treated with kindness and that he be allowed to rest, bathe, exercise, and 
keep in touch with his comrades. The doctors believed that the sooner the patient 
returned to his regiment and endured combat alongside his compatriots, the sooner he 
would bond with his peers, develop a cohesiveness more powerful than his longing for 
home, and thus be cured of his “malingering.” Army medical professionals recognized 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Magazine 1 (January 1864): 12-20; and John Gibbon, “Organization of United States Artillery,” The 
United States Service Magazine 1 (May 1864): 495-502. 
7 For examples of soldiers’ analyses of the behavioral aspects of combat, see OR, ser. 1, vol. II, 
pp. 77-82, 357-61; ibid., vol. XI, pt. 1, pp. 768-70, 775-79, 838-42; ibid., pt. 2, pp. 60-62, 65-69; ibid., vol. 
XIX, pt. 1, pp. 332-33; ibid., vol. XXI, pp. 236-38; ibid., vol. XXV, pt. 1, pp. 368-69, 381-83; ibid., vol. 
XXIX, pt. 1, pp. 299-300; ibid., vol. XXVIII, pt. 2, pp. 586-90; ibid., vol. XXXVI, pt. 1, pp. 437-40; and 
ibid., vol. XLII, pt. 1, pp. 218-21. Also see David Beem to Hala (wife), September 1 and 23, 1861, David 
Enoch Beem Papers, 1821-1954, Indiana Historical Society Library, Indianapolis. Similar affirmations of 
small-unit cohesion can be found in Otis J. Getshell to unknown, October 6, 1863, Civil War 
Miscellaneous Collection, U. S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. For an ironic example of 
small-unit cohesion serving to bind a regiment against following orders and performing another attack at 
Petersburg, see John MacLachlan to wife, July 4, 1864, John MacLachlan Papers, State Historical Society 
of Wisconsin, Madison. 
 
 7 
that the development of small-group cohesion was both vital in the treatment of mental 
casualties and in the creation of a successful combat unit.8 
Though a small number of infantrymen and medical officers recognized the 
importance of the behavioral aspects of combat for assessing effectiveness, these men 
were a minority within the army. Their relative obscurity was likely the result of several 
circumstances. First, military tradition did not permit seemingly superfluous commentary 
regarding the collective state of mind of the men within official reports and 
communiqués. Second, when soldiers did discuss the mental stresses they experienced 
during combat, they generally did so privately, either in letters to family members or in 
personal diaries. In either case, the soldiers’ comments were not intended for public 
consumption. Finally, the doctors who publicly discussed the mental aspects of combat 
did so in esoteric publications intended for a small group of like-minded medical 
professionals. Consequently, the analysis of Civil War combat, both during and after the 
war, continued to emphasize the environmental aspects of battle. 
By 1870 the U. S. Army began its official analysis of Civil War combat. Brevet 
Major General Emory Upton led the effort and focused on both the environmental and 
behavioral aspects of battle. A West Point graduate who entered the army as a second 
lieutenant and retired a major general, during which time he served outstandingly in all 
                                                          
8 See DeWitt C. Peters, “The Evils of Youthful Enlistments and Nostalgia,” American Medical 
Times, February 14, 1863, n.p.; J. Thomas Calhoun, “Nostalgia as a Disease of Field Service: A Paper 
Read Before the Medical Society of the 2nd Division, 3rd Corps, Army of the Potomac, February 10, 
1864—Part 1,” Medical and Surgical Reporter (February 27, 1864): 130-32; Calhoun, “Nostalgia as a 
Disease of Field Service: A Paper Read Before the Medical Society of the 2nd Division, 3rd Corps, Army of 
the Potomac, February 10, 1864—Part 2,” Medical and Surgical Reporter (March 5, 1864): 150-52; and S. 
Weir Mitchell, George R. Morehouse, and W. W. Keen, “On Malingering, Especially in Regard to 




three branches of the service (infantry, cavalry, and artillery), Upton was perplexed by 
the ineffectiveness of traditional combat tactics during the war. Specifically, he believed 
that defensive firepower and field fortifications had dominated the battlefield and that 
offensive tactics had to change before offensive actions could be victorious. His search 
for ways to bring effectiveness back to offensive tactics culminated in the private 
publication of two drill manuals: A New System of Infantry Tactics (1867), and Infantry 
Tactics (1874). Upton’s answer to the stifling dominance of defensive tactics on the 
battlefield was the combination of dispersion among, and cohesion within, attacking 
units. He called for the creation of “fours,” or four-man squads, as the basic unit in the 
Army’s infantry system. Each four-man squad would do almost everything together, 
including marching in column and deploying in line. Once in line of battle, the squad 
would disperse and fight, both offensively and defensively, in loose tactical formation. In 
Upton’s opinion, combat effectiveness could be achieved through dispersed tactics. His 
tactics probably fostered cohesion within each four-man squad, though Upton never 
identified group cohesion as an objective of his system. Though neither publication was 
ever officially adopted by the U.S. Army, Upton’s work became the Army’s first 
intellectual step toward its current tactics.9 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Civil War veterans had unleashed a deluge 
of regiment and brigade histories, personal memoirs, and battle histories. These works 
consistently omitted the soldiers’ perspectives. That is to say, the authors chose not to 
                                                          
9 Emory Upton, A New System of Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, Adapted to American 
Topography and Improved Fire-Arms (New York: D. Appleton, 1867); and Upton, Infantry Tactics: 
Double and Single Rank (New York: D. Appleton, 1874). For analyses of Emory Upton’s career, see 
Stephen E. Ambrose, Upton and the Army (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964); and 
 
 9 
include their personal reactions to combat. Instead, they emphasized the commanding 
generals and their responsibility for inducing their troops to overcome the physical 
obstacles of the battlefield. Combat outcome depended on the commander’s ability to 
inspire and lead his troops. When not on the battlefield, the commander’s responsibilities 
were only slightly diminished. He was still expected to instill his martial virtues in the 
men through diligent training and strict discipline. The men, on the other hand, usually 
appear as brave, patriotic, heroic warriors, executing orders and dying for their cause. 
Major Generals John Gordon and John Gibbon both went so far as to compare soldiers to 
machines—impressionable and sentient though they may be, they were still nothing more 
than machines.10 Veteran John Bigelow further reduced the importance of the soldier 
with his history of the battle of Chancellorsville. “Say what one will about the man 
behind the gun,” Bigelow wrote, “he is about what his officers make him. Good officers 
will make good soldiers of almost any kind of men; the best men under poor officers will 
make but indifferent soldiers.” The men mattered little, the importance lay with their 
leaders, and nearly all physical aspects of the battlefield could be overcome.11 
                                                                                                                                                                             
David J. Fitzpatrick, “Emory Upton and the Citizen Soldier,” Journal of Military History 65 (April 2001): 
355-89. 
10 See John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1903), 289; John Gibbon, Personal Recollections of the Civil War (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1928), 19. Gordon’s and Gibbon’s machine metaphors carried both positive and negative connotations. For 
an insightful analysis of the intellectual impact of automation in late-nineteenth-century America, see Leo 
Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
11 See John Bigelow, The Campaign of Chancellorsville: A Strategic and Tactical Study (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1910), 377. For additional examples of late-nineteenth-century unit histories 
and soldiers’ reminiscences that emphasize the commanding general and subsequent training and 
discipline, see James Fitz James Caldwell, The History of a Brigade of South Carolinians, Known First as 
“Gregg’s,” and Subsequently as “McGowan’s Brigade” (Philadelphia: King and Baird, 1866); David 
Power Conyngham, The Irish Brigade and Its Campaigns: With Some Account of the Corcoran Legion, 
and Sketches of the Principal Officers (New York: William McSorley and Company, 1867); Samuel P. 
Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, 5 vols. (Harrisburg: B. Singerly, 1869-1871); Otis F. 
Waite, New Hampshire in the Great Rebellion (Claremont, NH: Tracy, Chase and Company, 1870); Willis 
 
 10 
Veteran officer Francis Walker, in his history of the Army of the Potomac’s 
Second Corps, praised its first commander, Edwin V. Sumner, with similar rhetoric: 
“Jupiter, shining full, clear, and strong in the midnight heavens, might be the 
disembodied soul of Edwin V. Sumner. In honor, in courage, in disinterestedness, in 
patriotism, in magnanimity, he shone resplendent.” Walker acknowledged Sumner as the 
reason for the combat success of the Second Corps, even after Sumner relinquished 
command in October 1862. His position as the corps’s first commander during “. . . that 
highly plastic state of mind which belong[ed] to the early months of the war . . .” allowed 
Sumner to exert a special influence on the young officers and men under his command. It 
was Sumner’s character, and the manner in which his character aptly shaped his style of 
leadership, that not only created the Second Corps but also transformed it into an elite 
combat unit.12 
Americans were not the only people interested in their wartime experiences; 
military analysts in Europe also studied the Civil War. Prussian scholar Friedrich Karl 
scrutinized the war and understood the dynamic environment of the battlefield. In his 
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book The Influence of Firearms Upon Tactics (1876), he recognized the tactical 
advantage enjoyed by the defense, due primarily to the widespread use of rifled muskets, 
artillery guns, and field fortifications. Despite these advantages, however, Karl argued 
that the tactical offensive could still carry the day on the battlefield, as long as the troops 
were properly trained. “The American infantry,” he scoffed, “were wanting in the tactical 
discipline and thorough training necessary to carry on a fight in the same manner as the 
Prussian infantry would.” Karl was not alone in his negative assessment of the combat 
effectiveness of American Civil War soldiers. His European counterparts drew similar 
condescending conclusions. Together, they unwittingly contributed to the unfortunate 
momentum that drove thousands of men into the bloody fields of northern France in 
World War I.13 
Not everyone who studied the Civil War believed that the combination of elite 
leadership and hard training provided a solution to the tactical problems imposed by 
defensive firepower and field fortifications. John D. Young, in his post-war essay titled 
“A Campaign With Sharpshooters,” recognized the significance of a single behavioral 
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variable in combat—small-group cohesion. Young examined the way in which 
Confederate General Robert E. Lee tapped into the power of small-group cohesion during 
the last twelve months of the war. Because Lee was constantly pitted against superior 
Federal strength, Young argued, the Virginian hoped to bolster his army by creating 
permanent, cohesive sharpshooter battalions. He ordered that each brigade form a 
battalion of sharpshooters (approximately 185 men), with the intent that these small units 
learn to fight with the effective force of two to three times their actual strength.14 
Young compared these permanent battalions with their non-permanent 
forerunners and concluded that the short-lived sharpshooter units suffered from a lack of 
cohesion because both the enlisted men and the officers were only temporarily detached 
from the regiments within the brigade. Consequently, the troops were unfamiliar with 
each other, and individual soldiers sometimes refused to trust the man next to them with 
their lives. “. . . [I]f there is any one thing . . . that is well calculated to destroy the 
efficiency of a solder,” Young stated, “it is the suspicion that his comrades are going to 
give way.” Therefore, the new sharpshooter battalions of 1864 were permanently 
separated from their original regiments and formed unique bodies of troops. They 
camped, trained, and marched together; they were exempted from all regimental and 
camp duty; and they performed picket duty only when facing the enemy. The new 
sharpshooters specialized in both loose-order and skirmish tactics and emphasized 
personal initiative. Young concluded that through the cohesiveness of the new, 
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permanent, tight-knit sharpshooter battalions, General Lee successfully increased the 
combat effectiveness of his outnumbered forces.15 
Stephen Crane was another post-war author who emphasized small-group 
cohesion over other variables when considering combat effectiveness. In The Red Badge 
of Courage (1895), a fictitious account of Henry Fleming’s experiences during an 
unnamed battle (presumably the Battle of Chancellorsville), Crane described the 
inexperienced soldier’s doubts and fears regarding both the lethality of combat and his 
unpredictable reaction to it. During the chaos of battle, Fleming discovered that his 
anxiety disappeared. He was no longer an individual; rather, he was a member of a group. 
He was part of something bigger than himself. Crane described the newly discovered 
cohesion between young Fleming and his peers with this simple analogy: the soldier 
could not remove himself from the group any more than his small finger could detach 
itself from his hand. Though he did not label the force that bound the soldiers together, 
Crane recognized the power of small-group cohesion in combat.16 
Despite the scholarship of late-nineteenth-century authors like Young and Crane, 
most analyses of Civil War combat continued to concentrate on the physical environment 
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of the battlefield. By the turn of the century, several American intellectuals began to 
analyze statistically certain physical variables in Civil War combat—specifically, 
strength and casualty data. Frederick Phisterer, a German-born immigrant who earned the 
Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery and valor during the battle of Stones River, 
opened this avenue of inquiry with his study titled Statistical Record of the Armies of the 
United States (1883). He limited his analysis to the Federal armies, providing data 
ranging from their strengths and organizations, to their numbers of casualties per battle, 
to their commanders’ service records. Despite his broad collection effort, Phisterer’s 
study suffered from two weaknesses. First, his data were organized by army. No 
organizational unit below that of an army can be separated for more rigorous scrutiny. 
Second, Phisterer drew no conclusions from his data. He simply presented strength and 
casualty figures and expected the data to speak for themselves. Nevertheless, Phisterer 
deserves credit for pioneering statistical analysis of Civil War combat.17 
It did not take long for another statistical analysis of Civil War combat to appear. 
Six years after Phisterer’s study, William Fox published Regimental Losses In The 
American Civil War, 1861-1865 (1889). Influenced both by Phisterer’s data on the Civil 
War and by Ernst Engels’s work on the Franco-Prussian War, Fox placed the regiment, 
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not the army, at the center of his study. Like Phisterer, Fox used strength and casualty 
data to measure the fighting abilities of various Federal regiments, implying that those 
regiments that suffered more casualties fought harder and enjoyed greater success than 
their less-bloodied brethren. Taking his analysis one step further, however, Fox created a 
list of the top “Three Hundred Fighting Regiments.” It included all Federal regiments that 
either sustained a minimum of 130 men killed in combat, or whose percentage of killed, 
in Fox’s opinion, entitled them to a place in the list. Although chronologically second to 
Phisterer’s study, Fox’s compilation of the “Three Hundred Fighting Regiments” 
represents the first attempt to statistically quantify Civil War combat effectiveness at the 
regimental level.18 
In 1901 Thomas Livermore joined the dialogue with his statistical combat 
analysis, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-65. Using the army as 
his basic unit for analysis, Livermore compiled both strength and casualty data on both 
sides in most of the major battles of the war. However, Livermore recognized that 
strength and casualty data did not fully account for the martial capacity of the men. He 
therefore added the variables of “courage,” and “efficiency.” Though he never defined 
the new variables, Livermore attempted to measure the courage and efficiency of the 
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opposing armies by conducting two calculations per battle: the number “Hit in 1000” and 
the number “Hit by 1000.” The former stated the number of casualties that an army 
sustained per 1,000 men; the latter stated the number of casualties that the same army 
inflicted per 1,000 men. At Fredericksburg, for example, Livermore showed that both the 
Federal and Confederate “Hit in 1000” were 103 and 64 respectively, and their “Hit by 
1000” were 44 and 150 respectively. If these data are converted into simple percentages, 
they suggest that approximately 4 percent of the Union troops hit their targets during 
battle while 15 percent of the Confederates struck theirs. Similarly, the data show that 
approximately 10 percent of the Federal force was either killed or wounded as compared 
to only 6 percent of the Confederate force. In other words, the average Confederate 
soldier was over three times more effective with his weapon and only half as likely to be 
hit. Consequently, Livermore suggests that the Confederate army at Fredericksburg 
demonstrated greater combat effectiveness.19 
Frederick Dyer was the last of the early Civil War historians to provide a 
statistical analysis of the conflict. His three-volume study, A Compendium of the War of 
the Rebellion (1908), is less analytical and more descriptive than Livermore’s. Dyer 
presented data ranging from numbers of Federal troops furnished by each state to 
historical synopses of many of the Federal regiments that fought in the war. Similar to 
Fox’s list of the “Three Hundred Fighting Regiments,” Dyer provided a list of the nine 
hundred regiments that suffered fifty or more men killed or mortally wounded in combat. 
Though never explicitly stated by the author, it is likely that Dyer’s list of nine hundred 
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regiments was his attempt to identify those regiments that experienced the hardest 
fighting and demonstrated the highest degree of combat effectiveness.20 
World War I forced a temporary lull in Civil War combat analysis. After the war, 
however, scholarly inquiry into the behavioral aspects of combat began. European 
historians led the way. In 1925, for example, British military historian J. F. C. Fuller 
offered a philosophical theory of warfare. Fuller focused on the role of the commanding 
general and divided his combat experience into three intersecting spheres of influence: 
mental, physical, and moral. The mental sphere represented the intellectual capacity of 
the general. The physical sphere represented the physical realities of the battlefield. The 
moral sphere represented the personality of the commander. Fuller believed that within 
the commanding general all three of these spheres converged, but that the moral sphere 
served as the bridge between the mental and physical sphere. In other words, both the 
general’s decision-making ability and use of physical resources were affected by his 
character. Together, the interplay among these three spheres ultimately determined 
success or failure for the commander and his soldiers.21 
Because of the nature of Fuller’s aristocratic approach to understanding warfare, 
it is not surprising that when Fuller applied his theory to the American Civil War, he 
naturally focused on the war’s leading figures—Grant and Lee. The few times that Fuller 
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addressed tactical situations during the Civil War, he assumed the traditional approach to 
combat analysis: he emphasized the physical aspects of the battlefield. Specifically, 
Fuller acknowledged that the increased effective range of the rifled musket led to the 
supremacy of the defense over the offense and forced both sides to seek cover throughout 
most of the war.22 Although Fuller recognized the significance of both the physical and 
mental aspects of combat, he failed to apply them in a meaningful way to the opposing 
armies. Instead, he focused on the commanders and reiterated the traditional 
environmental interpretation of Civil War combat.23 
Several years later a German infantry officer echoed Fuller’s sentiments regarding 
the complex nature of combat, but the Prussian placed greater emphasis on its behavioral 
components. In his book Battle Leadership (1933), Adolf Von Schell acknowledged that 
officers must heed the physical realities of the battlefield, but he added that the mental 
condition of the men was equally important. Only through a clear psychological 
understanding of his men, argued Von Schell, could a commander achieve success on the 
battlefield. “Unfortunately,” Von Schell added, “we cannot formulate a set of 
psychological rules [for combat success]; human reactions can never be reduced to an 
exact science. War is governed by the uncertain and the unknown[,] and the least known 
factor of all is the human element.” In his conclusion Von Schell lamented the pitiful 
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state of combat psychology: “Long experience has taught us that we know too little of the 
small incidents of war. . . . In peace we learn how to lead companies, battalions, 
regiments, even divisions and armies. We learn in books and by maps how one fights and 
wins battles, but we are not instructed in the thoughts, the hopes, the fears that run riot in 
the mind of the front-line soldier.”24 
After the experience of World War II, American scholars began seriously 
studying human behavior in combat. Brigadier General Samuel Marshall’s classic study, 
Men Against Fire (1947), opened this avenue of inquiry and may be credited with 
establishing the behavioral approach to combat analysis. In his book Marshall argued that 
the primary motivating factor for men in combat was small-group cohesion. Because the 
men were mutually dependent upon one another for their survival, they understood that 
they had to perform their group function regardless of the situation. Likewise, they 
expected their comrades to do the same. The men understood that success rested squarely 
on their shoulders. “Men do not fight for a cause,” Marshall concluded, “but because they 
do not want to let their comrades down.”25 
The hypothesis that small-group cohesion was the tie that bound soldiers together 
in battle and maintained the effectiveness of the unit was validated in an exhaustive 
inquiry into the attitudes and opinions of World War II soldiers. Samuel Stouffer is 
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generally credited with producing this study, The American Soldier: Combat and Its 
Aftermath (1949). It was based on numerous surveys of U. S. Army personnel during 
World War II. Using scientific methodologies, Stouffer reinforced what Marshall had 
argued two years earlier. Specifically, Stouffer discovered that small-group cohesion 
motivated soldiers, compelled them to fight not only for themselves but for their 
comrades, and created an effective fighting unit.26 
Bell Wiley was the first Civil War historian to examine the wartime experiences 
of both Confederate and Federal soldiers in an effort to understand the war from the 
common soldier’s perspective. His books, The Life of Johnny Reb (1943) and The Life of 
Billy Yank (1952), detail aspects of the soldiers’ lives ranging from enlistment to venereal 
disease. Regarding combat performance, Wiley focused on the behavioral aspects of their 
experiences. He found that both Confederate and Federal soldiers depended upon courage 
to overcome cowardice. If they acted courageously, they would fight effectively. 
According to Wiley, the men felt that it was better to die facing the enemy in battle than 
to flee and face the humiliation and shame of their cowardly acts. In other words, it was 
the mental force of courage, not external physical pressures, that compelled the soldiers 
to fight effectively.27 
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One prominent Civil War historian, however, challenged Wiley’s thesis while 
remaining within the behavioral school of combat analysis. Bruce Catton, in his essay 
titled “Unit Discipline and Leadership in the Civil War” (1956), acknowledged that 
courage on the battlefield was important, but Catton did not believe that courage alone 
could explain combat effectiveness. Instead, Catton looked to leadership and small-group 
cohesion as the wellsprings for combat effectiveness. Because men were generally 
recruited from the same community, they knew each other and felt compelled to do their 
duty for fear of disgrace—disgrace among their peers in the army and among their 
families at home. The cohesion resulting from peer pressure, however, was not enough to 
ensure combat effectiveness. Leadership was the other vital ingredient. According to 
Catton, the type of leadership required was of the common-sense variety. Because the 
soldiers were citizens who lived in a strongly democratic society, they could not be 
coerced by small-minded dictators. Rather, courageous leadership through example was 
required. The men respected that. Through the combination of cohesion and leadership, 
Catton concluded, Civil War regiments became effective fighting units.28 
The centennial anniversary of the American Civil War marked an outpouring of 
scholarship. Civil War tactics became a rapidly expanding field of study as the 
environmental approach to combat analysis enjoyed a renaissance. Though not expressly 
addressing the question of combat effectiveness, these tactical historians discussed the 
physical realities of Civil War battlefields and attempted to understand the changing 
nature of infantry combat. John Mahon, in his essay titled “Civil War Infantry Assault 
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Tactics” (1961), examined the rifled musket and its impact on Civil War tactics. He 
found that by late 1862 rifled muskets had replaced smoothbore muskets, and because of 
the increased effective range of rifled muskets, defenders began to entrench whenever 
battle appeared imminent. Consequently, the tactical advantage shifted from offense to 
defense, leaving offensive-minded generals searching for less destructive combat tactics 
than linear frontal attacks against entrenched opponents armed with rifled-muskets. The 
continued high casualty rates suggest that no viable alternative was found. Mahon 
concluded by arguing that offensive combat effectiveness was nearly impossible to attain 
because of the increased use of the rifled musket and the development of tactical field 
fortifications.29 
Edward Hagerman’s dissertation expanded and refined Mahon’s thesis. In his 
work titled “The Evolution of Trench Warfare in the American Civil War” (1965), 
Hagerman agreed that the rifled musket significantly altered the nature of combat. Yet 
Civil War soldiers clung to the traditional belief that a strong frontal assault could carry 
almost any defensive position. Unfortunately, nearly every such assault resulted in total 
failure and chilling death for the attackers. In addition to the impact of the rifled musket, 
Hagerman added the impact of pre-war doctrine, tactics, logistics, military intelligence, 
combat experience, and nineteenth-century American democracy to his environmental 
calculus of Civil War combat. Combined with the increased lethality of the rifled musket, 
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Hagerman concluded, these additional external forces transformed Civil War combat into 
a dismally bloody stalemate.30 
Two years later Thomas Moseley produced his own dissertation on Civil War 
tactics, “Evolution of American Civil War Infantry Tactics” (1967). Like his 
predecessors, Moseley believed that the rifled musket brought bloody changes to the 
tactical nature of mid-nineteenth-century warfare. However, Moseley also considered the 
behavioral aspects of Civil War combat. He argued that, “. . . it is extremely difficult to 
separate tactics from the existing state of morale and discipline of the men in the ranks, 
and the degree of leadership exerted by the officers and noncommissioned officers at a 
specific time.” Morale, discipline, and leadership were still vital components of combat 
effectiveness despite the tactical advantage enjoyed by the defense due to the rifled 
musket and field fortifications. In other words, Moseley reminded his colleagues that the 
behavioral aspects of combat should not be overlooked, despite the then current trend of 
emphasizing the environmental elements of the battlefield.31 
The Vietnam War had a profound impact on many Americans, including Civil 
War scholars. As the resource-laden U. S. Army suffered setbacks at the hands of a 
smaller, poorer, weaker military force, some Civil War scholars became dissatisfied with 
the environmental approach to combat analysis. If such physical variables as strength, 
casualties, and weaponry could not be used as predictors for combat success, then some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
44; ibid., Part 2, (May 1954): 22-24; ibid., Part 3 (June 1954): 41-42; and Weller, “Civil War Minie Rifles 
Prove Quite Accurate,” The American Rifleman 119 (July 1971): 36-40. 
30 Edward H. Hagerman, “The Evolution of Trench Warfare in the American Civil War” (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 1965). For a summary of his dissertation, see Hagerman, “From Jomini to Dennis 
Hart Mahan: The Evolution of Trench Warfare and the American Civil War,” Civil War History 13 
(September 1967): 197-220. 
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other variables must be used to explain America’s combat experience in Vietnam. 
Consequently, scholars shifted their analyses of combat from environmental to behavioral 
aspects.32 
Psychologists began the dialogue by dissecting such behavioral variables as 
courage, morale, cohesion, and leadership. However, the trend among mental health 
professionals was to associate combat effectiveness with small-group cohesion. These 
combat psychologists concluded that small-group cohesion was the soldier’s best defense 
against the immense mental stress that fear inflicted upon him during battle. Through 
hours of working, training, and fighting, the soldiers gelled as a team and developed a 
bond of trust that only death could break. In other words, combat effectiveness depended 
more on the mental state of the soldiers than on the physical state of the battlefield.33 
British historian John Keegan is generally credited with bridging the intellectual 
gap between military history and psychology. His influential combat study, The Face of 
Battle (1976), marked the intellectual arrival of the behavioral approach to military 
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The Anatomy of Courage (London: Constable Press, 1966); J. Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and 
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Belenky, ed., Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). 
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history, including Civil War history. As a respected British military historian, Keegan 
challenged his peers on both sides of the Atlantic to study warfare, not from the general’s 
perspective but rather from the infantryman’s perspective. Too much had been written 
about generals, strategies, and tactics. Instead, Keegan endeavored to “. . . catch a 
glimpse of the face of battle . . .” by examining weapons and the wounds they inflicted, 
leadership at the lowest level, small-group cohesion, and individual attitudes. In essence, 
Keegan believed that combat was a “moral conflict,” and discovering the mental forces 
that caused a man to stand and fight, despite his fear and survival instincts, was the most 
fundamental step toward understanding warfare in general.34 
By the late 1980s Civil War historians began to include the behavioral aspects of 
combat in their analyses of the war. Gerald Linderman opened the dialogue with 
Embattled Courage (1987). His pioneering work deserves credit, not only for being one 
of the first Civil War studies to examine the mental aspects of combat, but also for 
combining both the behavioral and environmental approaches in his analysis. He argued 
that courage was at the center of the soldier’s mental world. Courage, the soldiers 
believed, would carry them safely through battle and lead them to victory. Technology, 
however, destroyed their faith in courage. Rifled muskets and defensive trenches twisted 
the soldiers’ concept of courage. Instead of courage leading to victory, it led to death. 
The most gallant soldiers were the first to die in the futile frontal assaults common on 
                                                          
34 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme (New York: 
Viking Press, 1976). In fairness to Pete Maslowski, it should be noted that his pioneering study of the 
behavioral aspects of Civil War combat, specifically morale, ideology, and leadership, preceded Keegan’s 
monograph by six years. Though Maslowski was most interested in comparing Civil War soldiers with 
their World War II counterparts, the fact that he studied behavioral aspects of combat earlier than any of 
his peers foreshadowed the changing nature of Civil War scholarship on the topic. See Pete Maslowski, “A 
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Civil War battlefields. Linderman concluded that the physical realities of the battlefield 
had destroyed the men’s mental armor. In essence, combat effectiveness depended on 
technology, not on the attitudes and feelings of the men.35 
Reid Mitchell followed one year later with his behavioral study titled Civil War 
Soldiers (1988). Mitchell concentrated on the mental aspects of the men and the ways in 
which their psyches changed as the war progressed. He argued that the realities of 
combat, especially the way in which both weapons technology and linear tactics reduced 
battles to indecisive bloodlettings, caused the men to create new identities better suited 
for the unanticipated horrors of war. Fundamentally, Mitchell agreed with Linderman. 
Both scholars felt that the physical aspects of the combat environment dominated Civil 
War battlefields, and the soldiers were forced to adjust in an effort to survive.36 
Simultaneous with the post-Vietnam outpouring of scholarship on the behavioral 
aspects of combat, there was a steady stream of combat analyses that continued in the 
traditional environmental pattern. Perry Jamieson’s 1979 dissertation led the way. Simply 
titled “The Development of Civil War Tactics,” this work argued that changes in 
weapons technology and combat tactics caused the bloody stalemates so often 
experienced by Civil War soldiers. He began by illustrating how the Mexican War 
fostered a dangerous trust in linear tactics among U. S. Army officers. With the 
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development of the rifled musket, however, linear tactics became futile.37 In an effort to 
escape the lethal firepower that dominated the battlefield, combatants entrenched. Thus 
the trenches that scarred the fields of northern Virginia presaged the trenches that would 
scar the fields of northern France fifty years later. Only after the Civil War, Jamieson 
concluded, would the U. S. Army attempt to reconcile its wartime experience with 
tactical doctrine. In the end, the Army had only limited success.38 
Perry Jamieson reiterated his thesis that the increased range of the rifled musket 
made Napoleonic tactics obsolete and deadly in his collaborative effort with Grady 
McWhiney titled Attack and Die (1982). By comparing army strength and casualty data 
from various battles throughout the war, the authors argued that the lethality of the rifled 
musket, coupled with the innate aggressive nature of most southerners due to their Celtic 
heritage, resulted in a regional offensive-mindedness that ultimately led to the defeat of 
the Confederacy. Linear offensive tactics employed against an entrenched opponent 
armed with rifled muskets resulted in casualty rates too high for the Confederacy to 
withstand. The authors concluded that, “. . . it was the rifle that won the war for the 
North—the rifle along with the refusal of Southerners to admit until they had bled 
                                                          
37 The linear tactics used during both the Mexican War and Civil War were intended to keep the 
soldiers pressed closely together in order to maintain organization, concentrate firepower, and provide the 
tactical shock necessary for successful bayonet charges. This meant that the typical infantry regiment 
frequently deployed in a linear formation known as a “line of battle.” A line of battle usually consisted of 
two ranks (or lines) of soldiers, with the second rank spaced approximately thirteen inches behind the first. 
Within each rank the men were aligned elbow-to-elbow and instructed to maintain physical contact as they 
advanced. 
38 Perry D. Jamieson, “The Development of Civil War Tactics” (Ph. D. diss., Wayne State 
University, 1979); and Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground. Steve Fratt, a graduate student at the 
University of California at Santa Barbara, indirectly refuted Jamieson’s argument that the rifled musket 
dominated Civil War battlefields by claiming that regimental articulations prescribed in William J. 
Hardee’s tactical manual proved effective in combat for the 22nd Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry 
Regiment. See Steve Fratt, “American Civil War Tactics: The Theory of W. J. Hardee and the Experience 
of E. C. Bennett,” Indiana Military History Journal 10 (January 1985): 4-17. 
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themselves nearly to death that the rifle’s killing power could check even the most 
courageous charges.” In other words, the Confederates attacked and died. Despite their 
best efforts, southern soldiers could not overcome the physical realities of the combat 
environment.39 
One year later Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones produced a military history of 
the Civil War titled How The North Won (1983). Included among the myriad issues they 
addressed is a limited quantitative analysis of Civil War combat. The authors’ analysis 
was based on the belief that the physical realities of the battlefield most influenced 
combat outcomes. Specifically, they believed that the rifled-musket and defensive field 
fortifications rendered offensive tactics ineffective and costly. Working within the 
traditional environmental school of thought, Hattaway and Jones examined the strengths, 
casualties, tactics, and outcomes for both the Federal and Confederates armies in twenty-
six major field engagements that took place during the first three years of the war. They 
used Frederick W. Lanchester’s square law to compare strengths and casualties with 
tactics and outcomes. Hattaway and Jones concluded that the combat effectiveness of the 
Army of Northern Virginia was similar to that of other Confederate armies and that 
Robert E. Lee was a representative Confederate general, neither inflicting nor sustaining 
an unusual proportion of casualties. The authors admitted that their statistical analysis 
                                                          
39 Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die, 146. Jamieson again stressed the 
importance of the environmental aspects of Civil War combat in a recent article. See Perry D. Jamieson, 
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was superficial, and they closed by expressing hope that their work would inspire others 
to conduct a more complete quantitative analysis of Civil War combat.40 
The next step in the analysis of the environmental aspects of Civil War combat 
was taken by Edward Hagerman in his monograph, The American Civil War and the 
Origins of Modern Warfare (1988). Hagerman accepted the argument that the rifled 
musket dominated the Civil War battlefield by giving the entrenched defense supremacy 
over the exposed offense. However, he expanded his analysis of Civil War combat 
beyond that of the American struggle by attempting to place it within the context of the 
Industrial Revolution and the transition from Napoleonic warfare to modern warfare. 
While much of Hagerman’s work is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note 
that Hagerman’s thesis rested upon the belief that the rifled musket altered combat to 
such an extent that Civil War tactics, casualties, and outcomes foreshadowed those of 
World War I rather than mirrored those of the Napoleonic Wars.41 
Scholars were quick to respond to Hagerman’s discovery of the origins of modern 
warfare in the tragic years of the American Civil War. With regard to combat 
effectiveness and combat outcome, the essence of the dialogue begun by Hagerman was 
whether Civil War combat was more like that of World War I or the Napoleonic Wars. 
                                                          
40 Lanchester’s square law states that the losses sustained per unit of time by two opposing forces 
on a battlefield is directly proportional to their numerical strengths. See Frederick W. Lanchester, Aircraft 
in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1917), 39-66; Herman 
Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1983), 721-32. One of the sources cited by Hattaway and Jones argued against the use of 
Lanchester’s square law for predicting combat outcomes for large-scale actions—exactly what Hattaway 
and Jones did. The author concluded that, “Lanchester’s square law is the poorest among poor alternative 
choices of deterministic laws. . . .” See Daniel Willard, Lanchester as Force in History: An Analysis of 
Land Battles of the Years 1618-1905 (McLean, VA: Research Analysis Corporation, 1962), 4. Hattaway 
recently reiterated his environmental approach to Civil War combat analysis. See Herman Hattaway, “The 




This limited, and arguably esoteric, debate continues today. The debate itself is not 
central to this study. The fact that the dialogue rests upon the assumption that the rifled 
musket revolutionized the physical nature of Civil War battlefields is important. The 
authors involved began their studies by accepting the theory that the increased lethality of 
Civil War combat was due to the deadly range and accuracy of the rifled musket. In their 
minds, the environmental aspects of Civil War battlefields dominated combat and 
dictated results.42 
James McPherson’s theories regarding Civil War soldiers in combat dominated 
the behavioral interpretation throughout the 1990s. In his books on the subject, What 
They Fought For (1994) and For Cause and Comrades (1997), McPherson accepted the 
traditional argument regarding the superiority of defensive firepower and field 
fortifications over offensive tactics and argued that the impulses of courage, self-respect, 
group cohesion, and ideology were the main sources of combat motivation for the troops. 
These mental aspects of combat, coupled with the metaphysical bonds of personal 
religion and hometown community, transformed the volunteers from citizen-soldiers to 
warriors. Combat was the catalyst; it synthesized their emotions and galvanized their 
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spirit. Whatever the physical hardships, the metaphysical strength of the men maintained 
their effectiveness and helped them cope with the realities of war.43 
The end of the twentieth century was flush with scholarship regarding Civil War 
combat. Historians continued to employ both the environmental and behavioral 
approaches in their examinations of the war. Because of the behavioral paradigm’s 
relative youth as an avenue of intellectual inquiry, it drew the attention of more late-
twentieth-century scholars than the longer-lived environmental interpretation. Despite the 
recent disproportionate intellectual vitality of the two schools, the millennium would 
close with challenges arising in both schools of thought. One historian, working within 
the behavioral school, would question the accepted explanatory preeminence given to the 
environmental paradigm. Two other historians would challenge the internal consensus 
within each of their respective analytical approaches to understanding Civil War combat. 
In Lee’s Miserables (1998), J. Tracy Power argued that the metaphysical aspects 
of battle most influenced combat results. Through his examination of morale, cohesion, 
and leadership in the Army of Northern Virginia during the last year of the war, Power 
credited two behavioral variables for having the greatest impact on combat effectiveness. 
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“The success or failure of almost any offensive or defensive action undertaken,” Power 
argued, “no matter how complex or simple it might be, no matter how large or small, was 
often determined by two basic criteria: the performance of battlefield commanders and 
the extent of unit cohesion.” With full acknowledgment of environmental influences, 
Power asserted that combat leadership and small-group cohesion determined tactical 
success or failure during the Civil War. In his opinion, tactical actions, positions, and 
weaponry were incidental to leadership and cohesion.44 
The greatest challenge to the consensus within the behavioral approach was 
issued by Gerald Prokopowicz. In both his dissertation and a journal article, Prokopowicz 
argued that small-group cohesion proved a double-edged sword. Although the 
interdependence within a regiment accounted for a unit’s combat effectiveness and 
tactical resilience, it simultaneously limited a regiment’s ability to blend into its brigade, 
division, corps, and army. The result was a force capable of hard fighting in small-unit 
actions but incapable of harmonizing its effort with that of a higher organizational unit 
(e.g., brigade or division) when engaged in large-scale battles. Ironically, though the 
regiment may perform well under fire, its brigade or division may disintegrate into 
pockets of spasmodic, isolated, ineffective troops.45 
Similarly, the century closed with internal dissent among scholars working within 
the environmental school. In his monograph titled Rally Once Again (1987), British 
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military historian Paddy Grffith took aim at two targets. First, he argued that the rifled 
musket did not significantly affect Civil War combat tactics because the terrain upon 
which many of the battles were fought was so uneven or wooded that it negated the 
potential tactical advantages offered by the rifled musket’s increased accuracy and range. 
He added that Civil War soldiers lacked the necessary training to employ their rifled 
muskets effectively at ranges beyond 150 yards. Second, Griffith concluded that the Civil 
War was not a modern precursor to World War I. Rather, it was tactically similar to the 
Napoleonic Wars. In essence, Griffith challenged both the intellectual consensus 
regarding the impact of the rifled musket on Civil War combat and the belief that the 
Civil War foreshadowed World War I.46 
Despite recent intellectual challenges, the environmental interpretation of Civil 
War combat has dominated most tactical analyses of the war. Whether writing after-
action reports, letters to loved ones, personal memoirs, military biographies, campaign 
studies, small-unit histories, leadership analyses, soldier studies, or complete war 
histories, both soldiers and scholars frequently used the assumptions of the environmental 
school as their foundation for discussing Civil War combat. They emphasized the tactical 
dominance of defensive firepower over offensive shock tactics. In those studies that 
include the behavioral aspects of combat, the authors usually subordinated the mental 
condition of the soldiers to the physical realities of the battlefield. In other words, most 
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historical studies that touched upon the nature of Civil War combat accepted the 
interpretation encapsulated in the environmental school of thought.47 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Any attempt to understand human behavior based on historical records requires 
the historian to make countless decisions regarding the pertinence, accuracy, and 
reliability of the information he or she collects. Traditional historians rely on their 
expertise and knowledge to determine what types of information to consider. The task is 
the same for quantitative historians. These researchers sift through documents and make 
the same decisions regarding each piece of information. It is in analyzing the collected 
information that traditional and quantitative historians differ. Whereas traditional 
historians use their knowledge and expertise to understand and discuss their subjects, 
quantitative historians use their knowledge, expertise, and statistical methods to 
understand and discuss their subjects. Quantitative researchers take the additional 
analytical step of pouring their data through various mathematical formulae, searching 
for patterns, trends, and correlations that may not otherwise be apparent. Despite their 
differences, both methodologies aim to reap the same rewards. They attempt to illuminate 
the past in meaningful ways for the present.1 
                                                          
1 Traditional and quantitative historians do not always agree on the appropriateness of each 
other’s methodologies. For example, one historian argued that Civil War combat was too complex and 
varied to measure with rules and describe with numbers, and a quantitative researcher stated that Civil War 
combat was too complex and varied to be understood through non-quantitative methods. Ironically, each 
pointed to the multifaceted nature of combat as the reason for the other’s failure. See William B. Hankee, 
“Fire and Maneuver at the Battle of Booneville,” Military Review 53 (March 1973): 8-16; and Herbert K. 
Weiss, “Combat Models and Historical Data: The U.S. Civil War,” Operations Research: The Journal of 
the Operations Research Society of America 14 (September-October 1966): 759-90. 
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Although traditional and quantitative historical studies share many similarities, 
extra caution is in order when examining quantitative studies. The absolute nature of 
numbers compared to the ambiguous nature of language can easily seduce the reader into 
placing too much reliance on numerical measurements. For example, the number used to 
describe a regiment’s strength before going into battle is often an estimate of the unit’s 
strength based on numerous conflicting sources. Whereas the traditional writer may 
deflect criticism of his or her strength estimate by using adverbs such as 
“approximately,” “nearly,” or “almost,” the quantitative historian must select a single 
value in order for subsequent statistical analyses to have meaning. Rigorous research 
usually enables the quantitative historian to meet the demands of data precision with 
confidence. In certain cases, however, the accuracy implied by a number may be 
misleading. Therefore, a measure of skepticism on the reader’s part is justified. 
The fundamental building blocks for this work are the complete combat histories 
of the twenty-seven Federal regiments that happened to constitute the Army of the 
Potomac’s First Division, Second Corps, from May 1, 1864, through the end of the war. 
The data have been divided into the following four data sets: Roster, Command, 
Armament, and Combat. Roster data detail the arrivals and departures of soldiers within 
each regiment. Command data describe each regiment’s chain of command. Armament 
data delineate each regiment’s weaponry. Combat data relate battle information for every 
significant engagement in which each of the twenty-seven regiments participated.2 These 
                                                          
2 A “significant engagement” is defined as an engagement that was either included in Frederick 
Phisterer’s list of the 2,261 most significant battles during the Civil War, or an engagement understood by 
the Federal participants to have significance. See Frederick Phisterer, Statistical Record of the Armies of 
the United States (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 81-212. 
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four data sets offer a multifaceted account of each regiment’s personnel and martial 
exploits throughout the war. 
After the war most northern states compiled rosters of the men who served in 
their regiments. Delaware is the single exception.3 From these rosters, information 
regarding the arrival and departure of each soldier may be gleaned. Specifically, the 
rosters detail each man’s name, when and how he joined the regiment, and when and how 
he separated from the regiment. All arrival and departure information fell into one of the 
following thirteen categories: deserted, died, discharged, executed, killed in action, 
missing in action, mustered in, mustered out, resigned, transferred to Veteran Reserve 
Corps, wounded in action, and miscellaneous inbound and miscellaneous outbound. 
These categories became the variables used to organize the roster information.4 
To ascertain the influence that personnel changes may have had on a regiment’s 
combat effectiveness, each unit’s arrival and departure information was divided into 
segments. Each segment represented the period of time between the regiment’s previous 
engagement and its subsequent engagement. In other words, the Roster data provide each 
regiment’s between-battle personnel changes.5 Two distinct measurements mark these 
                                                          
3 One of the twenty-seven regiments included in this study is the 2nd Delaware. Because no 
regimental roster is available, all analyses of roster information will be based on the other twenty-six 
Federal regiments. The regimental rosters are available either in print at various research libraries or via the 
Internet through a private company, Historical Data Systems. After obtaining copies of several rosters from 
differing states, I compared the printed regimental rosters with their online counterparts and found that the 
electronic versions were so accurate that they maintained the same typographical mistakes found in the 
original rosters. Therefore, I used the electronic rosters to collect the regimental information. See 
“American Civil War Research Database,” in the Historical Data Systems page on the Internet’s World 
Wide Web at http://www.civilwardata.com/. 
4 The died category includes all soldiers who died from either accidents or illnesses. Both the 
miscellaneous inbound and miscellaneous outbound categories include soldiers who transferred between 
regiments or branches of the military. 
5 The between-battle personnel changes assigned to each regiment’s first battle reflects all 
personnel changes that occurred between the organization of the unit and its first engagement. 
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changes. The first is the total number of soldiers represented in each circumstance. For 
example, if a regiment had two men desert between its second and third engagements, the 
regiment’s number deserted variable assigned to the third engagement would have a 
value of “2,” indicating that two men deserted some time between the regiment’s second 
and third battles. The second measurement is the average number of days between the 
personnel changes and the regiment’s subsequent battle. Continuing the above example, 
if one of the two deserters bolted ten days prior to battle and the other fled the morning of 
battle, then the regiment’s time between desertion and combat variable would be the 
mean of the two values, or “5” days. 
In addition to the between-battle data culled from the rosters, combat casualty 
information was also collected. When a soldier was either killed, wounded, missing, or 
taken prisoner during battle, the loss was usually included in the published roster entry 
pertaining to that particular soldier. Thus, the rosters provided three valuable bits of 
combat information: dates of casualties, number of casualties, and types of casualties. 
Cross-referencing these data with each soldier’s date of entry into the regiment provides 
the “time-in-service” for each combat casualty. For example, during the Battle of Reams’ 
Station on August 25, 1864, the 26th Michigan lost 15 men—2 killed, 3 wounded, and 10 
missing or captured. From the regimental roster it was possible to identify each of these 
men, determine the number of days each served in the regiment prior to becoming a 
casualty, and calculate the soldiers’ average time in service within each casualty type. In 
the case of the 26th Michigan, the 2 killed soldiers averaged 365 days in service, the 3 
wounded men averaged 742 days in the regiment, and the 10 missing or captured soldiers 
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averaged 719 days in service.6 Time-in-service casualty data relative to each battle 
throws light on the relationship between time in service and combat performance. 
Although the rosters were a rich source of information, their overall completeness 
varied. Some accounted for every man who served in the unit. These were exceptional. 
Most rosters contained varying numbers of soldiers’ records with either “unknown date 
of entry,” “unknown date of separation,” or “unknown reason for separation.” The 
missing data, however, were not enough to invalidate the use of the rosters. Of the nearly 
50,000 men who served in the twenty-six regiments whose rosters were available, 
approximately 4,500 men (9 percent) had information missing in their service records. Of 
the 4,500 soldiers whose records were incomplete, some 3,400 men were missing 
information pertaining only to the separation of the soldiers from their regiments. In 
other words, the rosters provided complete arrival and separation information for 
approximately 45,500 men (91 percent) and complete arrival information for nearly 
46,600 men (93 percent).7 
The second data set includes all known personnel changes within the command 
hierarchy of each regiment throughout the war. Timelines for each regiment’s 
commanding officers, as well as each regiment’s respective brigade, division, corps, and 
army commanders, were created in an effort to understand the impact of command 
continuity on combat performance. Similar to the Roster data, the Command data were 
segmented into intervals of time. Unlike the Roster data, however, the segments of time 
                                                          
6 See “26th Michigan Personnel Listing” in “American Civil War Research Database [online 
database].” 
7 The U.S. War Department’s Compiled Military Service Records were not used to fill in roster 
data gaps because the gaps were not large enough to invalidate statistical analysis of the data. 
 
 40 
used for the Command data began with the conclusion of each regiment’s previous 
engagement and ended with the conclusion of each regiment’s subsequent engagement. 
In other words, the Command data were divided in such a way as to describe the 
continuity or change in each regiment’s chain of command from the end of one battle 
through the end of the next battle. Whereas the Roster data were segmented into 
between-battle periods of time, the Command data were segmented into periods of time 
stretching from the unit’s previous battle through its subsequent battle. 
Each segment of time includes both the total number of command changes at 
every level of a regiment’s command hierarchy, as well as the average number of days 
between the various changes at each level of the command hierarchy and the conclusion 
of a regiment’s next battle. For example, during the period of time between the battles of 
Antietam and Fredericksburg, the regimental commanding officer of the 28th 
Massachusetts was replaced on October 18, 1862. Therefore, the unit’s regimental 
command values for the Battle of Fredericksburg were “1” (number of regimental 
command changes that occurred from September 17, 1862, through December 13, 1862) 
and “56” (average number of days before the conclusion of the Battle of Fredericksburg 
that the regimental command change occurred).8 Through these measurements, the effect 
of command continuity and change at each level of a regiment’s command hierarchy can 
be measured against the regiment’s combat performance. 
                                                          
8 See U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-
1901, ser. 1, vol. XIX, pt. 1, pp. 169-80, 184-203, ibid., vol. XXI, pp. 48-61, 129-45 (hereafter referred to 
as OR); James L. Bowen, Massachusetts in the War, 1861-1865 (Springfield, MA: Clark W. Bryan, 1889), 
423-24; Lawrence F. Kohl and Margaret C. Richard, eds., Irish Green and Union Blue: The Civil War 
Letters of Peter Welsh, Color Sergeant, 28th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers (New York: Fordham 
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The greatest weakness in the Command data set is the gaps that appear in some 
regimental data from May through June 1864. For example, in several regiments the 
exact date when a new regimental commander assumed command is not known. The new 
commander’s name simply appears as the commanding officer in the monthly returns for 
the unit. Therefore, the date assigned to such changes in command may be in error by as 
much as thirty days. Despite these shortcomings, approximately 2,050 (90 percent) of the 
names and dates within the Command data are accurate, with the remaining 227 (10 
percent) accurate to within thirty days of the actual date of command change.9 
The third data set contains information on weaponry. It includes each regiment’s 
type of weapon and date of issue. It also chronicles changes in each regiment’s armament 
throughout the war. For example, the 148th Pennsylvania used three different types of 
weapons during its three years of service. On September 14, 1862, the men were issued 
Vincennes rifled muskets, dilapidated Belgian-made copies of the French flintlock rifled 
musket. On February 8, 1863, the troops received Springfield rifled muskets, single-shot, 
muzzle-loading weapons manufactured in Massachusetts. On October 7, 1864, they were 
issued Spencer rifles, breech-loading repeating rifles also manufactured in 
Massachusetts.10 The types of weapons that each of the regiments used in battle possibly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 1986), 24-25; and “28th Massachusetts Personnel Listing” in “American Civil War 
Research Database [online database].” 
9 The command changes at the grand division level were combined with the command changes at 
the army level because the grand division was such a short-lived institution within the Army of the 
Potomac. Major General Ambrose Burnside organized the Army of the Potomac into grand divisions on 
November 14, 1862. Major General Joseph Hooker eliminated the army’s grand divisions on February 5, 
1863. See Everette B. Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac 1861-1865 (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1971), 287, 318. 
10 See Joseph W. Muffly, ed., The Story of Our Regiment: A History of the 148th Pennsylvania 
Volunteers (Des Moines, IA: Kenyon Printing, 1904), “The Itinerary,” by Joseph W. Muffly and T. P. 
Meyer, 15-22; ibid., “The Colonel’s Story,” by James A. Beaver, 58-140; ibid., “The Story of Company D: 
Part I,” by William Gemmill, 616-38; ibid., “The Surgeon’s Story: Part I,” by A. T. Hamilton, 166-80; 
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influenced Federal combat performance. Detailed weapon information for the numerous 
Confederate regiments included in this study was not available. Consequently, analysis of 
the impact of weaponry in combat is limited to Federal regiments. 
It was possible to chronicle the weaponry changes for most of the Federal 
regiments. However, information regarding the armaments of four regiments (the 145th 
Pennsylvania, 183rd Pennsylvania, 2nd New York Heavy Artillery, and 7th New York 
Heavy Artillery) was incomplete. Sources indicate that the 145th Pennsylvania fought 
with smoothbore muskets through the Battle of Gettysburg. From July 1863 through the 
end of the war, however, no additional information regarding the regiment’s weaponry 
was found. Therefore, I estimated that the 145th Pennsylvania exchanged its smoothbore 
muskets for Springfield rifled muskets before the Battle of Reams’ Station (August 25, 
1864), the same time that another regiment within the brigade had upgraded its weaponry 
from smoothbore to rifled muskets.11 The 183rd Pennsylvania was probably armed with 
rifled muskets because of its late muster-in date. It entered into service and joined the 
First Division in March 1864, at which time most newly organized Federal regiments 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ibid., “The Lieutenant Colonel’s Story: And Incidentally the Story of Company B,” by James F. Weaver, 
143-64; John W. Busey and David G. Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg (Hightstown, 
NJ: Longstreet House, 1994), 35, 203, 242; W. Springer Menge and J. August Shimrak, eds., The Civil 
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Weapons of the Civil War (New York: Military Press, 1987), 32-61. 
11 The other regiment to upgrade its weaponry at this time was the 116th Pennsylvania, a former 
unit of the Irish Brigade and a diehard proponent of the smoothbore musket. By August 1, 1864, 
Lieutenant Colonel K. Oscar Broady, the commanding officer of the 4th Brigade, ordered the 116th 
Pennsylvania to exchange its smoothbore muskets for Springfield rifled muskets. It is likely that Broady 
also ordered the 145th Pennsylvania to do the same. See Menge and Shimrak, The Civil War Notebook of 
Daniel Chisholm, 135; Joseph G. Bilby, Remember Fontenoy! The 69th New York and the Irish Brigade in 
the Civil War (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 1995), 115, 163-66; and St. Clair A. Mulholland, The 
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were being armed with rifled muskets. Therefore, I assigned the 183rd Pennsylvania rifled 
muskets. Similarly, because of the late date upon which both heavy artillery regiments 
joined the Army of the Potomac (May 1864), and because most of the heavy artillery 
regiments garrisoned around Washington, D. C., were armed with rifled muskets, it was 
likely that the soldiers in both the 2nd New York Heavy Artillery and the 7th New York 
Heavy Artillery carried rifled muskets when they joined the Army of the Potomac as 
infantry units near Spotsylvania Court House.12 
At the heart of this study lies the fourth data set—Combat data. This data set 
contains forty-three distinct variables for each of the 465 engagements fought by the 
twenty-seven Federal regiments included in this work. The forty-three combat variables 
fall into one of three categories: Universal data, Federal data, and Confederate data. 
Universal data include information regarding those aspects of each battle that affected 
both the Federals and the Confederates. The two remaining data sets, Federal data and 
Confederate data, provide details regarding each side during battle. 
                                                          
12 There is a consensus among Civil War historians that by 1864 most soldiers, both Federal and 
Confederate, were armed with rifled muskets. See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil 
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 475; Paddy Griffith, Rally Once Again: Battle 
Tactics of the American Civil War (Ramsbury, Marlborough, Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 1987); reprint, 
Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 76-86 (page citations are to the 
reprint edition); Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, 
Organization, and Field Command (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 253-74; Richard E. 
Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 468-70; Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and 
Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1982), 69-80; Bruce Catton, The Army of the Potomac: A Stillness at Appomattox (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday and Company, 1953), 154-55; J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (London: J. 
Murray, 1929), 62-63; Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the 
American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987), 134-39; Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A 
Military and Political History, 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 32-35; and 
Howard M. Madaus, “Arms, Weapons, and Ammunition: Army Ordnance,” in Richard N. Current, ed., 
Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 4 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 1:59-62. 
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Universal data include the following variables: duration, weather, and terrain. The 
duration variable indicates the elapsed time of each engagement. Because of the inherent 
confusion associated with combat, the historical record occasionally yields conflicting 
information regarding combat duration. In those cases where a reliable measurement of 
combat duration was unattainable, an estimate was used. It was based on the combatants’ 
references to measurable moments within a day, such as dawn, sunrise, midday, sunset, 
and dark. Using Mark M. Boatner’s table for converting such language into specific 
hours and minutes, a reasonable estimate of battle duration was calculated. Though such 
calculations fall short of perfection, they are as accurate an estimate as allowed by the 
historical record.13 
The last Universal variables are weather and terrain. Both these variables are 
divided into categories based on the adjectives used by the soldiers to describe them. For 
example, weather categories vary from “hot” to “cold” to “rain,” while terrain categories 
vary from “open field” to “woods” to “swamp.” From the soldiers’ accounts of their 
combat experiences, it was possible to ascertain the weather conditions and terrain types 
for each battle. 
The second category of Combat data includes Federal battle information. The 
details regarding the Federal regiments in combat were captured in the following 
variables: regiment, time between battles, engagement order, battle number, strength, 
casualty, killed, wounded, missing, strength ratio, casualty ratio, percent lost, colors 
captured, colors lost, artillery support, action, outcome, position, formation, quality, 
                                                          
13 Boatner states that his calculations are accurate to within one or two minutes to the actual time 
during the Civil War. See Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 819-21. 
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prebattle 0-12, prebattle 12-24, prebattle 24-36, and prebattle 36-48. Three of these 
variables (regiment, colors captured, and colors lost) require minimal explanation. 
Respectively, they identify the Federal regiment engaged in the battle, the number of 
Confederate colors captured by the Federal regiment, and the number of colors lost by the 
Federal regiment.14 Rarely did the source materiel leave any doubt on these matters. 
The time between battles variable measures the number of days between 
engagements for a regiment. For example, after the 5th New Hampshire concluded its 
actions on June 3, 1864, the regiment did not enter into its next battle until June 16, 1864. 
Therefore, the value of the time between battles variable for the 5th New Hampshire’s 
June 16 engagement is “13,” representing the number of days between June 3 and June 
16.15 
The engagement order variable provides the chronological order of a Federal 
regiment’s engagements when that regiment participated in multiple engagements on the 
same day. For example, on October 14, 1863, the 126th New York engaged in two distinct 
clashes. The first occurred shortly after sunrise when the New Yorkers drove the 1st 
North Carolina cavalry from the flank and rear of the Second Corps near Auburn, 
Virginia. The second occurred later that day when the 126th successfully repulsed an 
                                                          
14 Typically, both Federal and Confederate regiments carried three types of flags into battle: their 
national flag, their regimental flag, and numerous guidons (small flags used by the companies within a 
regiment to identify and guide the unit). 
15 See OR, ser. 1, vol. XXXVI, pt. 1, pp. 370-72, 375-76; ibid., vol. XL, pt. 1, pp. 332-34, 338-40; 
William Child, A History of the Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the American Civil War, 
1861-1865 (Bristol, NH: R. W. Musgrove, 1893), 253-61, 269-73; Otis F. Waite, New Hampshire in the 
Great Rebellion (Claremont, NH: Tracy, Chase and Company, 1870), 288-89; Military Historical Society 
of Massachusetts, comp., Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 6 vols. (Boston: 
Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 1905), 4:341-62; R. Wayne Maney, Marching to Cold 
Harbor: Victory and Failure, 1864 (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1995), 138-45; Ernest B. 
Furgurson, Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor 1864 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 136-48; and 
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attack by the 15th North Carolina infantry at Bristoe Station. In this example, the morning 
engagement is designated as engagement order “1” and the afternoon fight is designated 
as engagement order “2.” Because it is sensitive to the date, the engagement order 
variable is meaningful only when a Federal regiment engaged in multiple battles in a 
single day. 
The battle number variable maintains an overall chronology of the engagements 
fought by each Federal regiment. Instead of placing each regiment’s engagements in 
chronological order relative to the dates upon which they occurred, the battle number 
variable places each regiment’s engagements in chronological order regardless of the 
date they occurred. In other words, if we wanted to study the fourth battle in which each 
Federal regiment participated, regardless of when the battles occurred, we can simply use 
the battle number variable to quickly identify the desired engagements. 
Information regarding the strength of a Federal regiment when it entered combat 
was usually available. However, there were occasions in which no clear statement of unit 
strength was available. In these circumstances, a regiment’s strength was extrapolated 
from detailed information regarding the brigade in which the regiment served. Beginning 
with the total strength of the brigade, the number of soldiers serving in regiments whose 
strengths were known was subtracted from the brigade’s total. The remainder represented 
the total number of soldiers in the brigade belonging to regiments whose strengths were 
not known. The remainder was then divided by the total number of regiments whose 
strengths were not known, resulting in an estimated average strength for each of the 
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unknown regiments. To corroborate the accuracy of such an estimate, it was compared 
with the regiment’s nearest known strengths, both preceding and following the date of the 
estimated strength. The strength estimate was also cross-referenced with the arrivals and 
departures of the men within the regiment as stated in the regimental roster.16 
The casualty variable represents the total number of casualties sustained by a 
Federal regiment in combat. Unlike regimental strength data, casualty data have been 
analyzed more carefully by previous scholars. Therefore, it was not a question of finding 
the data; it was a question of determining whose data were most reliable. For example, 
there are numerous reports of the casualties sustained by the 61st New York during the 
Seven Days’ battles. No two of them agree. The range of the 61st New York’s total 
number of casualties is 110-145. The range of the number killed is 10-49. The range of 
the number wounded is 57-86. The range of the number missing is 4-21.17 In a case such 
as this, the various sources were measured for accuracy and reliability, with the greatest 
weight placed on the official casualty reports and the after-action reports from both the 
regiment and brigade commanders. To further ensure the accuracy of the data, the 
                                                          
16 To measure the accuracy of this method for estimating and corroborating regimental strength, 
the calculations were conducted on several regiments when their strengths were known. In each case the 
strength estimates were within 10 percent of the regiment’s actual strength. The practice of taking a 
superior organizational unit’s strength and averaging it across the constituent parts in an effort to estimate 
the strength of one of the constituent parts has a long history among Civil War scholars. See Daniel H. Hill, 
“The Battle of South Mountain, or Boonsboro,” found in Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson, eds., 
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 vols. (New York: Century Company, 1887), 2:559-81. 
17 See OR., ser. 1, vol. XI, pt. 2, pp. 24, 60-2, 65-69; Frederick Phisterer, New York in the War of 
the Rebellion: 1861 to 1865, 5 vols. (Albany, NY: F. B. Lyon Company, 1912), 3:2554-73; William F. 
Fox, Regimental Losses In The American Civil War, 1861-1865: A Treatise On The Extent And Nature Of 
The Mortuary Losses In The Union Regiments, With Full And Exhaustive Statistics Compiled From The 
Official Records On File In The State Military Bureaus And At Washington (Albany, N.Y.: Albany 
Publishing Company, 1889), 31, 201; and “61st New York Personnel Listing” in “American Civil War 
Research Database [online database].” 
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casualty figures were contrasted with the losses detailed in the regimental roster. Finally, 
if a casualty figure was still in doubt, the average of the conflicting numbers was used. 
The killed variable includes the number of men killed or mortally wounded. These 
values were combined because, regardless of the soldier’s classification, he would not 
return to the regiment for subsequent engagements. The wounded variable includes those 
soldiers who were wounded during combat, but not mortally wounded. Finally, the 
missing variable represents the sum of the number of men reported as either “missing” or 
“taken prisoner.” These categories were combined because often within the primary 
source material the number “missing” and “taken prisoner” were either combined or 
unreliably separated. 
The next three variables are calculations based on the relative strengths and 
casualties of the opposing forces. Strength ratio is the ratio of Federal soldiers to 
Confederate soldiers. It was calculated by dividing the strength of the Federal regiment 
by the strength of its Confederate opponent. Casualty ratio was derived in an identical 
fashion. Instead of comparing regimental strengths, however, casualty ratio compares 
their respective casualties. It represents the total number of Federal casualties divided by 
the total number of Confederate casualties.18 The last of these calculated variables is 
percent lost. This variable describes a Federal regiment’s combat casualties as a 
                                                          
18 In 21 of the 465 engagements, either the Federals or Confederates sustained no casualties. In 
these instances, the casualty ratio variable was either zero or null. A multiple regression model was used to 
estimate the casualty ratios for these 21 engagements. Using both the Federal missing and percent lost 
variables as “predictor variables” in the regression procedure, 95 percent of the variance in the variable 
casualty ratio was explained. Therefore, I accepted the model’s “predicted values” for the 21 missing cases 
and entered them into the Federal casualty ratio variable. The model’s R Square value and Adjusted R 
Square value were both .946, with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) F statistic of 3891.408 and p < .0005. 
Finally, the mean casualty ratio before entering the regression estimates was 14.4464 with a standard error 
of 3.944 and a range of 979.99. After entering the regression estimates, the mean value was 13.8342 with a 
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percentage of its combat strength. For example, if a regiment of 100 soldiers lost 10 men 
in battle, the regiment’s percent lost would be 10 percent. 
Ascertaining the number of Federal cannon that supported each infantry regiment 
during battle required careful analysis of the source material. For example, when the 
140th Pennsylvania engaged the Confederates at Corbin’s Bridge on May 8, 1864, the 
regiment was supported by an artillery battery composed of six cannon. Although it was 
not possible to learn the identity of the artillery unit, various sources revealed that the 
battery comprised six guns.19 By applying the same research methodology to each 
Federal regiment, reasonable artillery strength estimates were possible. 
The remaining Federal variables are categorical. These variables are meant to 
describe those aspects of combat that were not numeric in nature but are believed to have 
influenced combat performance. To determine their values, the regiment’s combat 
perspective was assumed. For example, if a northern regiment defeated its opponent but 
was forced to retreat because of Federal setbacks on its flanks, the regiment’s combat 
performance was considered a success despite the ultimate defeat of its brigade. 
Therefore, the accounts of battles included in this study may differ from official or other 
scholarly descriptions of these engagements. Because one of the goals of this work is to 
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understand the nature of Civil War combat at the regimental level, the regiment’s 
perspective was used as the guiding criterion when collecting and evaluating information. 
The first of these categorical variables is action. This variable describes the 
tactical action taken by the Federal regiment during battle. The variable has only three 
possible values: “1 = offense,” “2 = mixed” (offense and defense), and “3 = defense.” 
Each regiment’s action was determined by examining its tactical objective and its efforts 
to achieve that objective. Both “offense” and “defense” are self-explanatory. Mixed 
actions were those instances in which a Federal regiment began in either an offensive or 
defensive posture but, because of circumstances, switched from its original action to the 
opposite action. Although action is a categorical variable, by giving each tactical posture 
a numeric value, action can also be used as a continuous variable. Because of its double 
nature as both a categorical and continuous variable, action can be included in numerous 
statistical procedures. 
The outcome variable is similar to the action variable. It is both categorical and 
continuous. It too has only three possible values: “1 = lose,” “2 = stalemate,” and “3 = 
win.” Like action, outcome is based on the tactical mission of the regiment and the 
degree to which the regiment successfully fulfilled its mission. From the information 
available regarding the battles in which the Federal regiments participated, their 
respective outcomes were usually clear. Occasionally discrepancies arose, but they were 
mediated by a careful assessment of the accuracy and reliability of the conflicting 
sources. 
Both the position and formation variables are strictly categorical. The position 
variable describes the area in which a Federal regiment deployed into its combat 
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formation before entering the fray; the formation variable describes the tactical formation 
used by the regiment as it engaged in combat. Typical positions included areas such as 
open fields, woods, or behind breastworks. Typical formations included line, column, or 
a tactically dispersed formation called skirmish. 
Federal quality is the next variable. It is an estimate of certain behavioral 
characteristics of each regiment. Specifically, the variable is an amalgam of a unit’s 
morale, cohesion, and leadership. Each regiment’s quality fell into one of three 
categories. Inferior units were assigned “1 = low” quality. Superior regiments were 
assigned “3 = high” quality. Those units that were neither inferior nor superior were 
assigned “2 = average” quality. Despite the subjective nature of these estimates, careful 
research provided adequate information from which to judge the quality of the regiments. 
For example, during the Battle of Antietam, the 61st New York proved that it was a 
superior combat unit. Its officers were praised for their exemplary leadership during 
fighting along the Bloody Lane. Both Colonel Francis Barlow and Lieutenant Colonel 
Nelson Miles maintained command and control of their troops as they turned the 
Confederate right flank and pursued the fleeing enemy soldiers. The officers praised the 
men for their discipline, courage, and steadiness under such trying circumstances. The 
men pointed to the two Confederate flags that they captured as a measure of their 
effectiveness. Based on this information, the quality of the 61st New York at Antietam 
was estimated as “high.”20 
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The final four Federal variables describe the activities of a regiment prior to 
entering combat. They are prebattle 0-12, prebattle 12-24, prebattle 24-36, and prebattle 
36-48. Each prebattle variable encompasses a twelve-hour period and describes the 
regiment’s primary activity during that period. Prebattle 0-12 describes a regiment’s 
actions during the twelve hour period just prior to combat, prebattle 12-24 describes the 
regiment’s actions during the twelve hour period preceding prebattle 0-12, and so on. For 
example, prior to the Battle of Morton’s Ford on February 6, 1864, the 126th New York 
was in its winter quarters. Despite the miscellaneous duties carried out by one or two of 
its companies, the majority of the New Yorkers were quietly encamped until the day of 
battle. On February 6 the regiment was roused at dawn and marched into the afternoon 
before engaging the Confederates at Morton’s Ford. In this scenario, the prebattle 
variables were assigned as follows: prebattle 0-12 = “march,” prebattle 12-24 = “camp,” 
prebattle 24-36 = “camp,” and prebattle 36-48 = “camp.” The combined effect of these 
four variables is an account of the New Yorkers’ actions in twelve-hour increments for 
the two days prior to battle.21 
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The final portion of the Combat data set is Confederate data. This subset contains 
many of the same variables as the Federal data subset. The Confederate data variables are 
regiment, strength, casualty, killed, wounded, missing, percent lost, colors captured, 
colors lost, artillery support, action, outcome, position, formation, and quality. These 
variables are identical to those in the Federal data subset. 
After collection and collation of the Roster, Command, Armament, and Combat 
data, the data were merged into a single file consisting of over 2 million datapoints. Once 
the between-battle information was synthesized and segmented, the data file became 
more manageable. It consisted of 465 unique cases, each representing a single 
engagement for one of the twenty-seven Federal regiments. Each of the 465 cases 
consisted of 85 variables. Therefore, the final data file was reduced from an unwieldy 2 
million datapoints to a more functional 40,000 datapoints. 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows, version 10.0) 
was used to analyze the data in three steps. The first involved applying simple statistical 
procedures to the data and comparing the results with those predicted by both the 
environmental and behavioral schools of thought. The second involved duplicating the 
unique combat analyses of several historians in an effort to measure the reliability of their 
methodologies. The final analytical step involved the creation of a statistical model 
designed to predict battle results for Federal infantry regiments. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL COMBAT ANALYSES 
Preliminary analysis of the data reveals patterns and trends consistent with the 
environmental approach to understanding Civil War combat. The data corroborate the 
theory that the physical aspects of battle significantly influenced combat performance. 
However, the data also suggest that the behavioral aspects of battle may have affected 
combat performance more than previously believed. While the analyses in this chapter 
cannot determine whether combat performance was influenced more by the physical or 
mental characteristics of battle, the tests clearly indicate that both aspects significantly 
affected the combatants’ ability to fight. 
A brief examination of the Federal regiments included in this study is in order. Of 
the twenty-seven regiments analyzed, twenty-four were volunteer infantry units, and the 
remaining three were heavy artillery regiments temporarily serving as infantry 
regiments.1 The majority of the regiments were recruited in New York. The Empire State 
                                                          
1 In March 1864 General Ulysses S. Grant began studying the feasibility of transferring heavy 
artillery units from garrison duty around Washington, D. C., and Baltimore to infantry duty with the Army 
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1864. The 2nd New York Heavy Artillery and the 7th New York Heavy Artillery arrived on May 16, 1864. 
Though some of the artillery soldiers felt that their conversion from artillery to infantry service was a 
betrayal of their terms of enlistment, they limited their protests to messmate chatter, family 
correspondence, and personal diaries. See U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901, ser. 1, vol. XXXIII, pp. 721, 760-61, 829, 879-80, 887-88; ibid., vol. XXXVI, 
pt. 1, pp. 70, 72, 192, 337-38; ibid., pt. 2, pp. 595-96, 627-28, 652, 695-96, 736, 784, 798-99, 828-29, 844, 
849-50; ibid., vol. LI, pt. 1, p. 1165 (hereafter referred to as O.R.); Hyland C. Kirk, Heavy Guns and Light: 
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provided thirteen of the twenty-four infantry units and all three of the heavy artillery 
regiments. New York’s contribution of manpower was followed most closely by 
Pennsylvania’s. The Keystone State contributed seven infantry regiments to the First 
Division. Finally, the states of Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire 
provided one regiment each. 
These Federal regiments’ collective combat history spanned nearly four years of 
fighting. Their first battle occurred on July 21, 1861, at the Battle of First Manassas (Bull 
Run), and their last battle occurred on April 7, 1865, at the Battle of Farmville. 
Throughout their forty-six months of combined service, the regiments participated in 465 
distinct engagements. The 111th New York and the 126th New York fought the greatest 
number of engagements (twenty-four each), and the 7th New York Veteran fought the 
least (only six). The 39th New York served the longest, fighting with the Army of the 
Potomac throughout the entire war. The 7th New York Veteran regiment, on the other 
hand, participated in only the final year of the war. Overall, the Federal units averaged 
ten engagements each in slightly over three years of service. 
When analyzing Civil War combat, many historians have adopted the same 
intellectual model. They agree that combat performance was largely based on the 
influence of the environmental conditions present on the battlefield. This scholarly 
consensus maintains that battles often resulted in futile carnage because of the tactical 
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advantage enjoyed by well-armed, entrenched defenders when pitted against exposed 
attackers advancing in linear formation. This conception, explicitly or implicitly, usually 
depends on sixteen variables: Federal and Confederate outcome, action, position, 
formation, terrain, weaponry, artillery support, and casualties. Many historians use the 
interactions of these variables to explain the nature of Civil War combat. 
The most significant variable within this environmental approach to 
understanding Civil War combat is outcome. Battlefield results were undoubtedly 
influenced by the remaining variables. Therefore, the first step when using the 
environmental analytical approach to examine the data collected for this study is to 
review battlefield results. A glance at the Federals’ collective combat record indicates 
that they did not enjoy much success. They won only 24 percent of their engagements, 
lost almost 60 percent, and fought to a stalemate in the remaining 16 percent. The 
Confederates’ collective results were nearly opposite those of the Federals. Southern 
troops won approximately 61 percent of their battles, lost only 25 percent, and were 
stalemated in the remaining 14 percent. 
The distribution of results indicates that Federal and Confederate outcomes had 
an inverse relationship. Federal victories were associated with Confederate defeats just as 
Federal defeats were associated with Confederate victories. When either side fought to a 
tactical stalemate, however, the opposite side frequently stalemated as well. The 
seemingly inverse relationship between victories and defeats, however, was not always 
symmetrical. Occasionally, engagements occurred in which both sides claimed victory. 
For example, on February 6, 1864, Brigadier General Joshua T. Owen’s brigade of four 
regiments (39th New York, 111th New York, 125th New York, and 126th New York) 
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waded across the icy Rapidan River at Morton’s Ford in northern Virginia and drove 
back an enemy picket line. The Federals secured their foothold on the opposite side by 
advancing three-fourths of a mile beyond the river and falling to the ground in line of 
battle. From their forward positions, the northern troops could see the main line of 
Confederate breastworks and feel the heat of their guns. Rifle and artillery fire was 
incessant. While the Federals positioned themselves, the Confederates prepared a 
counterattack. Nearly six hours after the Federals had initiated the engagement, the 
Confederates seized the initiative and struck. Under a hail of rifle and artillery fire, the 
Confederates bellowed their rebel yell and charged directly at Owen’s brigade. Despite 
making several assaults, the Confederates failed to break the Federal line. They did, 
however, threaten to turn the Federals’ right flank. In light of the protracted struggle and 
the fact that the Federals were ordered merely to demonstrate against the Confederate 
forces at Morton’s Ford, Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, commander of the 
Second Corps, ordered his advanced units to retire across the river.2 
Based on the orders, expectations, and accomplishments of the opposing forces, 
both sides felt that they had been successful. The Federals crossed the Rapidan in front of 
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the enemy, drove its pickets back, and held the field until ordered to retire. The 
Confederates, on the other hand, rallied when their pickets indicated an impending attack, 
stopped the Federal advance, counterattacked, and forced the Federals to retreat. Under 
these circumstances, both sides were justified in claiming victory. Unique engagements 
like this explain why the distribution of Federal and Confederate outcomes is not 
inversely symmetrical. Overall, the outcomes of only eighteen engagements (4 percent) 
failed to demonstrate an inverse relationship (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of Federal and Confederate Combat Outcomes, 1861-653 
Combatant Win Stalemate Lose Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Federal 113 24.3 76 16.3 276 59.4 465 100.0 
Confederate 282 60.6 66 14.2 117 25.2 465 100.0 
 
 
Perhaps the most striking characteristics of the outcome data are the discrepancies 
between Federal and Confederate victories and defeats. If the environmental school is 
correct, then the other variables included in the model should account for the variance in 
battlefield results. When tactical actions and combat outcomes are analyzed together, a 
significant relationship between the two variables emerges.4 Federal regiments enjoyed 
more tactical success when fighting defensively than offensively. Throughout the war the 
Federals attacked in 305 engagements, winning only 21 percent, while losing over 58 
percent. On defense, however, the Federals enjoyed greater success. They fought 
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defensively in 100 battles, of which 42 resulted in victory and 51 ended in defeat. 
Whenever the Federals employed mixed tactics, however, the results were disastrous. Of 
the 60 battles in which the Federals fought mixed actions, they lost over 78 percent of 
them. In other words, northern soldiers doubled their chances of victory by fighting 
defensively versus offensively, they lost with near equal frequency when fighting either 




Comparison of Federal Tactical Actions and Federal Combat Outcomes 
Action Win Stalemate Lose Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Offense 66 21.6 61 20.0 178 58.4 305 100.0 
Mixed 5 8.3 8 13.3 47 78.3 60 100.0 
Defense 42 42.0 7 7.0 51 51.0 100 100.0 
 
 
The relationship between Confederate actions and outcomes was similar. 
Defensive actions resulted in victory more often than offensive actions. When seizing the 
initiative and attacking, the Confederates won nearly 55 percent of the time and lost 37 
percent. When fighting defensively, they won over 68 percent of their engagements and 
lost only 18 percent. Unlike the Federals, however, the Confederates were more than 
twice as likely to win versus lose when fighting mixed tactical actions. In other words, 
analysis of the Confederate data not only supports the notion that defense dominated the 
Civil War battlefield, but it suggests that Confederate soldiers enjoyed more success than 
their Federal counterparts regardless of the tactics they employed. Possible explanations 
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for the differences in combat outcomes relative to tactical actions must be sought in the 
analyses of the remaining variables (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of Confederate Tactical Actions with Confederate Combat Outcomes 
Action Win Stalemate Lose Total 
 N % N % N % N % 
Offense 93 54.7 14 8.2 63 37.1 170 100.0 
Mixed 27 47.4 19 33.3 11 19.3 57 100.0 
Defense 162 68.1 33 13.9 43 18.1 238 100.0 
 
 
Examination of the data regarding prebattle tactical positions and combat 
outcomes reveals a statistically significant association between positions and outcomes.5 
The environmental view of Civil War combat suggests that the impact of tactical 
positions on combat performance was felt primarily when units fought defensively. The 
prebattle position assumed by a defensive force was the position from which that force 
engaged its opponent, thereby granting the defensive force whatever tactical advantages 
its position afforded. Inversely, the prebattle position assumed by an offensive force had 
negligible influence on its combat performance because the attacking force was required 
to abandon its position as it advanced toward the enemy. Therefore, analysis of the 
positional data relative to combat actions should show that defensive positions 
significantly affected outcome. 
                                                          
5 Pearson’s chi-square test was used to analyze the possible relationship between outcome and 
position. The results suggest that the positions from which combatants entered battle significantly affected 
their chances for victory. Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Federals was 108.495 with 12 df and p < 
.0005. Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Confederates was 57.082 with 6 df and p < .0005. Analysis of 
variance provides another measure of the relationship between the outcome and position. Similar to the 
chi-square test, analysis of variance for both combatants’ position and outcome data suggest that tactical 
positions significantly affected battlefield results. The Federal F statistic was 14.638 with 6 df and p < 
.0005. The Confederate F statistic was 11.994 with 3 df and p < .0005. 
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Analysis of those engagements in which one combatant attacked while the other 
defended suggests that defensive tactical positions did indeed affect combat outcomes. 
When the Federals attacked, they lost approximately 70 percent of the time, and either 
won or stalemated approximately 15 percent of the time each. The Confederate defensive 
tactical position that most frustrated Federal assaults was an entrenched position. Federal 
units attacked entrenched positions 129 times. They lost approximately 90 percent of 
these engagements, and won less than 10 percent. The Federals attacked weaker 
defensive positions, such as enemy troops positioned in wooded areas or behind 
temporary breastworks, 109 times. Against these softer defensive positions, the Federals 
reduced their failure rate from 90 percent to 40 percent, and they more than doubled their 
success rate, increasing it to approximately 20 percent.6 
Despite the dominant role that Confederate defensive positions appear to have 
played on the battlefield, the impact of Federal defensive positions is less clear. Because 
the Federals fought defensively against attacking Confederates only ninety-eight times, it 
is difficult to measure the possible relationship between Federal defensive positions and 
Federal combat results.7 The data imply that the stronger the defensive position, the more 
                                                          
6 Both chi-square analysis and analysis of variance indicate a significant relationship between 
Confederate defensive positions and Federal battlefield performance. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 
57.546 with 4 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 26.827 with 2 df and p < 
.0005. 
7 Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson have argued that southern forces took the tactical 
offensive in nearly 70 percent of the “major battles” during the first three years of the war. The data used in 
this study indicate that the Confederates attacked only 47 percent of the time during these “major battles.” 
However, McWhiney and Jamieson defined tactical action based on the overall posture of an army. At 
Antietam, for example, the authors found that the Federals were the aggressors. At the army command 
level, they certainly were. At lower levels of command, however, tactical actions were not so clearly 
divided. Federal regiments attacked 72 percent of the time, and Confederate regiments attacked 52 percent 
of the time. Though the Federals still may be considered the aggressors at Antietam, the data suggest that it 
may be inaccurate to describe the battle simply as a Federal offensive action. Much of the difference 
between the tactical action data used in this study and that used by McWhiney and Jamieson may be 
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likely the chances that the defender would win. For example, when northern troops 
fought defensively from an exposed position, they lost 60 percent of their engagements 
and won less than 40 percent. When they defended from behind improvised breastworks 
or within a wooded area, the Federals lost only 50 percent of their engagements and won 
over 40 percent. When they fought defensively from an entrenched position, the Federals 
lost one-third of their engagements, winning the other two-thirds. Though the data failed 
to show a statistically significant relationship between Federal defensive positions and 
combat outcomes, they do demonstrate an increased likelihood for success when the 
soldiers in blue fought from a strong defensive position.8 
Tactical formations changed only slightly during the war. Both the Federals and 
the Confederates consistently used linear formations. That is to say, their infantrymen 
usually deployed in compact, rigid, lines before entering battle.9 The Federals formed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attributed to the differing criteria used to determine which side attacked and which defended. The tactical 
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D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1982), 7-9. 
8 Because of the limited number of engagements in which Federal forces defended against 
attacking Confederate forces, the defensive tactical positions assumed by the Federals were consolidated 
into three categories. The first category, “1 = No Cover or Concealment,” included the twenty-nine 
engagements in which the Federals fought defensively from an unobstructed position. The second 
category, “2 = Limited Cover or Concealment,” included the sixty-three engagements in which the 
Federals fought defensively either within wooded areas or behind temporary breastworks. The third 
category, “3 = Full Cover or Concealment,” included the six engagements in which the Federals fought 
defensively from entrenched positions. Both chi-square analysis and analysis of variance failed to find a 
statistically significant relationship between Federal defensive positions (using the three generic categories 
outlined above) and Federal outcome. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 2.739 with 4 df and p = .602. 
Analysis of variance produced an F statistic of .709 with 2 df and p = .495. Finally, by using the numerical 
characteristics of both Federal outcome and Federal position variables, it was possible to examine the data 
using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Like the previous statistical tests, Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
failed to find a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. However, the test did show a 
positive correlation between Federal outcome and Federal defensive positions. In other words, the more 
that the Federals used cover and concealment when fighting defensively, the more likely their chances for 
victory. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = .118 with p = .248. 
9 Civil War regiments generally formed a line of battle by dividing into two or three equal ranks 
(or lines) of men. Within a rank, the soldiers crowded together to such an extent that their shoulders and 
elbows touched. The rear rank maintained a distance of approximately thirteen inches from the front rank. 
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lines of battle over 78 percent of the time, and the Confederates fought in line nearly 93 
percent of the time. When the Federals deployed in line, they won approximately 28 
percent of their engagements, lost 64 percent, and stalemated the remaining 8 percent. 
When the Confederates deployed in line, on the other hand, they won nearly 64 percent 
of the time, lost 27 percent, and stalemated the remaining 9 percent. 
Rarely did either side experiment with non-linear tactics. When they did, the 
combatants usually deployed in either column or skirmish formations. The typical 
column formation required that the lines of battle created by the individual regiments 
within a single brigade be tightly stacked directly behind one another. The Federals 
fought in column formation only 10 percent of the time, and the Confederates never 
attempted it in battle. When the Federals fought in column, they were defeated 54 percent 
of the time, stalemated 46 percent of the time, and were never victorious. Both 
belligerents employed skirmish formations in battle with similar frequency and results. 
The typical skirmish formation required that the soldiers within a regiment disperse along 
a single rank at intervals of approximately five yards. The Federals fought in skirmish 
formation 12 percent of the time; the Confederates used the formation 8 percent of the 
time. When deployed in skirmish formation, the Federals won 18 percent of their 
engagements, lost 34 percent, and stalemated in the remaining 48 percent. When the 
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Confederates fought in skirmish formation, they won 23 percent of the time, lost 3 
percent, and stalemated 74 percent of the time.10 
The relationship between formations and outcomes appears statistically 
significant. The data suggest that skirmish formations usually resulted in tactical 
stalemates. Similarly, column formations often led to stalemates, but were slightly more 
likely to end in defeat. The data regarding linear formations, however, is less clear. The 
uneven distribution of Federal and Confederate combat outcomes when deployed in lines 
of battle suggests that combat results were influenced not only by tactical formations, but 
also by other factors. Variables such as action, terrain, or position may account for the 
difference in outcome when fighting in lines of battle. However, the combatants’ limited 
success when deployed in nonlinear formations suggests that these formations negatively 
influenced combat results. In other words, the relationship between linear formations and 
battlefield effectiveness is less obvious because of the wide-spread use of linear 
formations. The relationships between non-linear formations and battle results, however, 
is more apparent. Non-linear formations frequently resulted in either stalemate or 
defeat.11 
The data suggest that terrain played a significant role in Civil War battles. 
Northern soldiers fought across broken ground (an uneven killing zone where limited 
protection from enemy fire was available) 25 percent of the time, up hill over broken 
                                                          
10 For descriptions of either column or skirmish formations, see respectively, Jeffry D. Wert, A 
Brotherhood of Valor: The Common Soldiers of the Stonewall Brigade, C.S.A., and the Iron Brigade, 
U.S.A. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999) , 177; or White, The Civil War Diary of Wyman S. White, 
14. 
11 Analysis of formation and outcome suggests that a significant relationship between the two 
variables existed. Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Federals was 97.698 with 4 df and p < .0005. 
Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Confederates was 112.689 with 2 df and p < .0005. 
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ground 23 percent of the time, across open ground 17 percent of the time, in wooded 
areas 9 percent of the time, and on various other types of terrain 26 percent of the time. 
Surprisingly, the Federals gained nearly 50 percent of all their victories while fighting on 
either open ground or broken ground. They were least effective when fighting up hill on 
either open or broken ground. Of the twenty-six times that the Federals were engaged on 
a smooth incline, they lost every time. When they fought on an uneven hillside, the 
Federals lost eighty-three engagements and won only twenty-two. Other than the 
Federals’ success when fighting on open or broken ground, their experience appears 
consistent with the environmental view that the force positioned on high ground had a 
tactical advantage.12 
The data regarding Confederate combat performance relative to terrain are more 
consistent with scholarly theory. The distribution of terrain types experienced by 
Confederate units mirrored that of the Federals. The southerners fought on broken ground 
25 percent of the time, down hill over broken terrain 23 percent of the time, over open 
ground 17 percent of the time, in wooded fields 9 percent of the time, and on various 
other terrain types 26 percent of the time. Confederate units were most effective when 
fighting down hill over uneven ground. They won almost 83 percent of the time. They 
were least effective when fighting on open ground. Under these conditions, they lost 37 
percent of the time. Similar to the Federal data regarding terrain and outcome, the 
                                                          
12 Analysis of terrain and Federal outcome suggests that a significant relationship between the two 
variables existed. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 196.605 with 18 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance 
produced an F statistic of 6.199 with 9 df and p < .0005. 
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Confederate data suggest that the slope of a hill may have had greater impact on combat 
than the surface characteristics of the ground.13 
Indeed, further analysis of terrain data confirms that the pitch of the battlefield, 
not the foliage on it, significantly affected combat performance. The optimum tactical 
scenario was to fight down hill; the second-best was to fight on level ground; the worst 
was to fight up hill. The slope of the ground also appears to have dispelled any doubt as 
to who won or who lost. The combatants never fought to a stalemate when engaged on a 
hillside. All seventy-six tactical stalemates included in this study occurred on level 
terrain. In other words, not only did the slope of the ground influence combat 
performance far more than the surface of the ground, the slope also made combat more 
decisive.14 
The type of infantry arms used in battle appears to have had only a slight effect on 
combat performance. Unfortunately, accurate weapon data were available only for the 
                                                          
13 Analysis of terrain and Confederate outcome suggests that a significant relationship between 
the two variables existed. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 190.410 with 18 df and p < .0005. Analysis of 
variance produced an F statistic of 7.076 with 9 df and p < .0005. 
14 To analyze the influence that the surface characteristics of the ground had on combat outcome, 
the terrain variable was recoded. First, terrain was classified by its surface characteristics. Each battlefield 
was categorized as either “1 = Open Ground,” “2 = Broken Ground,” or “3 = Wooded Ground.” Using 
these terrain categories, both analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation coefficient procedures were 
applied to the data. Analysis of variance of Federal combat performance produced an F statistic of .342 
with 2 df and p = .710; Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = -.016 with p = .727. Analysis of variance 
of Confederate combat performance produced an F statistic of .896 with 2 df and p = .409; Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient was r = -.001 with p = .990. In other words, both statistical tests found that the 
relationships between terrain surface and both Federal and Confederate combat performance were far from 
significant. Next, terrain was classified by its slope. Each battlefield was categorized as either “1 = Down 
Hill,” “2 = Level Ground,” or “3 = Up Hill.” Using these terrain categories, both analysis of variance and 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient procedures were applied to the data. Analysis of variance of Federal 
combat performance produced an F statistic of 17.787 with 2 df and p < .0005; Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient was r = -.149 with p = .001. Analysis of variance of Confederate combat performance produced 
an F statistic of 18.035 with 2 df and p < .0005; Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = -.182 with p < 
.0005. In other words, both statistical tests found that the slope of the battlefield significantly affected the 




Federal regiments. Therefore, all analyses regarding the impact of shoulder arms on 
combat performance must be limited to the northern units. A comparison of combat 
results in which the Federals used either rifled or non-rifled shoulder arms suggests that 
Federal units were more likely to lose those engagements in which they used smoothbore 
muskets. When armed with smoothbore muskets, northern units lost 63 percent of their 
engagements and won only 17 percent. When armed with rifled weapons, however, the 
Federals’ combat performance improved. They still lost 60 percent of the time, but their 
percentage of victories rose from 17 to 26. Furthermore, the data suggest that among the 
various rifled weapons used by the Federals, the Spencer repeating rifle gave them their 
greatest tactical advantage. When Federal regiments used the Spencer rifle, they won 67 
percent of the time, fought to a stalemate 33 percent of the time, and never lost a battle.15 
The data regarding the use of artillery during combat support the belief that 
cannon played an important role on Civil War battlefields. Overall, the Confederates 
enjoyed an advantage in the number of cannon employed during battle.16 They averaged 
                                                          
15 Caution should be used when interpreting the relationship between weapon types and combat 
performance. Uneven sample sizes make drawing any conclusions problematic. Of the 465 engagements 
analyzed, smoothbore muskets were used in 72 battles while rifled weapons were used in the remaining 
393 engagements. Of the 393 battles in which rifled weapons were used, Spencer repeating rifles were 
used in only 3 engagements. Although the distribution of Federal combat results suggests that weaponry 
affected outcome, more careful analyses reveal that the relationship between weaponry and outcome was 
not statistically significant. For example, by categorizing the types of weapons used by the Federal 
regiments as either rifled or non-rifled and then examining the relationships between weaponry and 
outcome, statistical analyses reveal that the two variables were not significantly associated. Pearson’s chi-
square statistic was 3.236 with 2 df and p = .198. Analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.385 with 
1 degree of freedom and p = .24. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = .055 with p = .240. Though 
Pearson’s correlation analysis indicates that the relationship between the variables was not statistically 
significant, it shows that the relationship was positive. This positive relationship means that Federal 
regiments were more likely to win when armed with rifled weapons, but the relationship was not strong 
enough to meet the requirements of statistical significance. Finally, when all the categories within the 
Federal weapon variable were analyzed, the results showed no statistically significant relationship between 
weapon and outcome. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 12.686 with 8 df and p = .123. 
16 Most Civil War historians agree that the Confederacy suffered from a lack of cannon 
throughout much of the war. This study found that the southerners frequently enjoyed a numerical 
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thirteen guns against the Federals’ ten. Regardless of outcome, the Confederates 
consistently averaged two to three more cannon than the Federals.17 Interestingly, the 
Federals usually won when artillery use by both sides was low. As the combatants 
increased their number of cannon, the Federals tended to lose or fight to a stalemate. 
Because Federal regiments usually fought offensively, and because artillery was used 
primarily as a defensive weapon, it is not surprising that the northern troops enjoyed 
more success when southern troops used fewer artillery guns.18 
The final type of information usually included in environmental analyses of Civil 
War combat is casualty data. The environmental school of thought maintains that high 
casualty rates were associated with tactical defeat because of the deadly effect that 
concentrated defensive rifle and artillery fire had against advancing lines of infantry. A 
comparison of the mean number of casualties with battlefield results indicates that defeat 
was more costly than victory or stalemate. The Federals lost an average of thirty-two men 
per regiment when they were victorious, forty-one men when they fought to a stalemate, 
and forty-nine men when they were defeated. Similarly, the Confederates averaged ten 
casualties when they were victorious, twenty casualties when they stalemated, and sixty-
                                                                                                                                                                             
advantage in cannon because they usually fought defensively. The Confederates often remained in 
defensive tactical positions near their artillery batteries. The Federals, however, often took the tactical 
offensive, thereby advancing away from their artillery support and toward that of their opponent. For 
discussions regarding Confederate artillery, see John R. Elting, “An Overview”; Russ A. Pritchard, 
“Confederate Artillery”; Pritchard, “Captured U.S. Artillery”; and C. A. Huey, “Imported English 
Artillery”; in Richard N. Current, ed., Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 4 vols. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1993), 1:91-96, 96-99, 99-102, 102-103 respectively. 
17 The mean number of Federal versus Confederate cannon per Federal outcome were: Win = 6 v. 
9, Lose = 11 v. 13, Stalemate = 14 v. 16, respectively. 
18 Analysis of variance between both Federal and Confederate artillery strength and Federal 
combat outcome reveals statistically significant relationships. Specifically, the Federal F statistic was 
14.189 with 2 df and p < .0005. The Confederate F statistic was 10.129 with 2 df and p < .0005. 
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eight casualties when they were defeated. Despite similar trends, only the changes in the 
mean number of Confederate casualties proved statistically significant.19 
Based on the preceding analyses of the sixteen variables included in most tactical 
studies of Civil War combat, it appears that the data used in this study are consistent with 
the environmental school of thought. Entrenched infantry and artillery enjoyed a tactical 
advantage when fighting defensively against an exposed, advancing line of soldiers. The 
defensive force usually suffered fewer casualties and won the engagement, and the 
offensive force often suffered heavy casualties and lost the engagement. Furthermore, the 
data suggest that the use of rifled weaponry was more strongly associated with tactical 
success than non-rifled weaponry, though in this data set neither category of weaponry 
demonstrated a statistically significant association with battlefield results. 
One notable gap in many environmental combat analyses is the omission of the 
behavioral aspects of battle. The original sixteen variables describe only the physical 
characteristics of the battle. Recently, however, scholars have found that soldier quality 
was also an important variable in the calculus of combat effectiveness. Behavioral 
characteristics such as soldier morale, small-group cohesion, and leadership quality 
played important roles on the battlefield. Though few scholars would argue that the 
behavioral aspects of combat were more influential than the environmental aspects, most 
would agree that the attitudes and opinions of the soldiers affected their martial 
performance. 
                                                          
19 Analysis of variance between Confederate casualties and outcomes produced an F statistic of 
97.174 with 2 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the same variables was r = -.523 with 
p < .0005. The same statistical tests failed to find a significant relationship between Federal casualties and 
Federal outcomes. Analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.471 with 2 df and p = .231. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient for the same variables was r = -.08 with p = .087. 
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A comparison of the overall quality of the Federal and Confederate infantry units 
suggests that the belligerents possessed nearly equal levels of martial skill. By averaging 
each side’s quality rating in all 465 engagements, mean quality ratings were derived. The 
mean Confederate quality was 2.0, precisely “average,” and the mean Federal quality was 
1.9, slightly less than “average.”20 The nearly identical mean quality values of the two 
sides, coupled with the fact that the Confederates won at least two engagements for each 
battle won by the Federals, raise a question: How could two equally skilled forces 
produced such lopsided combat results? Part of the answer lies in a more careful analysis 
of the quality data. 
The distribution of Federal and Confederate quality ratings indicates that 
Confederate soldiers frequently displayed higher levels of quality than their opponents. 
The northerners fought 40 percent of their engagements with low quality troops, 36 
percent with average quality men, and 24 percent with high quality soldiers. The 
southerners, however, fought 25 percent of their engagements with low quality troops, 50 
percent with average quality men, and 25 percent with high quality soldiers. In other 
words, the Confederates exhibited low quality less frequently than the Federals, and they 
demonstrated both average and high quality more frequently. In each quality category, 
the Confederates had the advantage. 
Having the advantage in soldier quality appeared decisive. Southern soldiers 
enjoyed the advantage of confronting inferior opponents more often than did northern 
soldiers. Confederate troops engaged lower-grade Federal troops in 213 of 465 
                                                          
20 Note that the Federal and Confederate quality variables were both categorical and continuous: 
“1 = Low,” “2 = Average,” and “3 = High”. 
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engagements. Consequently, the Federals won only 5 percent of these engagements, 
stalemated in 9 percent, and lost 86 percent. The Federals, however, engaged lesser-
quality opponents in only 117 engagements. With the advantage in soldier quality, the 
Federals won 58 percent of their engagements, stalemated in 11 percent, and lost 31 
percent. Put another way, when the Federals fought a Confederate force of inferior 
quality, the northerners increased their percentage of victories from 5 to 58 and decreased 
their percentage of defeats from 86 to 31.21 
These battle results become even more compelling when considered in light of the 
environmental aspects of the engagements. When the Confederates enjoyed an advantage 
in soldier quality, a majority of the engagements occurred in a slightly uneven field with 
both sides fighting in lines of battle from positions with limited concealment. On the 
other hand, when the Federals had an advantage in quality, a majority of the engagements 
occurred on the same type of terrain (broken field) with both sides using the same types 
of formations and positions (lines of battle with limited concealment). In other words, 
despite the differences in soldier quality, most of the environmental characteristics of 
these engagements were similar. 
The only environmental aspects of these engagements that did not remain 
constant were the combatants’ tactical actions. Surprisingly, when higher quality soldiers 
used either offensive or defensive tactics, they achieved victory in a majority of their 
                                                          
21 Statistical tests also indicate that soldier quality influenced combat performance. Analysis of 
Federal outcome and quality suggests that a significant, positive relationship between the two variables 
existed. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 66.111 with 4 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance produced 
an F statistic of 30.519 with 2 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s correlation was r = .334 with p < .0005. 
Analysis of Confederate outcome and quality also suggests that a significant relationship between the two 
variables existed. Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 139.9 with 4 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance 
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engagements. Specifically, when the Confederates fought an inferior Federal force, they 
won over 83 percent of their offensive actions and nearly 92 percent of their defensive 
actions. Likewise, when the Federals enjoyed an advantage in soldier quality, they won 
over 52 percent of their offensive actions and more than 94 percent of their defensive 
actions. While these data corroborate most scholars’ opinions regarding the tactical 
advantage enjoyed by defensive forces, they challenge the popular notion that offensive 
tactics were a recipe for defeat. The data suggest that disparity in soldier quality was the 
true determinant of combat performance rather than the tactical actions taken by either 
side. 
From these preliminary analyses of both the environmental and behavioral aspects 
of Civil War combat, it appears that the data included in this study support the view that 
both physical and mental characteristics influenced battle outcome. However, the data 
also indicate that the traditional subordination of combat’s mental aspects to its physical 
aspects maybe misleading. An advantage in soldier quality appeared crucial in enabling a 
regiment to overcome many of the theoretical tactical disadvantages traditionally 
associated with Civil War combat. 
Unfortunately, the limitations of the statistical procedures used here make it 
impossible to determine whether combat performance was more heavily influenced by 
the environmental or the behavioral aspects of the contest. The tests are incapable of 
comparing the impact of a battle’s physical features with the influence of its mental 
characteristics. They can only indicate whether or not a significant relationship existed 
                                                                                                                                                                             




between any given variable and combat outcome. Therefore, any conclusions drawn 
regarding the influence of environmental versus behavioral variables on combat 
performance would be premature. Such a comparison will appear later in this study, after 
more sophisticated statistical procedures are applied to the data. Before introducing these 
advanced statistical procedures, however, an examination of several specialized combat 




SPECIALIZED COMBAT ANALYSES 
Some scholars have taken specialized approaches to understanding Civil War 
combat. Instead of relying on the core variables included in most conventional analyses, 
these historians have turned to specific combinations of diverse variables for tactical 
insights. Though many of these scholars appear to agree with the environmental 
interpretation of Civil War combat, they suggest that a small number of specific 
variables, carefully analyzed, may provide added insight into the nature of the fighting. 
Most of these analyses fall into one of two categories. They concentrate on either 
specific environmental variables or explicit behavioral aspects of combat. Those scholars 
who emphasize the physical characteristics of the fighting generally focus on strength 
and casualty information, believing that combat effectiveness can be assessed by 
comparing the battle strengths and casualty rates of two opposing forces. Those 
historians who emphasize the mental component of combat often examine the soldiers’ 
varying levels of combat experience, believing that battle performance can be understood 
by measuring the positive and negative effects of combat experience on the men’s ability 
to fight. 
The specialized environmental approach, specifically the use of strength and 
casualty data to measure combat effectiveness, is as old as the war. During its first year, 
some Americans believed that one southern soldier could single-handedly defeat several 
northern soldiers in battle. A common perception at that time was that southern men 
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possessed martial qualities superior to those of their northern counterparts. This belief 
was based on the stereotypical images of southerners as hard outdoorsmen and 
northerners as soft urbanites. The impression that southerners were better fighters was 
reinforced by early Confederate victories at First Manassas (Bull Run) on July 21, 1861, 
Wilson Creek on August 10, 1861, and Ball’s Bluff (Leesburg) on October 21, 1861. 
Confederate bravado swelled as some inexperienced soldiers and patriotic journalists 
boasted that each southern soldier could whip three, then five, then ten, Federal soldiers. 
After the war, as southerners struggled to come to terms with their defeat, the former 
braggarts among them were forced to reframe their view of southern combat 
effectiveness. If one Confederate soldier had been able to defeat several Federal soldiers, 
then the South should have won the war. Therefore, they concluded that they lost because 
the Federals wore them down with greater quantities of men and materiel. In other words, 
the Confederacy lost the war by bleeding itself white through victorious actions on the 
battlefield.1 
Few scholars subscribe to this “lost cause” interpretation of combat effectiveness. 
Rather than exaggerate one side’s fighting abilities over that of the other, most historians 
                                                          
1 See C. Vann Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut’s Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981): 109-10, 147, 166, 170-71, 182, 194, 219; B. G. Humphreys, “Recollections of Fredericksburg,” in 
Southern Historical Society, comp., Southern Historical Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond: Virginia 
Historical Society, 1876-1959), 14:415-28 (hereafter referred to as SHSP); Edward McCrady, Jr., “Address 
of Colonel Edward McCrady Jr.,” SHSP, 16:246-60; M. C. Butler, “Southern Genius,” SHSP, 16:281-85; 
Dabney H. Maury, “A Remarkable Victory,” SHSP, 19:51-54; J. B. Moore, “Sharpsburg,” SHSP, 27:210-
19; Anonymous, “The First Manassas,” SHSP 30:269-73; John McGrath, “In A Louisiana Regiment,” 
SHSP, 31:103-20; Bennett H. Young, “Zollicoffer’s Oak,” SHSP, 31:165-72; William S. Hammond, “The 
Battle of Dranesville, Va.,” SHSP, 35:69-77; R. A. Goodwin, “Memorial Sermon,” SHSP, 37:338-47; and 
Edward A. Pollard, The Lost Cause (New York: E. B. Treat, 1867, reprint, New York: Gramercy Books, 
1994), 133, 152-53 (page citations are to reprint edition); and Everette B. Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of 
U. S. Grant (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 445, 453-54. For an analysis of northern 
perceptions of southern martial abilities, see Michael C. C. Adams, Our Master the Rebels: A Speculation 
on Union Military Failure in the East, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
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agree that southerners probably entered the war with a slight martial advantage, 
especially in the area of horsemanship. Scholarly comparisons of the soldiers’ fighting 
abilities, however, usually emphasize their similarities, and such studies often conclude 
that the men were equally capable on the battlefield. When explaining why the South lost 
the war, historians usually include the superior resources of the Union states as a 
contributing factor, but they rarely point to it as the only one. Still the romantic image of 
the gritty southern soldier dominating the battlefield through personal bravery, while 
terrorizing his enemy with his infamous “rebel yell,” lingers in American memory.2 
The three variables upon which this sectional discussion of combat effectiveness 
is based are outcome, strength, and casualties. Descriptive analysis of these variables 
may indicate whether the Confederates did indeed fight with greater efficiency. Based on 
the assumption that the more capable force usually defeated the less capable force, the 
distribution of wins and losses should favor the more effective soldiers. Combat outcome 
data suggest that the Federals were considerably less effective than the Confederates. 
Northern regiments lost nearly 60 percent of their battles while winning only 24 percent. 
                                                          
2 See Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 89, 123-24, 312-13, 347; E. Merton Coulter, The 
Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 453; 
Richard N. Current, “God and the Strongest Battalions,” in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won the 
Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 15-32; Adams, Our Master the Rebels, 
46, 178-79; Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate Nation: 1861-1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 
118; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military 
Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982); Herman Hattaway 
and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1983), 721-32; Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Why the 
South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 458-81; James M. McPherson, 
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 346-48; Reid 
Mitchell, “The Perseverance of the Soldiers,” in Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Why the Confederacy Lost (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 109-32; Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and 
Political History, 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 23-35, 62-63; and Gordon 
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The least successful Federal units lost almost three-fourths of their engagements, while 
the most successful northern regiments won only half their battles. The distribution of 
Confederate results was just the opposite. Southern regiments lost only 25 percent of 
their engagements and won over 60 percent. This simple comparison of combat outcomes 
suggests that Confederate soldiers may have been more effective on the battlefield than 
their northern counterparts.3 
Strength data also suggest that southern soldiers may have been more capable 
than northern soldiers. When the Confederates succeeded, they often did so by 
overcoming a Federal force of equal strength. The mean southern regimental strength was 
280 men, and the mean northern regimental strength was 282 men. When the Federals 
won, however, they averaged approximately 20 percent more men than the Confederates. 
The boys in blue averaged 325 troops per regiment versus 262 gray-clad men. These data 
suggest that the Confederates frequently won when fighting against an opponent of equal 
strength. The Federals, on the other hand, tended to win only when fighting a numerically 
inferior opponent. 
Casualty data also support the hypothesis that the Confederates may have been 
more effective than the Federals. When the Confederates won, they averaged 10 men per 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rhea, Richard Rollins, Stephen Sears, and John Y. Simon, “What Was Wrong With the Army of the 
Potomac?,” North & South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society 4 (March 2001): 12-18. 
3 The distribution of Federal combat results was as follows: Win = 113 engagements, or 24 
percent; Stalemate = 76 engagements, or 16 percent; Lose = 276 engagements, or 60 percent. The least 
successful Federal regiments were the 2nd Delaware (lost 8 of 11 engagements, or 73 percent), the 2nd New 
York Heavy Artillery (lost 10 of 14 engagements, or 71 percent), the 52nd New York (lost 14 of 20 
engagements, or 70 percent), and the 7th New York Heavy Artillery (lost 8 of 11 engagements, or 73 
percent). The most successful Federal regiments were the 57th New York (won 6 of 14 engagements, or 43 
percent), the 64th New York (won 9 of 20 engagements, or 45 percent), and the 7th New York Veteran 
(won 3 of 6 engagements, or 50 percent). Because this study is limited to the combat histories of twenty-
seven Federal regiments, the combat results of their Confederate opponents cannot be separated by 
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regiment either killed, wounded, or missing, versus the Federals’ 48. When the Federals 
won, they lost approximately 32 soldiers versus the Confederates’ 54. Regardless of 
which side won, the victor inflicted more casualties than the vanquished. However, the 
ratios of casualties suggest the Confederates fought with greater efficiency. When the 
southerners won, they inflicted almost five times the number of casualties that they 
sustained. When the Federals won, they inflicted less than double the number of 
casualties that they sustained. 
The preceding comparisons of combat outcomes, strengths, and casualties suggest 
that the boisterous rhetoric of wartime Confederates and post-war southerners may have 
contained a kernel of truth. The data indicate that southern forces won over 60 percent of 
their engagements by inflicting almost five times the number of casualties that they 
sustained while fighting an opponent of near equal strength. Northern combat 
performance pales in comparison. Federal forces won only 24 percent of their 
engagements by inflicting less than twice the number of casualties that they sustained 
despite fighting an opponent approximately four-fifths their size. 
Before concluding that one Confederate soldier was equal to several Federal 
soldiers, the hypothesis of southern superiority must be analyzed more carefully. 
Rigorous statistical analysis of the strength, casualty, and outcome data suggests that it is 
difficult to draw reliable conclusions from them regarding combat effectiveness. Analysis 
indicates that neither side’s regimental strength significantly influenced the results of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regiment. The distribution of Confederate combat results was as follows: Win = 282 engagements, or 61 
percent; Stalemate = 66 engagements, or 14 percent; Lose = 117 engagements, or 25 percent. 
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small-unit actions.4 Similarly, only the total number of Confederate casualties 
demonstrated a significant relationship with combat outcomes; Federal casualty data 
were not significantly associated either Federal or Confederate combat results.5 These 
results suggest that only Confederate casualty data should be used when trying to assess 
battle outcomes. In other words, the argument that “Southerners made better soldiers 
because they won more battles by inflicting more casualties on opponents of equal 
strength,” may be misleading—the reference to opposing strengths appears superfluous.6 
Careful examination of the Federal and Confederate strength data reveals why 
strength did not appear to influence outcome significantly. The Federal data indicate that 
                                                          
4 A comparison of Federal and Confederate strengths reveals that the difference in strength of the 
opposing forces was not large enough to significantly influence combat outcome. When the Federals won, 
they outnumbered the Confederates 2 to 1. When the Federals were stalemated, they outnumbered the 
Confederates 1.5 to 1. When the Federals lost, they outnumbered the Confederates 2.4 to 1. Analysis of 
variance and Pearson’s correlation were used to examine the relationships between both Federal and 
Confederate strength and outcome data. The tests revealed that Federal strength did not significantly 
influence either Federal or Confederate combat results. When Federal outcome was analyzed relative to 
Federal strength, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.479 with 2 degrees of freedom (df) and p 
= .229, and Pearson’s correlation was r = .072 with p = .119; when Confederate outcome was analyzed 
relative to Federal strength, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.375 with 2 df and p = .254, 
and Pearson’s correlation was r = -.064 with p = .169. Similarly, when Federal outcome was analyzed 
relative to Confederate strength, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of .808 with 2 df and p = .446, 
and Pearson’s correlation was r = -.040 with p = .390; when Confederate outcome was analyzed relative to 
Confederate strength, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of .652 with 2 df and p = .522, and 
Pearson’s correlation was r = .048 with p = .305. 
5 Analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation were used to examine the relationships between 
both Federal and Confederate casualty and outcome data. The tests revealed that Federal casualties were 
not significantly associated with either Federal or Confederate combat results. When Federal outcome was 
analyzed relative to Federal casualties, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.471 with 2 df and p 
= .231, and Pearson’s correlation was r = -.080 with p = .087; when Confederate outcome was analyzed 
relative to Federal casualties, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 1.228 with 2 df and p = .294, 
and Pearson’s correlation was r = .055 with p = .234. When both Federal and Confederate combat 
outcomes were analyzed relative to Confederate casualties, however, the tests indicated that the total 
number of southern casualties significantly affected both side’s combat performance. When Federal 
outcome was analyzed relative to Confederate casualties, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 
52.793 with 2 df and p < .0005, and Pearson’s correlation was r = .423 with p < .0005; when Confederate 
outcome was analyzed relative to Confederate casualties, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 
97.174 with 2 df and p < .0005, and Pearson’s correlation was r = -.523 with p < .0005. 
6 The reference to casualties cannot be discounted because the Confederate casualty data were 
significantly associated with both sides’ outcome data. However, because the Federal casualty data were 
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when the northerners won, they averaged 20 percent more men than their opponent; when 
they lost, they averaged the same number of men as their opponent. Relative to Federal 
battle results, these strength data make sense. When the northerners outnumbered their 
opponent, they won; when they merely matched the strength of their opponent, they lost. 
It is the inclusion of the third possible outcome (stalemate) that invalidates Federal 
strength information as a predictor of combat performance. Specifically, when the Union 
men enjoyed their greatest numerical advantage, they frequently fought to a stalemate. 
They averaged 26 percent more men than their opponent when stalemated. In other 
words, when the Federals enjoyed their greatest strength advantage, they were frequently 
stalemated; when they had a small numerical advantage, they usually won; and when 
their strength equaled that of the Confederates, the Federals tended to lose. 
Analysis of the Confederate strength data reveals a similar pattern. The 
relationship between strength and outcome appears logical when analysis is limited to 
either victory or defeat. When the southerners won, their average strength equaled that of 
their opponent; when they lost, their strength was approximately 20 percent less than that 
of the Federals. Once again, it is the inclusion of those engagements that ended in 
stalemate that render Confederate strength data unreliable for predicting combat results. 
When the southerners averaged 26 percent fewer men than their opponent, they were 
usually stalemated. In other words, when the Confederates deployed a force equal to their 
opponent’s, they won; when they fought with a force smaller than their opponent’s, they 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not significantly associated with the outcome data, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the 
overall analytical reliability of casualty data when assessing combat performance. 
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lost; and when they deployed their smallest force relative to that of the Federals, they 
were stalemated. 
The two preceding analyses of combat effectiveness appear to contradict each 
other regarding the usefulness of strength data. The descriptive analysis suggested that 
the Confederates were more effective under fire because they won by defeating an enemy 
force of equal strength, and the Federals won by defeating an enemy force of lesser 
strength. The statistical analysis, however, indicated that it is difficult to draw reliable 
conclusions regarding combat effectiveness from strength data because large numbers did 
not insure victory and small numbers did not guarantee defeat. 
The reason for the discrepancy in analyses is simple: The descriptive analysis of 
the strength, casualty, and outcome data was limited to a single category in the outcome 
variables—victory; all data pertaining to stalemates and defeats were omitted. The 
statistical procedures, however, were not limited by outcome; they included all 465 
engagements. It is this inconsistency in analysis that has caused the conflicting 
conclusions regarding the relationship between strength and outcome information. 
By limiting their analyses of strength, casualty, and outcome data, some authors 
may draw unreliable conclusions regarding the combat performances of two opposing 
forces. Unfortunately, limited descriptive analyses of strength and outcome data 
frequently appear in Civil War studies. Historians often use strength comparisons to 
frame their combat narratives, pointing to disproportionate strengths when discussing the 
heroic fighting of a weaker force or the overwhelming power of a stronger force. Those 
authors who use such comparisons when analyzing tactical actions may inadvertently 
mislead their readers. Nevertheless, strength comparisons shall continue. Despite 
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statistical findings to the contrary, the perceived significance of tactical strength 
information will ensure that future scholars continue to use these data in their analyses of 
Civil War combat.7 
Returning to the hypothesis that initiated the preceding analyses of strength, 
casualty, and outcome data, the question regarding which side fought more effectively 
remains. Based on the three variables used to argue southern martial superiority, it is 
difficult to draw any reliable conclusions. One of the three variables (strength) provides 
little useful information regarding either side’s fighting effectiveness. The two remaining 
variables (casualties and outcomes) offer a glimpse into the nature of the fighting, but it 
would be dubious to claim that the complexities of battle can be adequately understood 
through two variables. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the limited 
data upon which the hypothesis of southern martial superiority has been built can not 
adequately support it.8 
                                                          
7 Though strength comparisons are commonplace in campaign (strategic) studies, it is their use in 
combat (tactical) studies that is considered here. For examples, see John Q. Imholte, The First Volunteers: 
History of the First Minnesota Volunteer Regiment, 1861-1865 (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, 1963), 
114-25; John Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1993), 251; Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987), 314-414; William D. Henderson, The Road to Bristoe Station: Campaigning 
With Lee and Meade, August 1 - October 20, 1863 (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1987), 163-91; Peter 
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NC: Posterity Press, 1994), 17-18. 
8 The hypothesis of southern martial superiority will be reexamined later in this study using 
broader, more dependable, statistical procedures. 
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A similar environmental approach for measuring combat effectiveness was 
introduced almost one hundred years ago by Frederick W. Lanchester. In his study titled 
Aircraft in Warfare, Lanchester outlined a mathematical formula that allowed historians 
to estimate the fighting values of two opposing forces based on their respective battle 
strengths and casualties. According to Lanchester’s formula, if two combatants were 
equally effective, their respective fighting values should equal 1. If one side was more 
effective, its value would be greater than 1. If one side was less effective, its value would 
be less than 1. For example, at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863, the 140th Pennsylvania 
engaged the 2nd South Carolina on the slopes of Stony Hill northwest of the Wheatfield. 
The Pennsylvanians, 515 soldiers strong, threw themselves against the 412 South 
Carolinians aligned in the woods near the crest of the hill. After nearly sixty minutes of 
close combat, the Federals’ right flank was turned and they were forced to retire. In the 
wake of this sharp engagement, the 140th Pennsylvania lost 241 men while the 2nd South 
Carolina sustained 170 casualties. When Lanchester’s formula is applied to the data, the 
derived fighting values appear consistent with the known tactical results of the battle. The 
fighting value of the 140th Pennsylvania was .58 while that of the 2nd South Carolina was 
1.71. In other words, the Federals were approximately one-third as effective as their 
opponents, and the Confederates were nearly three times as effective as the Federals. 
According to Lanchester, therefore, it should not be surprising that the Federals lost the 
engagement.9 
                                                          
9 See Frederick W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (New York : D. 
Appleton and Company, 1917), 39-66; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, 721-32; Beringer, 
Hattaway, Jones, and Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War, 470-73; and Daniel Willard, Lanchester as 
Force in History: An Analysis of Land Battles of the Years 1618-1905 (McLean, VA: Research Analysis 
Corporation, 1962), 1-37. 
 
 84 
Application of Lanchester’s formula to the strength and casualty data included in 
this study produced opposing fighting values that appear to support previous analyses of 
Civil War combat effectiveness. When the Federals had a high fighting value, they 
usually won the battle. When their value was low, they often lost. Specifically, the 
Federals’ mean fighting value peaked at 12.0 when they won, dropped to 3.1 when they 
were stalemated, and sank to 1.3 when they lost. The Confederate fighting values 
followed the same trend. When the southerners won, their mean fighting value was 76.5. 
When they were stalemated, it fell to 17.7. When they lost, the Confederate mean 
fighting value dropped to 5.1. The data indicate a direct relationship between 
Lanchester’s measurement of combat effectiveness and combat outcome.10 
Before accepting the validity of Lanchester’s formula, a closer examination of the 
fighting values is necessary. Most troubling is the fact that when either the Federals or 
the Confederates lost, their mean fighting values were still greater than 1.0. In other 
words, despite demonstrating greater combat effectiveness than their opponents, they still 
lost the engagements. Also troubling is the extreme variation found in the Federal and 
Confederate mean fighting values. The results appear to disregard Lanchester’s index 
value of 1.0. There are two probable explanations for these discrepancies. First, perhaps 
the scale of the engagements being analyzed distorts Lanchester’s calculations. When 
                                                          
10 Both analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation indicate statistically significant associations 
between the combat performances of the Federal regiments and their respective fighting values. Analysis of 
variance produced an F statistic of 13.425, with 2 df, and p < .0005. Pearson’s correlation was r = .225 
with p < .0005. When the Confederate data were examined, however, only Pearson’s correlation indicated 
the presence of a significant relationship. Analysis of variance failed to show a statistically significant 
association between Confederate combat outcomes and Confederate fighting values. Analysis of variance 
produced an F statistic of 2.683, with 2 df, and p = .069. Pearson’s correlation was r = .104 with p = .025. 
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Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones used Lanchester’s formula, they measured the 
combat effectiveness of two opposing armies in twenty-six battles. Based on this 
approach, their results appeared logical. They found that the armies’ fighting values 
ranged from 0.5 to 2.5, that defensive actions proved more effective than offensive 
actions, and that Confederate forces appeared more effective than Federal forces.11 
When Lanchester’s calculations were used to measure the combat performance of 
opposing regiments in the 465 engagements included in this study, the results appeared 
less dependable. Fighting values ranged from .01 to 260, and only Confederate defensive 
actions proved more effective than their offensive actions. However, the tactical fighting 
values did support Hattaway and Jones’ conclusion that southern forces generally fought 
with greater efficiency than northern forces. The discrepancies between these two 
applications of Lanchester’s methodology may be attributed to their differing scales of 
combat. 
When measuring combat performance with Lanchester’s formula, the scale of the 
fighting proved significant. Engagements at the tactical level were occasionally one-sided 
affairs. In such cases, Lanchester’s fighting values may be surprisingly high or low. 
However, when combat was examined at the operational level, imbalances in regimental 
combat performance were effectively smoothed by the measurement of an army’s overall 
fighting performance. Considering the inability of Civil War armies to annihilate their 
opponents, army fighting values do not exhibit the same degree of variation found in 
regimental fighting values. Therefore, while Lanchester’s model may be appropriate for 
                                                          
11 Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, 721-32 
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measuring combat performance at the operational level, it appears unreliable for 
analyzing combat performance at the tactical level. 
A second plausible explanation for the discrepancies between the belligerents’ 
tactical fighting values and their respective combat performances may be the assumption 
upon which Lanchester’s formula is based—it leaves his model vulnerable to an 
inestimable margin of error. Lanchester’s formula assumes that each soldier could strike 
each opposing soldier at every moment during battle. If, for example, terrain, positions, 
or formations limited some of the soldiers’ field of fire, than Lanchester’s calculations 
would contain an immeasurable margin of error. Therefore, despite Lanchester’s 
sophisticated mathematical model, it appears that combat outcome cannot be accurately 
predicted from strength and casualty data. These variables do not provide an adequate 
framework for forming hypotheses regarding Civil War combat effectiveness. 
While some historians examined certain environmental data in their efforts to 
understand battle performance, a second group of scholars turned to various behavioral 
data. Specifically, these historians stressed the relationship between combat experience 
and combat performance. They found that as inexperienced soldiers became seasoned 
combat veterans, they passed along a learning curve. Early in their combat careers, the 
abilities of the men improved with each moment spent under fire. At some point, 
however, combat experience no longer served to sharpen their martial skills. Instead, the 
soldiers’ combat effectiveness decreased with continued exposure to enemy fire. Despite 
the intuitive appeal of this hypothesis, few scholars have scientifically examined the 
relationship between combat experience and combat performance, and even fewer have 
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ventured to estimate the point at which combat experience became a detrimental 
influence on combat performance.12 
Several historians have argued that when Civil War soldiers fought numerous 
battles in rapid succession, their combat effectiveness declined. These scholars believe 
that after the first twenty-five days of continuous combat, the soldiers’ combat skills 
began to dull, lessening their unit’s overall combat effectiveness.13 The data collected for 
this study appear to support this hypothesis. The only phase of the war during which the 
Federal regiments engaged in continuous fighting for over twenty-five days was during 
the Overland Campaign in May and June, 1864. Through the first twenty-five days of 
fighting, the Federals engaged in eighty-four engagements. Of these, they won 6 percent, 
                                                          
12 For a sample of both soldiers and scholars who have recognized the relationship between 
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Morrow and Company, 1947), 123-24; Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of 
Napoleon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 193-98; Frank Holsinger, “How It Feels to be Under 
Fire,” in Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Blue and the Gray, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), 
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and the Iron Brigade, U.S.A. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 145-54, 172, 313-14; Joseph G. 
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stalemated 37 percent, and lost 57 percent. Though their combat record for the first 
twenty-five days of fighting was dismal, the Federals performed even worse during the 
next twenty-five days. During this phase of the campaign, the Federals participated in 
155 engagements. Of these, they failed to win a single encounter, they were stalemated 
15 percent of the time, and they lost 85 percent. 
Though the performance of the Federals during the first twenty-five days of 
continuous fighting was better than their performance during the subsequent twenty-five 
days, it is difficult to view their effectiveness as anything other than dismal. Considering 
that the northerners won over 24 percent of all their engagements throughout the war, and 
that in 1864 they won 11 percent of all their fights, their mere five victories in May and 
June (2 percent of their engagements those months) indicate that something had blunted 
their martial edge. However, the lack of sharp contrast in Federal results during each of 
the twenty-five-day periods suggests that the twenty-five-day rule may not be a 
dependable method for understanding combat performance. 
Another reason for doubting the reliability of the twenty-five-day rule is the fact 
that during the same period of time, and while enduring similar campaign hardships, the 
Confederates won 75 percent of their engagements. During the first twenty-five days, 
they won 45 percent of their engagements, and during the second twenty-five days they 
won 100 percent. Despite being exposed to similar combat conditions, the Confederates 
appear to have improved over time. Based on these data, the twenty-five-day rule appears 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 50 (page citations are to the reprint edition); and 
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle (New York: Free Press, 1985), 213-18. 
 
 89 
unreliable. Something other than prolonged combat exposure probably lessened the 
Federals’ martial prowess.14 
Perhaps a better way to analyze the possible relationship between combat 
experience and combat performance is to examine the number of days that elapsed 
between battles and the outcomes of the subsequent engagements. Using this approach, 
the data suggest that time between battles and combat performance were directly related. 
The greater the number of days between engagements, the greater the probability that the 
Federals would win their next fight. The mean number of days between battles prior to 
Federal victories was 103. However, that number fell to 48 prior to Federal defeats. 
When they fought to a stalemate, the Federals averaged 65 days between engagements 
(see Graph 1). 
 
                                                          
14 The Confederate data cannot be directly compared with the Federal data because they are 
inconsistent with the Federal data. Whereas the Federal data describe the continuous combat records of 
twenty-seven northern regiments, the Confederate data describe only those southern units that happened to 
engage one of these Federal regiments. In other words, the Confederate data lack the continuity necessary 




































Analysis of the time between battles and outcome variables supports the 
hypothesis that protracted campaigns of continuous combat caused Federal regiments to 
lose their fighting edge. However, the data neither support nor refute the contention that 
twenty-five days of continuous fighting was the maximum number of days that a 
regiment could endure before losing its combat effectiveness. The data merely suggest 
that experience and outcome were related, and that Federal combat effectiveness 
decreased as the frequency of battles increased.15 
A third possible approach for understanding the relationship between experience 
and effectiveness is to examine the impact that regimental prebattle activities may have 
                                                          
15 Analysis of variance suggests that the number of days between battles for the Federal regiments 
and their subsequent battlefield performance were related. The test produced an F statistic of 9.529 with 2 
df and p < .0005. Pearson’s correlation Federal outcome and the number of days between battles was r = 
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had on combat performance. According to several studies regarding Confederate Major 
General Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson and his troops during the Shenandoah 
Valley and Peninsular campaigns in 1862, the constant grind of marching and fighting 
numbed the mind of Jackson and blunted the martial edge of his men. Consequently, 
Jackson and his troops failed to perform as expected when they were called to join 
General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and attack the flank of the Federal 
army as it approached the Confederate capital. If analysis of the number of days of 
continuous fighting does not fully explain the relationship between experience and 
outcome, perhaps analysis of the soldiers’ prebattle activities will.16 
The activities carried out by the northern regiments during the two days preceding 
battle appear to have affected their combat performance. Analysis indicates that the 
Federals’ actions during each of the four twelve-hour segments of time prior to battle 
have statistically significant associations with combat outcome.17 The distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
.196 with p < .0005, indicating that the greater the number of combat-free days enjoyed by the Federals 
before entering battle, the greater the likelihood that they would be victorious in battle. 
16 See Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall: Being Chiefly the War Experiences of the 
Youngest Member of Jackson’s Staff from the John Brown Raid to the Hanging of Mrs. Surratt (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 100-01; James I. Robertson, Jr., Stonewall Jackson: The 
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McGraw-Hill, 1957), 299-301; George Francis Robert Henderson, Stonewall Jackson and the American 
Civil War (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1943), 339-95. 
17 Both analysis of variance and Pearson’s chi-square analysis for each of the four prebattle 
variables (prebattle 0-12, prebattle 12-24, prebattle 24-36, and prebattle 36-48) relative to the Federal 
outcome variable indicate statistically significant relationships between them. Analysis of variance for 
prebattle 0-12 produced an F statistic of 11.009 with 6 df and p < .0005, while Pearson’s chi-square 
statistic was 79.452 with 12 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance for prebattle 12-24 produced an F 
statistic of 11.319 with 8 df and p < .0005, while Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 119.751 with 16 df and 
p < .0005. Analysis of variance for prebattle 24-36 produced an F statistic of 5.496 with 7 df and p < 
.0005, while Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 63.814 with 14 df and p < .0005. Analysis of variance for 
prebattle 36-48 produced an F statistic of 9.698 with 7 df and p < .0005, while Pearson’s chi-square 
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combat results per prebattle activity suggests that when the Federals participated in two 
battles within forty-eight hours, the Union men were likely to lose the second 
engagement. Similarly, if the Federals engaged in more than two battles within forty-
eight hours, they were likely to lose each of the subsequent engagements following their 
first engagement. Inversely, light duty most often preceded Federal victory. When 
northern regiments spent the forty-eight hours prior to battle either in camp, on picket 
duty, on fatigue duty, or performing any combination of these three activities, they 
significantly increased their chances of winning the approaching contest.18 Simply stated, 
Federal regiments were twice as likely to be victorious if they had not fought for at least 
forty-eight hours prior to entering battle. If the units engaged in combat anytime during 
the two days prior to battle, their chances for victory were halved.19 
The relationship between experience and outcome is clarified slightly by the 
preceding examination of prebattle activities and battlefield results. The data clearly 
indicate that when the Federals engaged in multiple battles within a forty-eight hour 
period, they frequently lost those engagements that followed their first engagement. 
Therefore, previous scholarly estimates stating that Civil War combat effectiveness began 
to decrease after twenty-five days of continuous fighting may be too high. The data 
collected for this study indicate that continuous fighting over a period of time as small as 
                                                          
18 Those activities most frequently associated with Federal defeat during each of the twelve-hour 
segments of time were: prebattle 0-12 = “combat” (led to defeat 88 percent of the time), prebattle 12-24 = 
“combat” (led to defeat 89 percent of the time), prebattle 24-36 = “combat” (led to defeat 100 percent of 
the time), prebattle 36-48 = “picket” (led to defeat 100 percent of the time). Those activities most 
frequently associated with Federal victory during each of the twelve-hour segments of time were: prebattle 
0-12 = “camp” (led to victory 51 percent of the time), prebattle 12-24 = “camp” (led to victory 48 percent 
of the time), prebattle 24-36 = “picket” or “fatigue” (each led to victory 50 percent of the time), prebattle 
36-48 = “fatigue” (led to victory 41 percent of the time). 
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two days may have significantly eroded the fighting effectiveness of the Federal 
regiments. 
Another method used to understand the relationship between experience and 
performance is to track the cumulative number of battles in which a regiment fought. 
Two scholars have suggested that after soldiers participated in their third or fourth battle, 
their willingness to engage the enemy vigorously had diminished to such an extent that 
they hampered the overall effectiveness of their regiment. Instead of pressing their 
attacks, the veteran soldiers would advance a short distance, lay down, open fire, and try 
to avoid injury. The soldiers in the Second Corps recognized this old-soldier tactic and 
described it as “sitting down and making coffee.” Such ineffective veterans were no 
longer assets to their units; they were liabilities.20 
Analysis of combat outcome relative to battle number suggests that the two 
variables shared a statistically significant relationship.21 That relationship is best 
described in Graph 2. Throughout their first four battles, the Federals won and lost at 
nearly equal rates. They won forty-three engagements and lost forty-five. After their 
fourth battle, however, the northern units began to lose over three times as many battles 
as they won. They lost 231 battles and won only seventy. These trends appear to support 
the hypothesis that Civil War soldiers’ combat effectiveness declined after they endured 
the strain of battle more than four times. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 When Federal regiments entered combat without having participated in battle for at least two 
days, they won 28 percent of the time. However, when they entered combat within two days of their 
previous battle, the Federal won only 14 percent of the time. 
20 See McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 44-45; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 50; 
and Gibbon, Personal Recollections of the Civil War, 229. 
21 Analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 3.016 with 23 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s chi-
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Before concluding that the Federals’ fourth battle served as the pinnacle of their 
combat effectiveness, two weaknesses in the data should be noted. First, the median date 
for battle number four was July 2, 1863. Approximately half of the Federal regiments 
fought their fourth battle before July 2 and half fought their fourth battle after July 2. 
Interestingly, the median date for battle number five was May 5, 1864. Considering the 
difference in campaign strategies and intensities between 1862-63 and 1864-65, it would 
be dubious to conclude that battle number alone accounted for the rapid increase in 
Federal losses after battle number four. Though the obvious decline in the Federals’ 
combat effectiveness after their fourth engagement was likely the result of accumulated 
battle stress, other aspects of combat probably contributed to their increasingly poor 
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performance under fire.22 The second weakness in the data is the fact that the battle 
number variable applies only to the Federal regiments. The number of engagements in 
which each Confederate unit participated has not been included in this study.23 Therefore, 
it is not possible to compare the fighting performances of both sides relative to their 
respective battle numbers. Despite its weaknesses, however, the battle number variable 
appears to provide the most compelling explanation of the relationship between combat 
experience and combat performance. 
Based on the preceding analyses, it appears that the mental strain of battle did 
have an increasingly significant, negative influence on the northern soldiers’ ability to 
fight effectively. Whether their will to engage the enemy aggressively was eroded slowly 
through a long series of separate engagements, or whether their spirit was dampened by 
recent clashes, the Federals absorbed the impact of those engagements and carried the 
experiences with them into their next deadly struggle. 
                                                          
22 The notion that Civil War combat increased in intensity during the last year of the war is not 
new. The change in the nature of the fighting between 1861-63 and 1864-65 has been recognized by both 
soldiers and scholars. See Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, 364, 409, 419; William Swinton, 
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1882), 489-96; John C. 
Ropes, “Grant’s Campaign in Virginia in 1864,” and Thomas L. Livermore, “Grant’s Campaign Against 
Lee,” in Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, comp. Papers of the Military Historical Society of 
Massachusetts, 6 vols. (Boston: Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, 1895-1907), 4:363-405, 407-
59; J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: D. C. 
Heath and Company, 1969), 417-21; Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory, 
1864-1865, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 4: 9, 264-65; Russell F. Weigley , The 
American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1973), 128-52; John J. Hennessy, “I Dread the Spring: The Army of the Potomac 
Prepares for the Overland Campaign,” in Gary W. Gallagher, ed., The Wilderness Campaign (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 66-105; and Weigley, A Great Civil War, 324-38. 
23 The gap in the Confederate data is because of the vast amount of time required to collect 
detailed combat histories for each southern regiment against which any one of the twenty-seven Federal 
regiments fought. For example, after the twenty-seven Federal units fought their first Confederate 
opponent, the northerners had 438 more battles to fight. If only one-fourth of the Federal regiments fought 
unfamiliar Confederate opponents during the remaining 438 engagements, the total number of unique 
southern units faced by the Federals would be approximately ninety. In other words, before a thorough 
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In addition to analyzing the direct relationship between combat experience and 
combat performance, some historians have taken a more circuitous behavioral approach 
to the question. Rather than measure the impact that exposure to combat may have had on 
a regimental effectiveness, these scholars address the impact that personnel changes may 
have had on a unit’s battlefield performance. Though this approach does not directly 
address the relationship between combat experience and combat performance, it touches 
upon it tangentially by examining the collective level of military experience within a 
regiment. The scholarly consensus regarding the relationship between personnel changes 
and combat effectiveness holds that changes in personnel often reduced the fighting 
potential of a combat unit. Within this consensus, two general approaches have been 
taken. One approach examines the impact that changes in command personnel may have 
had on combat effectiveness. The second approach studies the impact that changes in 
enlisted personnel may have had on combat effectiveness. In both cases similar 
conclusions are drawn: A lack of continuity among either the commanding officers or the 
enlisted men generally reduced the combat effectiveness of the unit. 
The analytical approach regarding command continuity emphasizes the quality of 
leadership demonstrated by the opposing officers. Defeat, it is believed, was often the 
result of incompetent leadership. Though Civil War soldiers recognized the relationship 
between leadership and effectiveness, the analytical approach did not gain wide 
acceptance until the publication of Douglas Southall Freeman’s study of Confederate 
leadership titled Lee’s Lieutenants in the 1940s. Freeman attributed the defeat of General 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analysis of both Federal and Confederate combat performances could be attempted, the collection of 
complete combat and personnel histories for ninety Confederate regiments would be required. 
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Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia to the attrition of Confederate senior officers. 
The dangers of battle robbed Lee of his best subordinates, forcing the general to promote 
inexperienced junior officers who were not yet ready for the responsibilities of senior 
command, and not yet trusted by the men they commanded. Though Freeman originally 
argued that leadership turnover at senior command levels (e.g., brigadier general or 
higher) led to the defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia, other scholars have expanded 
his hypothesis to include officer attrition at command levels as low as infantry 
companies. Regardless of rank, therefore, changes in command are widely believed to 
have reduced the combat effectiveness of Civil War units.24 
This study cannot corroborate the hypothesis that officer turnover diminished 
regimental combat effectiveness. Indeed, the data suggest that increased Federal 
command changes often preceded success on the battlefield. At every level of command, 
the mean number of command changes associated with Federal victory were at least 33 
percent greater than those associated with defeat. Also, statistical analysis reveals that at 
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McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 53; and Wert, A Brotherhood of Valor, 196, 315. 
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every level of command except corps level, statistically significant positive relationships 
existed between combat performance and the number of command changes.25 
Before concluding that frequent changes in command contributed to Federal 
victory, an examination of the officers’ time in command before entering combat is 
necessary. Assuming that the consensus regarding the negative influence of command 
change on combat performance is correct, perhaps the frequency with which 
commanding officers were replaced was offset by the length of time that the new officers 
served as commanders before their subordinate units engaged in battle. When the mean 
number of days between changes in command and the affected regiments’ subsequent 
engagements was high, the Federals often won. When the mean number of days was low, 
they usually lost. In other words, a greater number of days in command for a new officer 
prior to battle may have offset the potentially negative influence that his assumption of 
command had on regimental combat effectiveness.26 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis that the negative effect of command 
change was offset by the amount of time that new commanders served prior to battle, 
                                                          
25 Both analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation suggest that Federal combat results and the 
number of command changes at each level of command share statistically significant relationships at all 
levels of command except the corps level. Analysis of variance produced the following results: the army 
level F statistic was 4.29 with 2 df and p = .014, the corps level F statistic was .353 with 2 df and p = .703, 
the division level F statistic was 8.988 with 2 df and p < .0005, the brigade level F statistic was 16.755 
with 2 df and p < .0005, and the regiment level F statistic was 8.918 with 2 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s 
correlation produced the following results: the army level r = .092 with p = .047, the corps level r = .039 
with p = .405, the division level r = .159 with p = .001, the brigade level r = .242 with p < .0005, and the 
regiment level r = .192 with p < .0005. 
26 The mean number of days between Federal command changes and subsequent engagements 
were consistently higher when the Federals won than when they lost. At the regiment command level, the 
mean values were: win = 34 days, draw = 15 days, lose = 13 days. At the brigade command level, the mean 
values were: win = 24 days, draw = 12 days, lose = 16 days. At the division command level, the mean 
values were: win = 11 days, draw = 15 days, lose = 10 days. At the corps command level, the mean values 
were: win = 28 days, draw = 17 days, lose = 14 days. At the army command level, the mean values were: 
win = 22 days, draw = 13 days, lose = 12 days. 
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more sophisticated statistical analyses are less supportive of the notion. The data suggest 
that only at certain levels within the chain of command did an officer’s time in command 
before battle appear to influence his soldiers’ fighting effectiveness. Statistically 
significant relationships between time in command and outcome were found at the corps 
and regiment levels. The amount of time that these commanders spent leading their 
subordinates prior to battle appears to have positively affected their soldiers’ 
performances in battle. However, no significant relationships were found at the army, 
division, or brigade levels. Therefore, despite the persuasiveness of the hypothesis that 
longer periods of time in command prior to battle positively affected combat 
performance, the data can neither support nor reject it.27 
If the data are inconclusive regarding the relationship between command 
continuity and combat effectiveness, perhaps a more narrow analytical approach would 
prove beneficial. Assuming that time in command offset the problems associated with 
changes in command, then those instances in which changes in command took place in 
the midst of battle should exhibit significant negative relationships between command 
                                                          
27 Analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation between Federal combat outcomes and the mean 
number of days in command before entering battle suggest that there was little statistical significance 
between the two variables. Not only do both tests find statistically significant relationships at no more than 
three of the five command levels, but the tests corroborate each other’s results at only two of the five 
command levels—the corps level and the regiment level. Analysis of variance produced the following 
results: the army level F statistic was 2.575 with 2 df and p = .077, the corps level F statistic was 5.467 
with 2 df and p = .005, the division level F statistic was .587 with 2 df and p = .557, the brigade level F 
statistic was 2.44 with 2 df and p = .088, and the regiment level F statistic was 10.316 with 2 df and p < 
.0005. Pearson’s correlation produced the following results: the army level r = .092 with p = .048, the 
corps level r = .146 with p = .002, the division level r = .011 with p = .817, the brigade level r = .067 with 
p = .150, and the regiment level r = .195 with p < .0005. The statistical analyses of the relationship between 
Federal outcome and the mean number of days in command at the army level before entering battle 
contradict each other. Analysis of variance did not find the relationship to be statistically significant, while 
Pearson’s correlation indicated that the relationship was significant. Because the p value from the analysis 
of variance was clearly not significant (p = .077), and because the p value from Pearson’s correlation was 




change and combat performance. Analysis reveals that at all command levels except 
corps and division, personnel changes made during battle did not appear to influence the 
outcome of the battle significantly. At both the corps and division levels, however, 
statistically significant relationships were found. Ironically, the data suggest that the 
greater the number of leadership changes made at these command levels during battle, 
the greater the likelihood that the Federals would be victorious. However, the conclusion 
that corps and division command changes during battle somehow bolstered the Federals’ 
combat effectiveness is dubious. It is derived from too few data. Corps level analyses 
were based on thirty-five engagements while division level analyses were based on only 
nine. Though it appears unlikely that command changes made in the heat of battle 
increased the martial skills of the northern troops, it appears equally unlikely that such 
command changes blunted the soldiers’ fighting edge.28 
The scholarly consensus regarding command continuity and combat effectiveness 
is not supported by this study for two reasons. First, the data suggest that high rates of 
command change often preceded tactical success rather than defeat. Second, although the 
data indicate that time in command may have offset the alleged corrosive effect that 
command change had on combat effectiveness, deeper analysis suggests that changes in 
command made in the heat of battle did not influence its result. Though the analyses do 
                                                          
28 Analysis of variance between Federal combat outcomes and the number of command changes at 
each level of command while engaged in combat produced the following results: At the army level there 
were not enough data to conduct the analysis, the corps level F statistic was 19.8 with 1 df and p < .0005, 
at the division level there was no variance in the data to analyze, the brigade level F statistic was 1.553 
with 2 df and p = .22, and the regiment level F statistic was .666 with 2 df and p = .518. Pearson’s 
correlation of the same variables produced the following results: At the army level there were not enough 
data to conduct the analysis, at the corps level r = .612 with p < .0005, at the division level r = 1.0 with p < 
.0005, at the brigade level r = .163 with p = .192, and at the regiment level r = -.006 with p = .961. 
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not irrefutably reject the behavioral view regarding command continuity and combat 
effectiveness, the findings do question its reliability. 
Like the hypothesis regarding command continuity, stability among a regiment’s 
enlisted personnel is often associated with increased combat effectiveness. Both Civil 
War soldiers and scholars have shared the belief that a regiment’s cohesiveness and 
combat effectiveness were lessened through personnel changes such as deserters fleeing 
the unit, new recruits replacing veterans, or illness decimating the ranks. The hypothesis 
regarding personnel continuity and combat performance was examined much like that 
regarding command continuity. Both the number of men arriving or departing from a 
unit, as well as the mean number of days that their transfers occurred prior to the unit’s 
next engagement, were analyzed for possible associations with the results of the 
subsequent engagements. The findings were like those regarding command continuity 
and combat effectiveness. Both increased personnel changes, as well as increased time in 
service prior to battle, were significantly associated with improved combat 
performance.29 
                                                          
29 For examples of soldiers and scholars who expressed a belief that personnel changes reduced 
the fighting force of Civil War units, see O.R., ser. 1, vol. II, p. 407; ibid., vol. V, pp. 217-20; ibid., vol. 
XXXVI, pt. 3, p. 552; ibid., vol. XLII, pt. 1, pp. 218, 897; Walker, History of the Second Army Corps, 315-
17, 418-19; Ezra D. Simons, A Regimental History: The One Hundred and Twenty-Fifth New York State 
Volunteers (New York: E. D. Simons, 1888), 21; Frederick, The Story of a Regiment, 266-67; Jacob H. 
Cole, Under Five Commanders, or, A Boy’s Experience with the Army of the Potomac (Paterson, NJ: News 
Printing Company, 1906), 39; Favill, The Diary of a Young Officer, 193, 196-97; Child, A History of the 
Fifth Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers, 153, 166-67, 219-20, 224; Gibbon, Personal Recollections of 
the Civil War, 259-60; Higginson, “Thomas Wentworth Higginson Explains the Value of Trained 
Officers,” in Commager, ed., The Blue and the Gray, 1: 486; Wyman S. White, The Civil War Diary of 
Wyman S. White, First Sergeant of Company “F” of the 2nd United States Sharpshooter Regiment (New 
Hampshire Men) in the Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865 (Hemet, CA: Russell C. White, 1979), 121; 
Patrick D. O’Flaherty, The History of the Sixty-Ninth Regiment in the Irish Brigade: 1861-1865 (New 
York: n. p., 1986), 344, 352; Ella Lonn, Desertion During the Civil War (New York: The Century 
Company, 1928), 123-24; John E. Horn, The Petersburg Campaign: June 1864 - April 1865 
(Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1993), 154-76; Wayne Mahood, “‘Some Very Hard Stories Were 
Told. . . .’ The 126th New York Infantry at Harpers Ferry,” Civil War Regiments: A Journal of the 
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Six of the thirteen categories used for classifying regimental personnel changes 
were found to have significant relationships with Federal outcome. They include 
discharges from the army, deaths from illness or accident, desertions, men mustering in, 
men mustering out, and transfers to the Veteran Reserve Corps. In each of these 
categories, both the number of men transferred and the mean number of days that elapsed 
between transfer and battle were found significantly related to combat outcome. Both 
variables showed positive correlations with outcome. When the number of personnel 
changes within a regiment was high, and when the personnel changes occurred well 
before battle, the regiment was more likely to win its next engagement.30 
                                                                                                                                                                             
American Civil War 1, no. 4 (1991): 22-23; R. L. Murray, The Redemption of the “Harper’s Ferry 
Cowards:” The Story of the 111th and 126th New York State Volunteer Regiments at Gettysburg (N.p., 
1994), 25; Bilby, Remember Fontenoy!, 121; Robert K. Krick, Conquering the Valley: Stonewall Jackson 
at Port Republic (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1996), 143, 158, 171; St. Clair A. 
Mulholland, The Story of the 116th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion, ed. 
Lawrence Frederick Kohl (New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 261; Wayne Mahood, “Written in 
Blood”: A History of the 126th New York Infantry in the Civil War (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 
1997), 33, 213-18, 311-12, 319-20; Thomas B. Buell, The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the 
Civil War (New York: Crown Publishers, 1997), 108-09; George W. Contant, “Each Bee Was A Bullet”: 
Corporal Thomas Geer and Color Sergeant Judson Hicks, Company A, 111th New York Infantry, at the 
Battles of Harpers Ferry and Gettysburg (Dover, DE: Historic Publications, 1998), 9; James I. Robertson, 
Jr., ed., The Civil War Letters of General Robert McAllister (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1998), 511, 523, 526-31; and Wert, A Brotherhood of Valor, 118, 175, 313-14. There were instances 
in which Civil War soldiers expressed admiration for the fighting quality of new recruits. See O.R., ser. 1, 
vol. XXIX, pt. 1, p. 278, 283-84; and T. W. Myton and D. W. Woodring, “The Drafted Men and 
Substitute's Story,” in Muffly, ed., The Story of Our Regiment, 749. 
30 Analysis of variance between number discharged and subsequent outcomes produced an F 
statistic of 9.327 with 2 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s correlation between number discharged and 
subsequent outcomes was r = .164 with p < .0005. The same statistical procedures were applied to the 
remaining five categories. The results were as follows: number died = F statistic of 12.277 with 2 df and p 
< .0005, r = .218 with p < .0005; number deserted = F statistic of 3.429 with 2 df and p = .033, r = .118 
with p = .011; number mustered in = F statistic of 5.244 with 2 df and p = .006, r = .126 with p = .006; 
number mustered out = F statistic of 6.251 with 2 df and p = .002, r = .126 with p = .007; number 
transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps = F statistic of 3.04 with 2 df and p = .049, r = .109 with p = 
.019. Analysis of variance between the mean number of days that elapsed between discharge and 
subsequent battle, and the results of that battle, produced an F statistic of 9.56 with 2 df and p < .0005. 
Pearson’s correlation between the mean number of days and the subsequent outcome was r = .193 with p < 
.0005. The same statistical procedures were applied to the remaining five categories. The results were as 
follows: mean time between death and combat = F statistic of 8.008 with 2 df and p < .0005, r = .176 with 
p < .0005; mean time between desertion and combat = F statistic of 9.838 with 2 df and p < .0005, r = .201 
with p < .0005; mean time between mustered in and combat = F statistic of 5.602 with 2 df and p = .004, r 
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Initial analysis of the data regarding personnel change and combat performance 
leads to the same conclusion as the initial analysis of the command change data: The 
greater the number of regimental personnel changes, and the greater the amount of time 
to elapse before combat, the greater the likelihood that the regiment would be victorious 
in its next battle. To see if time in service offset the potentially disruptive effects of 
personnel change, analysis was limited to those engagements in which the Federal 
regiments experienced personnel changes in any one of the six significant categories 
(discharge, death, desertion, muster in, muster out, and transfer to the Veteran Reserve 
Corps) within seven days of entering combat. If the consensus view is correct, regiments 
that experienced such personnel changes just prior to battle should perform more poorly 
than the units that underwent no changes. Surprisingly, only one of the six personnel 
categories was found to have a significant relationship with combat outcome. That 
variable was the number of men mustered into the regiment. Ironically, the higher the 
number of inexperienced troops entering a Federal regiment on the eve of battle, the 
greater the likelihood that the regiment would be victorious.31 
                                                                                                                                                                             
= .154 with p = .001; mean time between mustered out and combat = F statistic of 6.723 with 2 df and p = 
.001, r = .172 with p < .0005; mean time between transfers to the Veteran Reserve Corps and combat = F 
statistic of 7.74 with 2 df and p < .0005, r = .179 with p < .0005. 
31 Both analysis of variance and Pearson’s correlation of those engagements in which Federal 
units experienced any number of men either discharged, dying, deserting, mustering in, mustering out, or 
transferring to the Veteran Reserve Corps, within seven days of battle failed to find statistically significant 
relationships between the changes in personnel and combat performance, except in the case of men 
mustering into the regiments. Analysis of variance between number discharged and subsequent outcomes 
produced an F statistic of .168 with 2 df and p = .846. Pearson’s correlation between number discharged 
and subsequent outcomes was r = -.075 with p = .582. The same statistical procedures were applied to the 
remaining five categories. The results were as follows: number died = F statistic of .272 with 2 df and p = 
.763, r = .025 with p = .868; number deserted = F statistic of .831 with 2 df and p = .44, r = .005 with p = 
.966; number mustered in = F statistic of 38.52 with 2 df and p < .0005, r = .509 with p < .0005; number 
mustered out = F statistic of .039 with 2 df and p = .962, r = -.016 with p = .96; number transferred to the 
Veteran Reserve Corps = F statistic of .294 with 2 df and p = .747, r = .061 with p = .733. 
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These findings indicate that personnel changes did not diminish the Federals’ 
ability to fight. In fact, the addition of inexperienced men to the ranks of a veteran 
regiment appear to have increased the unit’s effectiveness in battle. Whether this 
occurred because the inexperienced soldiers fought out of ignorance of the realities of 
combat, or because the combination of inexperienced and experienced troops galvanized 
the unit, is difficult to know. The answer is probably a combination of both; 
inexperienced men anxious to prove themselves in battle, assisted by the dutiful service 
of some veteran soldiers, combined to form a surprisingly effective fighting force. 
Based on the preceding behavioral analyses, two observations may be made 
regarding the role that experience played on the battlefield. First, combat experience 
appeared to influence combat performance negatively after a certain point. After Federal 
regiments participated in four distinct battles, their effectiveness decreased and their 
number of defeats rapidly increased. Similarly, when northern units engaged in multiple 
battles over a forty-eight-hour time span, they often lost the battles that followed their 
first engagement. Second, personnel changes did not appear to affect combat 
performance negatively. Neither instability within the chain of command nor fluctuations 
within the regimental roster decreased Federal combat effectiveness. Indeed, the addition 
of inexperienced soldiers to veteran regiments appeared to increase the units’ 
performance in battle. 
Overall, the data collected for this study fail to support many of the specialized 
hypotheses proffered by scholars regarding battle efficiency. The common practice of 
contrasting battle strengths, casualties, and outcomes when assessing combat 
performance appears too limited to provide an accurate view of the tactical nature of the 
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fighting. Similarly, the wide-spread belief that veteran officers and men were 
prerequisites for an effective fighting force is also challenged. The only specialized 
hypothesis corroborated by this study is the notion that combat units began to lose their 




A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
Most scholars emphasize the environmental aspects of combat when discussing 
Civil War tactics. Some historians have broadened this approach by including combat’s 
behavioral aspects. Nevertheless, most authors continue to maintain that Civil War 
combat was dominated by its physical characteristics. The mental processes associated 
with transforming an individual from citizen to soldier to veteran are usually 
subordinated to the external realities of the battlefield. 
Statistical analysis of this study’s data suggests that a different approach to 
understanding Civil War combat may be worthwhile. Specifically, a simple 
environmental interpretation of Civil War combat may be less dependable than 
traditionally believed. The data indicate that the influence on combat performance of the 
soldiers’ attitudes, opinions, and emotions was stronger than that of their actions, 
positions, and formations. In other words, the behavioral aspects of battle affected 
fighting efficiency more than combat’s environmental aspects. The twin ironies of this 
analysis are that some of the behavioral variables that demonstrated the greatest influence 
on combat performance are aspects of battle rarely considered by many scholars, and that 
certain physical aspects of combat frequently emphasized by many scholars appear 
unreliable. Overall, these findings raise questions about the dependability of the simple 
environmental approach to understanding Civil War combat. 
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By using a statistical procedure known as a “General Linear Model” (GLM), 
three separate models (i.e. tests) were created for predicting Federal combat results. Two 
of the models were based on specific subsets of data, and the third was based on both 
subsets combined. The first model measured the influence of the environmental 
characteristics of battle on Federal outcome. The second model calculated the effects of 
combat’s behavioral aspects. The third model measured the combined interactions of 
both data subsets relative to Federal combat performance.1 
Comparison of the models’ reliability measurements (the Adjusted R Squared 
values) indicates that when all available data were used to analyze combat performance, 
the conclusions drawn were at least 25 percent more reliable than those based on any 
single data subset. Of the two data-specific GLMs, the model comprising behavioral 
variables explained Federal combat performance slightly more dependably. These 
variables accounted for approximately 49 percent of the northerners’ wins, losses, and 
stalemates. The environmental model appeared somewhat less reliable. It accounted for 
42 percent of the Federal results. Finally, when both the behavioral and environmental 
variables were combined, they reliably explained approximately 67 percent of the 
Federals’ battle results (see Table 4). 
 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of the General Linear Model statistical procedure, as well as statistical 




Comparison of each GLM’s Ability to Predict Federal Combat Results 
General Linear Model Adjusted R 
Squared 
Percent of U.S.A. 
Outcomes Predicted 
Behavioral Variables .487 49% 
Environmental Variables .422 42% 
Combined Variables .672 67% 
 
 
The behavioral model proved the most reliable data-specific approach for 
understanding Federal combat performance. Yet it consisted of only three basic types of 
information: regimental quality, battle number, and prebattle activities. The respective 
quality level of the opposing sides appeared to influence combat performance the most. 
As discussed earlier, units that demonstrated high levels of cohesion, morale, and 
leadership tended to win, and forces that exhibited low levels of these attributes tended to 
lose. For example, when the poorly-led, undisciplined, multi-national group of men that 
constituted the 39th New York attempted a bayonet charge against the 21st Georgia on 
June 8, 1862, during the Battle of Cross Keys, the Federals had no knowledge of the 
strong leadership and high morale of their opponent. The Georgians, who routed the 8th 
New York and captured that unit’s regimental flag earlier in the day, patiently waited for 
the New York unit to advance. Once the Federals were within fifty yards of their line, the 
Georgians poured volleys of buck-and-ball into them.2 The men of the 39th New York 
initially withstood the fusillade, but they soon began to waver. Some soldiers dropped to 
the ground and sought protection, others broke ranks and ran to the rear. Confused, 
frightened, and exposed, the Union men began to panic. They retreated in the direction of 
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their original position, whether ordered or not is unclear, and attempted to rally. For the 
soldiers of the 39th New York, the day’s fighting was over, but several battles lay ahead 
for some of the men in various courts martial. Similar to the experience of the 39th New 
York at Cross Keys, most low-quality regiments shared their fate when confronted by 
high-quality opponents.3 
The cumulative number of engagements fought by a regiment was the second-
most influential behavioral variable. As a measure of the relationship between combat 
experience and combat performance, the data indicated that after a Federal unit had 
endured four distinct engagements, its fighting efficiency significantly decreased with 
each additional deadly encounter. The 57th New York, for example, was undefeated 
through its first four engagements. Of its subsequent ten confrontations, however, the 
regiment won only two and lost eight. The loss of combat effectiveness exhibited by the 
New Yorkers after their fourth engagement was shared by all of the Federals regiments 
included in this study. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 A buck-and-ball cartridge contained a solid bullet and several smaller buckshot bullets. If the 
principal bullet missed, perhaps the buckshot bullets would do some useful damage. This type of cartridge 
was intended for use in non-rifled shoulder arms. 
3 U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901, 
ser. 1, vol. XV, pp. 655, 657-58, 664, 717, 795-800 (hereafter referred to as O.R.); Henry Kyd Douglas, I 
Rode With Stonewall: Being Chiefly the War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson's Staff from 
the John Brown Raid to the Hanging of Mrs. Surratt (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1940), 84-94; Jedediah Hotchkiss, Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall 
Jackson’s Topographer, ed. Archie P. McDonald (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 53-
55; Robert K. Krick, Conquering the Valley: Stonewall Jackson at Port Republic (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1996), 19-38, 137-209; Robert G. Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. 
“Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 
1976; reprint, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), 385-91 (page citations are to the reprint 
edition); Catherine Catalfamo, “The Thorny Rose: The Americanization of an Urban Immigrant, Working 
Class Regiment in the Civil War: A Social History of the Garibaldi Guard: 1861-1864” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Texas, 1989), 187, 202-226; and Michael Bacarella, Lincoln’s Foreign Legion: The 39th 




The third type of variable in the behavioral model described Federal prebattle 
activities. The Union soldiers’ activities during the two-day period preceding battle had 
powerful consequences on their martial capabilities. These activities ranged from combat 
to camping and they affected each soldier’s state of mind by subjecting him to fatigue, 
fear, and stress, as well as rest, routine, and comfort. When the Federals next stepped into 
battle, they carried with them the positive and negative mental forces created by their two 
days of prior service. 
The relationships between these three types of behavioral variables and combat 
performance are not surprising. Both soldiers and scholars have recognized that troop 
quality, combat experience, and prebattle actions affected the men’s performance on the 
battlefield. However, the magnitude of their impact on combat performance is surprising. 
These three behavioral aspects can account for approximately 49 percent of all Federal 
wins, stalemates, and losses. 
The environmental components of combat accounted for nearly 42 percent of all 
Federal outcomes. The image of combat created by these variables closely matched that 
of most authors: Entrenched defenders, supported by artillery, enjoyed a tactical 
advantage over exposed attackers advancing in linear formation. To this consensus view, 
the environmental model suggested three important modifications. First, it found that the 
impact of rifled versus non-rifled muskets was not significant when measured in the 
context of the physical realities of the battlefield. Second, it indicated that the slope of the 
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battlefield was more important than the texture of its surface. Third, the model revealed 
that the weather had an important effect on combat performance.4 
The impact of rifled versus non-rifled muskets on the results of the 465 
engagements included in this study was not significant. As discussed earlier, the data 
suggested that a unit armed with rifled muskets had a slightly improved chance for 
success versus one armed with smoothbore muskets; however, the difference failed to 
rise to the level of statistical significance. Speculating that the strength of rifled muskets 
lay with their use as a defensive weapon, the data were split into two groups: those 
engagements in which the Federals fought offensively, and those in which they fought 
defensively. Analysis indicated that the infantrymen’s armament had no significant effect 
on combat performance in either situation, though both scenarios showed a slight 
improvement in Federal performance when they were armed with rifled muskets. In other 
words, the data suggested that the impact of the rifled musket on Civil War battlefields 
may be overestimated.5 
                                                          
4 Note that the environmental model included the variables U.S.A. Formation, U.S.A. Position, 
and C.S.A. Artillery, but the model did not include the same variables for the opposing side. This is an 
idiosyncratic analytical result due to the nature of the data. The absence of Confederate formation and 
position information, as well as Federal artillery information, does not mean that these physical 
characteristics had no historical impact on combat performance. Their absence from the model simply 
means the variables did not have statistically significant associations with Federal battle results. 
Furthermore, the presence of the sectional counterpart to these variables indicates that they probably were 
important factors during battle, but the unique nature of the data masked their true significance. 
5 Three statistical tests were used to measure the relationship between Federal weaponry and 
Federal outcome relative to Federal action. When the Union forces fought defensively, analysis of variance 
produced an F statistic of .697 with 2 df and p = .501; Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = .057 with p 
= .575; Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 1.416 with 2 df and p = .493. When the Federals fought 
offensively, analysis of variance produced an F statistic of 2.441 with 2 df and p = .089; Pearson’s 




Anecdotal evidence offers one possible explanation for the lack of significance 
between rifled and non-rifled muskets: Civil War soldiers frequently did not fire their 
weapons at ranges greater than the effective range of smoothbore muskets. Of the 465 
engagements examined in this study, the participants recorded the ranges at which they 
opened fire in 206 of the actions (44 percent). The mean distance from the enemy at 
which the soldiers began firing was approximately 152 yards. War Department tests in 
early 1860 demonstrated both rifled and non-rifled shoulder arms could be used 
effectively up to 200 yards from a target. In other words, both Federal and Confederate 
soldiers tended to refrain from firing until their enemy was within 200 yards, at which 
point both rifled and non-rifled muskets could be used effectively.6 
Of all the physical components of battle, terrain appeared to have the greatest 
impact on combat performance. Fighting uphill seemed to sap both the strength and the 
determination of the disadvantaged force. For example, when the 2nd Delaware took part 
in a Federal charge across the Wheatfield at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863, the open 
expanse of the field was not the cause of the regiment’s defeat. The unit successfully 
dashed across the field despite its exposure to enemy rifle and artillery fire. Upon 
reaching the edge of the field, however, the Federals were faced with the daunting task of 
                                                          
6 War Department tests indicated that a rifled musket firing a conoidal bullet could strike a ten-
foot-by-ten-foot target at 200 yards at least 64 percent of the time, that a smoothbore musket firing a round 
bullet could strike the same target at the same range at least 36 percent of the time, and that a smoothbore 
musket firing buck-and-ball could strike the target at least 78 percent of the time. See National Archives, 
Records of the War Department, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Special File, Box 26, “Records of 
Firings and Opinions for the Trial of Small Arms According to Special Orders No. 23, War Department, 
February 1, 1860,” as found in Claud E. Fuller, The Rifled Musket (New York: Bonanza Books, 1958), 55-
148. This anecdotal analysis of the ranges at which Civil War soldiers tended to use their shoulder arms 
corroborates a similar examination of rifled and smoothbore musket firing ranges during the Civil War. See 
Paddy Griffith, Rally Once Again: Battle Tactics of the American Civil War (Ramsbury, Marlborough, 
Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 1987); reprint, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 73-75, 88-90, 129 (page citations are to the reprint edition). 
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fighting uphill. Climbing up the rocky hillside, the Union soldiers confronted the resilient 
men of the 59th Georgia. Over the span of sixty minutes, the two sides pushed each other 
up and down the slope. Finally, the Confederates mounted a rally that turned the 2nd 
Delaware’s left flank and forced them down the hillside. Rather than attempt another 
assault up the slope, the northerners retreated to safety across the Wheatfield. Though 
numerous other factors undoubtedly affected the performance of the 2nd Delaware that 
day, the hill beyond the Wheatfield significantly contributed to their defeat.7 
The last modification of the consensus view of Civil War combat offered by the 
environmental model was the importance of the weather. Weather mattered to the 
infantrymen. Constantly exposed to the elements, the men were keenly aware of the 
machinations of Mother Nature. For northern troops, mild temperatures and no 
precipitation served as the best possible atmospheric conditions in which to fight. Under 
temperate conditions, they won 43 percent of the time, were stalemated 12 percent, and 
lost 45 percent. When fighting in extreme heat, however, the Federals performed poorly. 
Under sweltering conditions, they won only 17 percent, were stalemated 15 percent, and 
lost 68 percent. According to numerous northern soldiers, campaigning in the sweltering 
heat of the southern sun could sap a strong man’s strength and steal a weak man’s life.8 
                                                          
7 O.R., ser. 1, vol. XXVII, pt. 1, pp. 399-409; Francis A. Walker, History of the Second Army 
Corps in the Army of the Potomac (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1887), 280-81; Enoch S. Moore et 
al., Report to Mark the Positions Occupied by the 1st and 2nd Delaware Regiments at the Battle of 
Gettysburg (Dover, DE: Delawaren Office, 1887), 3-28; Charles A. Hale, “With Colonel Cross at the 
Wheatfield,” ed. Edward G. Longacre, Civil War Times Illustrated 13 (August 1974): 30-38; Robert G. 
Smith, A Brief Account of the Services Rendered by the Second Regiment Delaware Volunteers in the War 
of the Rebellion (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1909), 24-25; John E. Pickett, The Crazy 
Delawares: A Short History of The Second Regiment Delaware Volunteers (Middletown, DE: J. E. Pickett, 
1995), 21-30; and Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987), 284-88. 
8 The Federals participated in 112 engagements when the weather was mild and 263 engagements 
when the conditions were hot. For descriptions of the negative ways in which the southern sun affected 
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The combined model included both the behavioral and environmental aspects of 
combat. It examined all eighty-five variables from each of the 465 engagements and 
determined that only thirteen variables were required to explain the Federals’ combat 
performance in over 67 percent of their engagements. Of those thirteen variables, seven 
were behavioral and six were environmental. In terms of the overall influence exerted by 
each variable on combat performance, the combined model indicated that the behavioral 
variables weighed more heavily than the environmental variables. In other words, the 
model described Civil War combat as a struggle of mental tenacity and emotion, 
influenced by the realities of mid-nineteenth-century warfare. 
The most influential aspect of battle was the quality of the opposing forces. The 
attitudes of the men toward their comrades and officers, as well as toward their duties and 
responsibilities, appeared to be the single most important determinant of tactical success 
and failure. Previous analyses of the combatants’ respective quality levels indicated that 
soldier quality affected combat performance. Both sides were victorious most often when 
fighting with high-quality soldiers. The Confederates won 77 percent of the time when 
fighting with high-quality men, and the Federals won 47 percent. Likewise, both sides 
frequently lost when fighting with low-quality troops. The Confederates lost 66 percent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
northern soldiers, see O.R., ser. 1, vol. XIX, pt. 2, pp. 14-15; David Beem, “History: Company H, 14th 
Indiana Volunteers: War of the Rebellion, 1861-1864,” and Beem to Hala (wife), August 23, 1862, David 
Enoch Beem Papers, 1821-1954, Indiana Historical Society Library, Indianapolis; James I. Robertson, Jr., 
ed., The Civil War Letters of General Robert McAllister (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1998), 450, 453, 458, 462; Arabella M. Willson, Disaster, Struggle, Triumph: The Adventures of 1000 
‘Boys in Blue’ from August, 1862, to June 1865 (Albany: Argus Company, 1870), 57; John Q. Imholte, 
The First Volunteers: History of the First Minnesota Volunteer Regiment, 1861-1865 (Minneapolis: Ross 
and Haines, 1963), 103; and Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 120-21. Not all Federal soldiers 
succumbed to the heat; some embraced it as a physical challenge. See O.R., ser. 1, vol. XVI, 106. 
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of their engagements when fighting with low-quality soldiers, and the Federals lost 77 
percent. 
Though the quality of men seemed to influence tactical outcomes, it was the 
difference in soldier quality that often appeared decisive on the battlefield. The most 
frequent combination of soldiers to clash in battle pitted low-quality Federal soldiers 
against average-quality Confederate soldiers. This scenario occurred in 135 engagements, 
and the Federals won only 5 percent of the time, were stalemated 10 percent, and lost 85 
percent. It was the difference in the opposing forces’ quality, especially the frequent 
superiority of southern forces, that had profound implications on both sides’ performance 
under fire. 
When opposing forces of equal quality clashed, however, the results were less 
predictable. The Federals performed best when two opposing low-quality units clashed. 
The Union men won 67 percent, were stalemated 10 percent, and lost 23 percent. They 
were less effective when soldiers of either average or high quality fought. When average 
soldiers engaged one another, the Federals won only 7 percent, were stalemated 48 
percent, and lost 45 percent. When high-quality regiments clashed, the Federals won 25 
percent, were stalemated 19 percent, and lost 56 percent. While low-quality northern 
troops appeared more effective than southern soldiers of equal quality, Federal forces of 
average or high quality usually performed poorly against similar opponents. 
The Federals’ inconsistent combat performance when confronted by soldiers of 
equal quality suggests that quality alone did not prove decisive in every engagement. 
Some other aspect, or aspects, of battle influenced combat performance. The combined 
model indicated that the cumulative number of engagements fought by Federal regiments 
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was the second most-influential aspect of battle. Increased exposure to intense enemy fire 
appeared to reduce a soldier’s ability to fight at some point. The emotional baggage 
accumulated by a soldier as he passed through multiple engagements eventually weighted 
him down to the point of reducing his effectiveness under fire. 
The data suggest that after their fourth engagement, Federal troops generally 
experienced a significant decrease in their combat effectiveness. Through their first four 
engagements, the Federals won 39 percent of the time, were stalemated 20 percent, and 
lost 41 percent. In subsequent engagements, however, their performance decreased. The 
northerners won only 20 percent of the time, were stalemated 15 percent, and lost 65 
percent. After their fourth engagement, the Federal rate of success was nearly halved, and 
their rate of failure increased approximately 33 percent. Because each Federal regiment 
participated in at least six engagements, none were immune to the debilitating influence 
of prolonged combat exposure. 
Of near equal influence on Federal combat performance were the prebattle 
activities of the northern soldiers during the thirty-six hours that preceded battle. The 
data indicate that the worst possible prebattle activity in which northern soldiers could 
have participated prior to entering combat was another engagement. When Federal troops 
participated in one or more engagements within thirty-six hours of battle, they lost the 
impending actions approximately 90 percent of the time. The data also indicate that the 
Federals enjoyed their highest rate of success after periods of preparation and rest. When 
northern units spent at least twelve of the thirty-six hours prior to battle either encamped 
or bivouacked, they won almost half of their subsequent engagements. The stress, 
fatigue, and chaos associated with combat appeared to dull the soldiers’ martial edge, and 
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the relative comfort, preparation, and order associated with camp life seemed to sharpen 
it. 
The scenarios of either fighting or camping prior to battle serve as the opposite 
ends of the spectrum regarding Federal prebattle activities. The most common actions 
taken by northern soldiers thirty-six hours prior to battle saw them either entrenching or 
marching to new positions. The former occurred before 70 percent of the Federals’ 
engagements; the latter preceded more than half. When entrenched prior to battle, Union 
forces won 16 percent of the time, were stalemated 17 percent, and lost 67 percent. When 
marching prior to battle, they won 21 percent, were stalemated 15 percent, and lost 64 
percent. In both cases, the Federals lost nearly four engagements for each that they won. 
Their poor combat record is testimony to the significance of proper battle preparation. 
The Federals could not fight, march, entrench, and then fight again, and maintain 
meaningful levels of combat effectiveness. 
Terrain also appeared as an influential aspect of Civil War combat. As previous 
analyses suggested, the slope of the battlefield appeared to influence combat performance 
more than the texture of its surface. Both sides enjoyed their highest rate of success when 
fighting downhill and suffered their highest rate of defeat when fighting uphill. These 
data suggest that the side that held the high ground usually won.9 
                                                          
9 The successful defense of Marye’s Heights by Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s First 
Corps against assaults by both Major General Edwin V. Sumner’s Right Grand Division and Major 
General Joseph Hooker’s Center Grand Division during the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862) 
illustrates the tactical advantage enjoyed by the force that held the high ground. However, simply 
maintaining a position of higher elevation did not guarantee success. General Braxton Bragg’s Army of 
Tennessee was defeated during the Battle of Chattanooga (November 25, 1863) when its line along the 




Though the slope of the battlefield may have made certain small-unit actions 
lopsided affairs, tilted battlefields were not the typical terrain type upon which 
engagements occurred. The most common type of battlefield terrain was a level field 
with a slightly uneven surface. There were two important implications to fighting across 
such a broken field of battle. First, throughout the engagement various groups of soldiers 
were unable either to see the enemy or be seen by the enemy. This occasionally 
encouraged some cautious individuals to drop from the ranks and seek cover. Second, the 
uneven surface served to disrupt tactical formations, making command and control 
difficult and creating more opportunities for the timid to fall out of formation. 
Consequently, some soldiers found themselves in isolated pockets of protection where 
they could neither see nor hear their officers. Instead of pressing their actions, these 
soldiers occasionally sought cover. The resulting loss of momentum encouraged both 
sides to settle into positions near one another and exchanged fire, thus rendering such 
engagements tactical stalemates. 
A comparison of both Federal and Confederate results illustrates the relationship 
between broken terrain and tactical stalemate. Of the 114 engagements that occurred on a 
broken field, the Federals won 19 percent of the time, were stalemated 35 percent, and 
lost 46 percent. Similarly, the Confederates won 46 percent of the time, were stalemated 
25 percent, and lost 29 percent. When they fought on all other terrain types, however, 
both sides’ percentage of stalemates decreased significantly. The Federals won 26 
percent of the time, were stalemated only 10 percent, and lost 64 percent. The 
Confederates won 66 percent of the time, were stalemated only 10 percent, and lost 24 
percent. The higher rates of stalemates and lower rates of victories and defeats can be 
 
 119 
partially attributed to the terrain. When fighting on broken ground, many Federal and 
Confederate soldiers failed to press their actions until either victory or defeat was 
realized. Instead, they fought more cautiously and were stalemated more often. 
Tactical positions appeared as the next most influential component of battle. The 
combatants’ tactical positions affected their performance in two important ways. First, a 
defensive force located behind strong fortifications enjoyed a significant advantage over 
an exposed attacking force. Second, an offensive force suffered a psychological blow 
when ordered to abandon its protective works and advance against the enemy. The 
combined effect of defensive fieldworks, therefore, was the weakening of offensive 
tactics and the bolstering of defensive actions. 
The data clearly indicate that fighting defensively from an entrenched position led 
to victory more often than defeat. Comparison of the southerners’ combat record when 
maintaining an entrenched position, versus a position of lesser protective value (i.e., 
wooden fence, tree line, open field, etc.), illustrates the value of strong fortifications 
during combat. Of the 129 engagements in which Confederate soldiers fought 
defensively from positions with complete cover, they won 88 percent of the time, were 
stalemated 5 percent, and lost 7 percent. However, of the 109 engagements in which 
Southern soldiers fought defensively from positions of limited or no cover, they won only 
44 percent of the time, were stalemated 25 percent, and lost 31 percent. In other words, 
the Confederates doubled their chances of success, and reduced their chances of defeat 
fourfold, by fighting defensively from an entrenched position versus fighting from any 
position of lesser strength. 
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The Federals also enjoyed noticeable success when fighting defensively from an 
entrenched position. Comparison of the Federals’ combat record when fighting from 
entrenched positions versus non-entrenched positions reveals a trend similar to that found 
in the Confederate data. Northern soldiers won two-thirds of the time, and lost one-third 
of the time, when holding entrenched positions against Confederate assaults. Their 
defensive effectiveness decreased, however, when fighting from weaker positions. Under 
these circumstances, the northern regiments won only 40 percent of the time, were 
stalemated 8 percent, and lost 52 percent. Like their Confederate counterparts, Federal 
troops experienced greater success when fighting defensively from entrenched positions 
versus non-entrenched positions.10 
Strong tactical positions also appeared to have a negative psychological effect on 
the men ordered to abandon such works and attack those of their opponent. When 
entrenched Federal soldiers were ordered to attack entrenched Confederate troops, the 
Federals performed miserably. Of the seventy-four engagements in which the northern 
men advanced from trenches and attacked enemy trenches, they won only 4 percent of 
the time, were stalemated 1 percent, and lost 95 percent. Ironically, when northern 
soldiers initiated assaults on southern trenches from non-entrenched tactical positions, the 
Union men experienced a significant increase in victories. Of the sixty-seven 
engagements in which Federal soldiers advanced from non-entrenched positions and 
assaulted Confederate trenches, the Federals won 25 percent, were stalemated 9 percent, 
                                                          
10 Note that Federal troops fought defensively from entrenched positions in only six engagements. 
Such a small sample cannot be considered reliable, but the trend within those six engagements is clear. The 
Federals tended to win when fighting defensively from strong fortifications, just as the Confederates did. 
The Union soldiers fought defensively from non-entrenched positions in ninety-four engagements. 
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and lost 66 percent. In other words, they experienced a sixfold increase in their chances 
of success. 
Though it is nearly impossible to separate the physical dominance that strong 
field fortifications gave defenders from the mental intimidation that they inflicted on 
attackers, the data suggest that the combination of influences made such works important 
components of Civil War combat. Physically, an entrenched defensive force could load 
its weapons, aim, fire, and reload with minimal exposure to enemy fire. Mentally, an 
offensive force experienced anxiety and trepidation when ordered to leave its protective 
works and assault those of its enemy. This unique combination of environmental and 
behavioral influences may partially explain why defensive tactical positions were such 
influential aspects of battle.11 
The next three influential variables in the combined model were the weather 
during battle, and Federal and Confederate tactical actions. Each of these variables has 
been discussed previously and will only be summarized here. Analysis revealed that hot, 
humid weather appeared to give the southerners an edge in battle, and mild, temperate 
weather seemed to give the northerners their best chance of success. Analysis also 
showed that both Federal and Confederate infantrymen experienced greater combat 
success when fighting defensively versus offensively. The data leave little doubt 
regarding the nature of the relationship between these variables and Federal outcome. 
The combined model also indicated that artillery played an important role in 
combat. That role was defined primarily by the tactical actions of each side. Because the 
                                                          
11 For an analysis of the psychological effects of field fortifications, see Griffith, Battle Tactics of 
the Civil War, 123-35. 
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Confederates fought defensively in a majority of their engagements, they increased their 
chances of winning by using numerous cannon during battle. The defensive strength of 
artillery guns allowed them to repel Federal assaults and emerge victorious. The Federals, 
on the other hand, increased their chances of winning by fighting when artillery use was 
limited. Because the Federals fought offensively in a majority of their engagements, they 
significantly improved their chances of success when assaulting a Confederate infantry 
force with limited artillery support.12 
The Confederate defense of Marye’s Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg 
(December 13, 1862) provides a vivid example of the defensive firepower of artillery 
during the Civil War. Days before battle, Lieutenant General James Longstreet ordered 
the Washington Artillery battalion to the crest of Marye’s Heights in support of his 
infantry. The battalion unlimbered eleven guns, moved them into position, zeroed their 
aim on several key features of the field before them, and prepared their limbers for 
action. On the day of battle, Brigadier General Thomas Meagher, commander of the 
Second “Irish” Brigade, deployed his five regiments in line of battle, consciously placing 
the 28th Massachusetts in the center of his line because it was the only unit that carried 
the green colors of the Irish Brigade. (The other regimental flags were in New York City 
being replaced.) When the Second Brigade emerged from the south edge of town, the 
Confederate gunners quickly went to work. 
The 800-yard advance of the Second Brigade toward Marye’s Heights gave the 
southern artillerymen an ideal target, and within that target they aimed at the conspicuous 
                                                          
12 The mean number of Federal versus Confederate artillery guns per Federal outcome were: 
Federal victory = 6 guns v. 9 guns; Federal stalemate = 14 guns v. 16 guns; Federal defeat = 11 guns v. 13 
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green flag carried by the 28th Massachusetts. The cannon blasts tore gaps through the 
Massachusetts line. The men leaned into the fire as if leaning into a strong wind and 
trudged toward the heights. Eventually, the 28th Massachusetts reached the enemy picket 
line and drove them back to the sunken road at the base of the hill. Once the pickets were 
out of the southern infantrymen’s field of fire, however, the Confederate soldiers added 
sheets of rifle fire to the leaden hail belching from the guns of the Washington Artillery. 
Under the combined strain of the unrelenting artillery barrage and infantry musket fire, 
the Massachusetts men broke ranks and sought protection along a rail fence in front of 
them. All order was lost as the men simply tried to survive. Approximately one hour after 
initiating their attack, the 28th Massachusetts retreated pell-mell back toward town. 
The 28th Massachusetts was nearly shattered. It lost 158 of 416 men (38 percent) 
in less than one hour of combat. The commanding officer, Colonel Richard Byrnes, spent 
the winter trying to rebuild his regiment. Despite his efforts, the survivors were 
demoralized, too demoralized even to celebrate Christmas in the usually gregarious 
fashion for which the Irish Brigade had become known. That holiday season, the men 
could do little more than lament the loss of their comrades and write bitterly of their 
futile assault at Fredericksburg.13 
                                                                                                                                                                             
guns. 
13 The description of the 28th Massachusetts at Fredericksburg was synthesized from the 
following: O.R., ser. 1, vol. XXI, pp. 129, 226-32, 240-52, 563-77, 1126-29, ; Walker, History of the 
Second Army Corps, 162-75, 192, 196; Patrick D. O'Flaherty, The History of the Sixty-Ninth Regiment in 
the Irish Brigade: 1861-1865 (New York: n. p., 1986), 184-97, 208, 327; Joseph G. Bilby, Remember 
Fontenoy! The 69th New York and the Irish Brigade in the Civil War (Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House, 
1995), 65-71; Lawrence F. Kohl and Margaret C. Richard, ed., Irish Green and Union Blue: The Civil War 
Letters of Peter Welsh, Color Sergeant, 28th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1986), 40, 42-47; Kevin E. O'Brien, ed., My Life in the Irish Brigade: The Civil War 
Memoirs of Private William McCarter, 116th Pennsylvania Infantry (Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing 
Company, 1996), 57, 139-201; Napier Bartlett, ed., Military Record of Louisiana, Including Biographical 
and Historical Papers Relating to the Military Organizations of the State (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
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Finally, the model showed that the number of days between engagements affected 
Federal combat performance significantly. The data suggest that the greater the number 
of days to elapse between battles, the greater the Federals’ chances for success in their 
next engagement. When northern regiments were allowed to rest and recuperate for at 
least 100 days between engagements, they won 46 percent of the time, were stalemated 
13 percent, and lost 41 percent. However, the Federals enjoyed this advantage in only 20 
percent of their engagements. Eighty percent of the time, northern soldiers faced enemy 
fire less than 100 days after their previous engagement. When they did, the Union forces 
won only 18 percent, were stalemated 17 percent, and lost 65 percent. In other words, 
when the Federals had at least 100 days of relative inactivity between engagements, they 
more than doubled their odds of winning their next fight.14 
Beyond the implications of the previous analyses of the combined model’s 
behavioral and environmental variables, the model is also noteworthy for the variables 
that it excluded. Every variable collected for this study was combined and measured for 
influence on Federal combat performance. Any variable not included in the model was 
removed because it failed to demonstrate a significant relationship with Federal outcome 
                                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 1964), 161, 164-66; James Lorenzo Bowen, Massachusetts in the War, 1861-1865 
(Springfield, MA: Clark W. Bryan, 1889), 424-25; William Miller Owen, “A Hot Day on Marye’s 
Heights,” found in Clarence C. Buel and Robert U. Johnson, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4 
vols. (New York: Century Company, 1887), 3:96-99 (hereafter referred to as B&L); LaFayette McLaws, 
“The Confederate Left at Fredericksburg,” B&L, 3, 86-94; Kevin E. O’Brien, ed., “‘The Breath of Hell’s 
Door’: Private William McCarter and the Irish Brigade at Fredericksburg” Civil War Regiments: A Journal 
of the American Civil War 4, no. 4 (1995): 47-69; David Power Conyngham, The Irish Brigade and Its 
Campaigns: With Some Account of the Corcoran Legion, and Sketches of the Principal Officers (New 
York: William McSorley and Company, 1867), 337-65; James Dinkins, “Griffith-Barksdale-Humphrey 
Mississippi Brigade And Its Campaigns,” in Southern Historical Society, comp., Southern Historical 
Society Papers, 52 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1876-1959), 32:250-74 (hereafter referred 
to as SHSP); and James Dinkins, “Barksdale’s Mississippi Brigade At Fredericksburg,” SHSP, 36, 17-25. 
14 Because the Federals’ mean number of days between battles prior to victories was 103, the 
threshold of 100 days was used to compare the distributions of Federal battle results. 
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when measured in conjunction with the other variables in the model. Admittedly, 
statistical significance does not always equal real-world significance. However, it is a 
scientific measurement of effect that is widely accepted. Therefore, those aspects of Civil 
War combat not included in the combined model may be considered, at best, noticeably 
less influential than those variables included. 
Two environmental variables used by many scholars when discussing Civil War 
combat failed to appear in the combined model. Neither weaponry nor strength proved 
statistically significant when placed in the model. The data indicated that there was little 
improvement in combat performance when Federal regiments used rifled muskets versus 
smoothbore muskets. The data also indicated that regimental combat strengths did not 
significantly influence the results of small-unit actions, despite Confederate regiments 
averaging thirty fewer men per engagement than Federal regiments. In other words, two 
environmental aspects of Civil War combat frequently used by scholars to understand the 
war’s tactical nature may be less instructive than commonly thought. 
Finally, two miscellaneous aspects of Civil War combat were also noticeably 
absent from the combined model. Data describing changes in commanding officers, from 
army commanders to regimental commanders, failed to demonstrate significant 
associations with Federal combat results. Similarly, data regarding changes in regimental 
personnel, ranging from recruitment through discharge, proved insignificant when tested 
for impact on Federal combat performance. Fluctuations in both the tenure of the officers 
and the consistency of the men did not noticeably affect the Federals’ ability to fight. 
Using the interpretation of Civil War combat suggested by the combined model, a 
test of the hypothesis of southern martial superiority is possible. The model identified 
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seven variables that exerted important influence on both sides’ ability to perform 
effectively under fire—soldier quality, battlefield terrain, tactical actions, defensive 
positions, and weather. When these seven variables remained constant, Federal and 
Confederate combat results should have been distributed equally among victories, 
stalemates, and defeats. If the combatants’ outcomes were not distributed equally, then 
the side with the better record probably fought more efficiently.15 
The first comparison involved those engagements in which two low-quality forces 
fought. These contests most frequently occurred on level, broken ground. Of these 
engagements, two possible scenarios were compared. The first involved Confederates 
attacking in hot weather (atmospheric conditions favorable to them) and Federals 
defending from positions that offered limited protection. This combination of 
circumstances led to Federal victory and Confederate defeat 100 percent of the time. The 
second scenario involved Federal forces attacking in hot weather (atmospheric conditions 
again favoring the southerners) and Confederate forces defending from positions with 
complete protection. These circumstances led to Federal and Confederate stalemates 100 
percent of the time. In other words, when low-quality troops fought under conditions that 
were either equal, or to the advantage of the Confederates, Federal forces were either 
victorious or stalemated, and Confederate units were either stalemated or defeated. These 
                                                          
15 There are two weaknesses associated with comparing Federal and Confederate combat 
effectiveness. First, the comparisons do not include artillery strength information. These data were omitted 
because it was not possible to obtain constant values while maintaining consistency among the other seven 
variables. However, when the other seven variables remained constant, the artillery strength of the 
defending force appeared as neither overwhelming nor feeble. Second, the comparisons omit several 
influential variables included in the combined model, specifically prebattle activities, battle number, and 
time between battles. These variables could not be used because they applied only to the Federal forces; no 
similar data were collected regarding the Confederate forces. 
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data suggest that low-quality Federal troops fought more effectively than low-quality 
Confederate soldiers.16 
The second comparison involved those engagements in which two average-
quality units clashed. Most of these engagements also occurred on level, broken ground. 
When southern soldiers attacked in hot weather and Federal troops defended from 
positions that offered limited protection, the Federals lost 25 percent of the time and were 
stalemated 75 percent. The Confederates, on the other hand, won 25 percent of the time 
and were stalemated 75 percent. When the Federals attacked in mild weather and the 
Confederates defended from positions of limited protection, the Federals and 
Confederates were stalemated 100 percent of the time. In other words, when average-
quality soldiers clashed under equal conditions, the Confederates were occasionally 
victorious, frequently stalemated, and occasionally defeated. The Federals, however, 
were never victorious, frequently stalemated, and occasionally defeated. These data 
indicate that average-quality Confederates fought more effectively than average-quality 
Federals. 
The third comparison involved those engagements in which two high-quality 
forces fought. The majority of these engagements occurred on level, open ground. When 
southern soldiers attacked in hot weather and Federal troops defended from positions 
with limited protection, the Federals lost every time, and the Confederates won. When 
the Federals attacked in mild weather and the Confederates defended from positions of 
                                                          
16 Based on the available data, it was not possible to make equal comparisons of the combatants’ 
low-quality soldiers. The best comparison possible required conceding two tactical advantages to the 
Confederates when they fought defensively—weather and position. Ironically, the Confederates under-
performed despite having these advantages. 
 
 128 
limited protection, the Federals won half and lost half, and the Confederates won 100 
percent of the time.17 In other words, when high-quality forces fought under equal 
conditions, the Confederates won every engagement. The Federals, however, 
occasionally won and frequently lost. These data suggest that high-quality Confederate 
troops fought more effectively than high-quality Federal soldiers. 
Though the overall differences in combat performance were not glaring, southern 
soldiers appeared to fight with greater efficacy than northern soldiers. The three 
preceding comparisons suggest that when the seven most-influential shared variables 
remained constant, southern troops enjoyed more success than their opponents. The only 
exception was when low-quality soldiers clashed. In these situations, Federal regiments 
tended to out-fight Confederate units. To understand the Confederates’ superior 
performance in most engagements, as well as the Federals’ advantage when low-quality 
soldiers clashed, further analysis is required. 
The combat performance of both Federals and Confederates appeared to be 
influenced by geography. The side that fought against an invading opponent generally 
performed better on the battlefield. When Confederate General Robert E. Lee led the 
Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland in 1862 and Pennsylvania in 1863, his men 
suffered numerous tactical defeats. The southerners won only 35 percent of the time, 
were stalemated 7 percent, and lost 58 percent. The Federals’ results were the opposite; 
they won 58 percent of the time, were stalemated 7 percent, and lost 35 percent. 
                                                          
17 Note that a regiment’s tactical success or failure was determined by its ability to achieve all, 
some, or none of its tactical objectives. Therefore, it was possible for both the Federals and the 
Confederates to claim victory in the same engagement. From each side’s perspective, they both 
successfully achieved their tactical objectives. 
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Likewise, when northern forces advanced into southern states, the Federals were often 
defeated. Federal forces won only 21 percent of the time, were stalemated 17 percent, and 
lost 62 percent; Confederate forces won 63 percent of the time, were stalemated 15 
percent, and lost 22 percent. In other words, northerners often won when fighting in the 
North, and southerners frequently won when fighting in the South.18 
This discrepancy in performance may be attributed to the psychological impact of 
fighting on home soil in defense of one’s capital. When the strategic situation required 
that one army protect both its land and its seat of government from an invading force, the 
side fighting to maintain the integrity of its region frequently proved more effective on 
the battlefield. This added behavioral aspect of Civil War combat may help explain why 
southern soldiers tended to perform better under fire than northern soldiers. Frequently, 
the Confederates were fighting to remove the Federals from the southern soil surrounding 
Richmond, and when not actively campaigning to force the Federals off their lands, the 
Confederates often served as a barrier to further northern incursions. In either case, 
southern soldiers could easily interpret their actions as those designed to defend home 
and hearth.19 
                                                          
18 The relationship between geographic location and combat performance proved statistically 
significant for both Federal and Confederate soldiers. To study the implications of geography and outcome, 
those engagements that occurred in northern states were coded as “1 = North,” and those that occurred in 
southern states were coded as “2 = South.” When analyzing the relationship between Confederate outcome 
and geographic location, Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = .221 with p < .0005. Analysis of 
variance produced an F statistic of 14.927 with 2 df and p < .0005. Finally, Pearson’s chi-square statistic 
was 28.225 with 2 df and p < .0005. When analyzing the relationship between Federal outcome and 
geographic location, Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r = -.222 with p < .0005. Analysis of variance 
produced an F statistic of 16.264 with 2 df and p < .0005. Finally, Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 
30.585 with 2 df and p < .0005. 
19 Several historians have recognized the interdependence of southern nationalism, morale, and 
combat effectiveness. See John Leekley, ed., Bruce Catton: Reflections on the Civil War (New York: 
Doubleday Publishing, 1981), 70-71; Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William 
N. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 66, 77; Kenneth M. 
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If the emotive force of fighting to defend the territorial and political integrity of 
the South helps to explain why Confederate soldiers tended to defeat Federal soldiers 
under equal conditions, the question regarding the superior effectiveness of low-quality 
Federal soldiers remains unanswered. The data suggest that low-quality Confederate 
units may have under-performed in combat because they began to doubt their chances of 
winning the war. Over 96 percent of the engagements involving two low-quality 
opponents occurred in late 1864 and early 1865. By this point in the war, some southern 
soldiers may have felt that their efforts were in vain. Perhaps they recognized that their 
attempt at independence would not survive another campaign season. Perhaps their 
willingness to sacrifice themselves for their country waned as their country’s future 
became increasingly bleak. Perhaps their poor performance was a combination of both 
views. Regardless, without a combative spirit, sparked by the belief in one’s purpose and 
maintained by the hope in ultimate success, the low-quality southern men were no match 
for their opponents.20 
Despite the complexities of Civil War combat, the combined model offers a 
plausible analysis of the fighting. The model indicated that several behavioral aspects of 
combat significantly influenced Federal fighting effectiveness. The quality of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 246-69; James M. McPherson, Drawn with the Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 113-36; Reid Mitchell, “The Perseverance of the Soldiers”; in 
Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Why the Confederacy Lost (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 109-32; and 
Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, 123-50. For an introduction to Confederate nationalism, see Drew Gilpin 
Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Eric H. Walther, The Fire-Eaters (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1992); and Don E. Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in 
the Slaveholding South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989). 
20 For an analysis of morale in the Army of Northern Virginia that corroborates this study’s data 
regarding the decline of Confederate morale by late 1864 and early 1865, see J. Tracy Power, Lee’s 
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soldiers, their prebattle activities, their cumulative levels of combat experience, and the 
amount of time that they spent between engagements, combined sometimes to sharpen, 
ofttimes to dull, the cutting edge of the Union soldiers. The model also indicated that 
various environmental aspects affected northern combat performance in meaningful 
ways. The battlefield terrain, the combatants’ tactical actions, the weather, and to a lesser 
degree, the tactical position and artillery strength maintained by the defensive force, 
combined to give Federal soldiers an occasional advantage, though frequently the Union 
men were handicapped by the difficulties associated with offensive tactics. However, 
certain physical aspects appear less important than previously thought. Weaponry, 
regimental strength, and personnel changes all failed to exert meaningful influence on 
regimental combat performance. Finally, application of the model to address the question 
regarding martial superiority suggests that Confederate soldiers often fought with greater 
effectiveness than their northern counterparts. 
In addition to detailing those aspects of combat that most influenced performance, 
the combined model also suggests that a simple environmental interpretation of Civil 
War combat may be less reliable than previous thought. Analysis indicated that the 
behavioral aspects of battle exerted a somewhat greater influence on outcome. Though 
the physical characteristics of the fighting were important, they were often overshadowed 
by the mental condition of the men. When studied in combination, however, the 
behavioral and environmental factors identified in the model provided a dependable 
methodology for understanding Civil War combat. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Miserables: Life in the Army of Northern Virginia from the Wilderness to Appomattox (Chapel Hill: 




This study is a limited statistical analysis of Civil War combat. It is based on the 
personnel records of twenty-seven Federal infantry and heavy artillery regiments and on 
the combat histories of their 465 engagements in the eastern theater of operations from 
1861 to 1865. It also includes Confederate regimental combat information for each of 
these engagements. Because of the large number of Confederate regiments that 
participated in the 465 engagements, it was not possible to include their complete rosters 
and battle histories in the database. Nevertheless, the data collected for this study are 
unusually rich, and they provide a unique perspective on the nature of Civil War combat. 
Analysis of the data indicates the need to reconsider the consensus view of Civil 
War combat. Traditional emphasis on combat’s physical features appears less reliable 
than generally thought. Though the environmental aspects of combat were influential, the 
behavioral aspects had a somewhat greater impact on small-unit actions. The attitudes, 
opinions, and experiences of the men facing each other in battle were more likely to 
shape the results of combat than their weapons, positions, and actions. 
The three variables with the greatest influence on combat performance were all 
measurements of the combatants’ mental state at the time of battle. The quality of the 
soldiers’ morale and cohesiveness and their trust in the abilities of their commanding 
officers appeared critical in determining who emerged from the fray unbowed and who 
emerged bludgeoned. The soldiers’ cumulative level of combat experience also affected 
their determination to fight. Finally, the prebattle activities of the men demonstrated both 
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positive and negative effects on their ability to perform under enemy fire. In combination, 
these three variables reliably explained Federal combat performance in almost half the 
engagements examined in this study. 
Certain physical characteristics of Civil War battlefields also affected combat 
performance, though to a lesser degree than the aforementioned behavioral variables. 
Most of the environmental factors commonly emphasized by both soldiers and scholars 
appeared important in separating victor from vanquished. Terrain emerged as the most 
influential physical characteristic in combat, especially the slope of the battlefield. The 
combatants’ actions, positions, and artillery strengths also affected their fighting 
efficiency in meaningful ways. Finally, the impact of the weather on combat performance 
appeared greater than perhaps traditionally thought. Together, these environmental 
variables adequately explained Federal combat performance approximately 40 percent of 
the time. 
Because the data indicate that combat performance during the Civil War was 
influenced more by the men doing the fighting than by the mechanisms with which they 
fought, it may be appropriate to reconsider the relationship of Civil War combat to other 
wars. Most scholars agree that the American Civil War marked a transitional period in 
the military history of the western world; it bridged the gap between the Napoleonic 
warfare of the early nineteenth century and the modern warfare of the early twentieth 
century. As a midpoint between these two European conflicts, the Civil War shared 
numerous characteristics with both epochs. Aspects of the American conflict, ranging 
from mobilization to industrialization, have been analyzed for similarities and differences 
with both the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. Though the majority of these analyses 
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are beyond the scope of this project, it is in the area of small-unit actions that this study 
may offer a fresh perspective. 
If the Civil War marked a transitional period in military history, then it raises 
numerous historical questions by virtue of its unique chronological circumstances. 
Foremost among these questions has been: Was Civil War combat more like that of the 
Napoleonic Wars or the First World War? In addressing this question, scholars have 
examined various tactical aspects of battle. Comparisons of combat variables such as 
action, position, formation, weaponry, morale, cohesion, leadership, etc., have produced a 
multitude of valuable studies regarding the three wars. Yet these studies have failed to 
agree on the proper place of Civil War combat in military history. This lack of consensus 
is due in part to the numerous variables being considered. For example, offensive actions 
may have yielded successful results for Napoleon’s soldiers, but they frequently brought 
stalemate or defeat to the soldiers of the Civil War and World War I. Similarly, the 
soldiers’ construction and use of defensive field fortifications may not have occurred 
with regularity during the Napoleonic Wars, but the men frequently depended on such 
defensive works by the end of the Civil War and throughout most of World War I. 
Though such a wide range of potential combat analyses has led to numerous 
insightful studies regarding various aspects of nineteenth- and twentieth-century warfare, 
the plenitude of topics has served to diffuse and fragment the scholarship. Therefore, it 
may be more useful to modify the analytical approach used to understand the Civil War’s 
place in military history. Instead of comparing the overall combat experiences of the 
different historical periods, it may be more beneficial to examine only those aspects of 
battle that most influenced combat performance. In other words, the question to be 
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answered is this: Were the most influential aspects of Civil War combat more like those 
of the Napoleonic Wars or those of the First World War? In this way, the dialogue will be 
limited only to those battle variables that held the greatest sway over tactical combat 
performance. 
The data in this study showed that the behavioral aspects of battle influenced 
martial performance more than the environmental aspects usually emphasized in combat 
histories of the Civil War. The spirit and emotions of the men often determined the 
outcome of small-unit actions. In this regard, Civil War combat was much like that of the 
Napoleonic Wars. The results of small-unit actions were often the product of one force 
disrupting and destroying another force’s cohesiveness and will to fight. Through the 
combined use of infantry and cavalry, Napoleon’s troops often gained tactical superiority 
over their opponents by surprising them and allowing the ensuing panic to undermine the 
enemy’s ability to fight. Though the mechanical ways in which tactical success was 
achieved may have differed between the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War, 
the understanding that small-unit actions turned on the mental strengths of the men 
fighting remained constant. 
Although the behavioral aspects of combat were important for both French and 
Federal soldiers, the mental status of the men failed to influence significantly the 
outcome of most engagements during World War I. By 1914 the soldiers’ ability to 
influence the results of combat had yielded to the overwhelming lethality of modern 
battlefields. Machine guns, breech-loading artillery, high explosives, barbed wire, and 
complex trench systems had transformed the tactical nature of combat from a battlefield 
in which the soldiers significantly influenced the outcome, to a battlefield in which the 
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weapons and fortifications most influenced the outcome. On this new battlefield, highly-
motivated men, making gallant assaults, would rarely threaten the enemy position. The 
waves of soldiers simply rolled toward the enemy’s guns and routinely broke short of his 
position. 
The transformation of combat tactics from the Napoleonic Wars through World 
War I may be described as a classic struggle between man and machine. In the early 
nineteenth century, the human component of battle proved more powerful than combat’s 
physical aspects. By the mid-nineteenth century, the attitudes and sentiments of the 
soldiers engaged in small-unit actions still overshadowed the environmental components 
of the battlefield, though the difference appeared less pronounced than fifty years earlier. 
By the early twentieth century, however, the soldiers’ will to fight made little difference 
when caught in the sights of an enemy machine gun or under the weight of an enemy 
artillery barrage. The technology of warfare had overcome the soldiers’ ability to 





APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL PROCEDURES 
Throughout Chapter 3, three statistical procedures were used to identify and 
describe the relationships between combat performance and the environmental and 
behavioral variables included in most analyses of Civil War combat. The three tests are 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, analysis of variance, and Pearson’s chi-square. The 
following is a description of these statistical procedures, coupled with their application in 
examining the relationship between tactical actions and combat results. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) was used to measure the extent to which 
changes in one variable may have affected changes in another variable. The value of “r” 
varies from -1 to +1; its absolute value reveals the strength of the relationship, with 
higher absolute values indicating stronger relationships. The sign of “r” denotes the 
direction of the relationship. A positive “r” value indicates that as one of the variables 
increases in value, so too does the value of the other variable; a negative “r” value 
indicates that as one variable increases, the other decreases. 
The p value associated with Pearson’s correlation coefficient, as well as with 
most statistical procedures, asserts whether the two variables are significantly associated. 
The general rule for interpreting the value of p is: If p is less than or equal to .05, then the 
relationship between the variables is statistically significant. A p value less than or equal 
to .05, indicates that there is only a 5 percent chance (or less, depending on the exact 
value of p) that the relationship between the two variables is the result of coincidence. A 
p value of .05 is widely accepted as the threshold for statistical significance. 
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Pearson’s correlation procedure compared the numerical values of both the 
Federals’ and Confederates’ action-outcome groupings in each of the 465 engagements 
included in this study. Pearson’s coefficient for the Federals was r = .096 with p = .038. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the Confederates was r = .176 with p < .0005. These 
results indicate the existence of a statistically significant, positive relationship between 
action and outcome. High action values correlated with high outcome values. Note that 
the highest action value is “3 = Defense,” and that the highest outcome value is “3 = 
Win.” In other words, Pearson’s correlation procedure indicates that defensive tactics 
proved more successful than offensive tactics, and that both the success of defensive 
tactics and the defeat of offensive tactics probably cannot be explained through 
coincidence. 
Like Pearson’s correlation procedure, analysis of variance was used to measure 
the relationship between the outcome and action variables. In this test, however, outcome 
was treated as a continuous variable and action was treated as a categorical variable. The 
test compared the variation in outcome numerical values (“1 = Lose,” “2 = Stalemate,” or 
“3 = Win”) relative to the possible categories of the action variable (“Offense,” “Mixed,” 
or “Defense”). A test that produced an F statistic markedly greater than 1.0 indicated that 
a significant association existed between outcome and action. The number of “degrees of 
freedom” (df) associated with the F statistic was used to determine the p value of the test. 
The p value indicated whether the relationship between the two variables was statistically 
significant. 
When testing outcome and action, the resulting Federal F statistic was 8.786 with 
2 df and p < .0005. The Confederate F statistic was 9.565 with 2 df and p < .0005. Note 
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that in most instances throughout this study when analysis of variance is applied, one of 
the assumptions of the test is often violated. The validity of the test is dependent upon 
equal variances in the distribution of the continuous variable (outcome) among the groups 
created by the categorical variable (action). In most instances, the data used in this study 
violated the assumption of equal variances. Though the inequality of variances lessened 
the reliability of the test, the large sample size (465 engagements) served to offset the 
potential inaccuracies caused by the inequality of variances. Therefore, analysis of 
variance was used throughout this study despite its limitations. When possible, additional 
statistical tests were included in an effort to corroborate the conclusions suggested by 
analysis of variance. 
Finally, Pearson’s chi-square test was used to measure the relationship between 
the categorical nature of the two variables (action = “Offense,” “Mixed,” or “Defense”; 
outcome = “Win,” “Stalemate,” or “Lose”). This test compared the “observed” 
distribution of outcome-action pairings with the “expected” distribution. If the difference 
between the observed and expected distributions was great, the test generally produced a 
high chi-square value, indicating that the variables may be associated. However, the 
value of chi-square has no absolute meaning. Therefore, similar to analysis of variance, 
the number of degrees of freedom was used to calculate a p value for the test. If p was 
less than or equal to .05, then the relationship between the two variables was considered 
significant. Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Federals’ outcome-action pairings was 
33.112 with 4 df and p < .0005. Pearson’s chi-square statistic for the Confederates’ 
outcome-action pairings was 38.892 with 4 df and p < .0005. 
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All three statistical procedures indicated that a relationship between tactical 
actions and combat outcomes existed, and that the relationship was probably not the 
result of coincidence. Additionally, Pearson’s correlation procedure showed that the 
relationship between the two variables was positive, indicating that defensive tactics 
tended to succeed and offensive tactics tended to fail. Based on the results of these 
statistical procedures, it appears that the tactical actions taken by two opposing forces 
directly influenced their respective battlefield results. Furthermore, when either side 
fought defensively, they significantly increased their chances for success. 
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APPENDIX B: GENERAL LINEAR MODELS 
The General Linear Model (GLM) procedure is an advanced statistical test often 
used by applied and social scientists when attempting to interpret vast amounts of 
complex data. Although a deep understanding of the GLM requires advanced statistical 
training, the procedure simply defines the pattern that best fits the general relationships 
that exist within the data. Once this pattern is defined, the GLM can identify those 
variables that most closely mirror it. Of course the model does not represent every 
possible variable in the data set nor every variable that could have been measured. In 
fact, the model probably does not resemble any single variable. Rather, it represents a 
summary of the data by showing the general pattern contained within it. Therefore, 
conclusions drawn from a GLM must be recognized as probable scenarios and not 
absolute truths. 
Several factors make a general linear model the logical procedure for analyzing 
and predicting Federal battle results. First, for a large sample the test can allow for 
departures from normality within the data. Given the nature of combat, few variables 
included in this study exhibit the characteristics of a normal distribution. Second, the 
procedure is designed to compare and contrast the effects of both categorical and 
continuous predictor variables on a single dependent variable. In other words, it can mix 
categorical variables (e.g., terrain, position, etc.) with continuous variables (e.g., 
strength, casualties, etc.) to see what the combined effect of these variables may have 
been on combat performance. Finally, the GLM can measure the individual influence that 
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each variable had on combat outcome and produce a ranking of these variables from most 
influential to least influential. 
Each GLM was designed using Federal outcome as the dependent variable and all 
remaining variables as independent variables. The independent variables were further 
divided into either categorical or continuous variables. Once the data were separated, the 
procedure automatically divided the data into groups based on the categorical variables 
and compared the intra-group effects of the continuous variables on the intra-group 
means of the dependent variable. In other words, the test divided all the data into groups 
defined by the categorical variables and then compared the influence that the various 
intra-group continuous variables had on the mean values of Federal outcome. Through 
these intra-group and between-group comparisons of mean values, the procedure was 
able to measure the variation in Federal outcome caused by a specific variable while 
controlling for the effects of the other variables. 
All of the GLMs presented the same statistical information. The column labeled 
“Variables” listed those variables that, when examined in combination, demonstrated 
statistically significant relationships with Federal outcome. The column designated “F 
statistic” presented the F statistic for each variable relative to Federal outcome. The 
column titled “p value” described the statistical strength of the relationship between each 
variable and Federal outcome.1 The column marked “Partial Eta Squared” described the 
ratio of the variation of Federal outcome accounted for by an individual variable to the 
sum of the variation accounted for by the variable and the variation unaccounted for by 
the model as a whole. The higher a variable’s Partial Eta Squared value, the greater the 
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amount of influence it exerted on Federal outcome. In other words, the Partial Eta 
Squared values describe the relative magnitude of each variable’s impact on Federal 
outcome. 
Finally the Adjusted R Squared statistic appears at the bottom of each GLM. It is 
a goodness-of-fit measurement used in linear models containing several independent 
variables. Simply stated, the Adjusted R Squared value may be interpreted as the 
proportion of variation in Federal combat outcomes accurately predicted by the variables 
in the model. It is based on the R Squared statistic, which describes the proportion of 
variation in the dependent variable (Federal outcome) explained by the model’s 
independent variables (e.g., terrain, strength, etc.), and is adjusted for the number of 
independent variables and the sample size. The R Squared statistic ranges in value from 0 
to 1; the Adjusted R Squared statistic may be less than 0 for poorly fitted models. Small 
values indicate that the model does not fit the data well, and large values indicate that the 
model accurately describes most of the data. 
The GLMs discussed in Chapter 5 are presented below. Table 5 describes the 
impact of combat’s environmental characteristics on battle performance. Table 6 presents 
the influence of the behavioral aspects of battle on combat effectiveness. Finally, Table 7 
depicts the combined effects of both combat’s environmental and behavioral variables on 
battle performance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 For a discussion of F statistics and p values, see Appendix A, pp. 138-41. 
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Table 5 
GLM of All Significant Environmental Variables Relative to Federal Outcome 
Environmental Variables F statistic p value Partial Eta Squared 
Terrain 9.666 < .0005 .166 
Weather 19.468 < .0005 .151 
U.S.A. Formation 26.803 < .0005 .109 
U.S.A. Action 21.987 < .0005 .091 
C.S.A. Artillery 33.185 < .0005 .070 
U.S.A. Position 5.234 < .0005 .067 
C.S.A. Action 7.811 < .0005 .034 
Corrected Modela 14.036 < .0005 .455 







GLM of All Significant Behavioral Variables Relative to Federal Outcome 
Behavioral Variables F statistic p value Partial Eta Squared 
C.S.A. Quality 66.371 < .0005 .245 
Battle Number 2.303 .001 .115 
U.S.A. Prebattle 12-24 hrs 4.738 < .0005 .085 
U.S.A. Prebattle 36-48 hrs 4.283 < .0005 .068 
U.S.A. Prebattle 24-36 hrs 3.224 .002 .052 
U.S.A. Quality 6.866 .001 .032 
U.S.A. Prebattle 0-12 hrs 2.148 .047 .031 
Corrected Modela 9.008 < .0005 .548 
a The model’s R Squared = .548 (Adjusted R Squared = .487) 
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Table 7 
GLM of All Significant Variables Combined Relative to Federal Outcome 
Behavioral Variables F statistic p value Partial Eta Squared 
C.S.A. Quality 44.085 < .0005 .184 
Battle Number 3.323 < .0005 .163 
U.S.A. Prebattle 12-24 hrs 9.335 < .0005 .160 
Terrain 6.889 < .0005 .137 
U.S.A. Position 9.813 < .0005 .131 
Weather 13.526 < .0005 .122 
U.S.A. Prebattle 0-12 hrs 8.120 < .0005 .111 
U.S.A. Prebattle 24-36 hrs 6.230 < .0005 .100 
U.S.A. Action 10.553 < .0005 .051 
C.S.A. Artillery 16.248 < .0005 .040 
C.S.A. Action 6.671 .001 .033 
U.S.A. Quality 4.589 .011 .023 
Days Between Battles 5.620 .018 .014 
Corrected Modela 9.008 < .0005 .548 
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